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Through	the	years,	many	philosophers	have	appealed	to	reflective	endorsement	to	address	important	philosophical	problems.		In	this	dissertation,	I	evaluate	the	merits	of	those	approaches.		I	first	consider	Christine	Korsgaard’s	appeal	to	reflective	endorsement	to	solve	what	she	calls	“the	normative	problem.”		I	then	consider	Harry	Frankfurt’s	use	of	reflective	endorsement	as	part	of	his	account	of	“caring,”	which	plays	a	crucial	role	in	his	accounts	of	agency,	free	will,	and	personhood.		I	then	turn	to	Marilyn	Friedman’s	use	of	reflective	endorsement	to	explain	autonomous	action.		Finally,	I	turn	to	Alan	Gibbard’s	use	of	reflective	endorsement	as	part	of	an	account	of	what	it	is	to	make	a	normative	judgment.		I	argue	that	each	of	these	positions	is	subject	to	similar	problems—they	fail	to	provide	a	plausible	account	of	the	self.		In	the	remaining	chapters,	I	argue	that	empirical	psychological	studies	suggest	that	reflective	endorsement	plays	an	important	role	with	respect	to	psychological	health,	but	that	judgments	made	by	using	a	process	of	reflective	endorsement	are	generally	not	accurate.		Ultimately,	I	argue	that	reflective	endorsement	is	valuable,	but	only	under	certain	circumstances.	
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CHAPTER	I	
INTRODUCTION	
	Many	of	history’s	deepest	thinkers	have	identified	our	capacity	to	introspect	as	the	source	of	some	of	the	most	unique	features	of	human	experience.		It	has	been	suggested	that	the	capacity	for	reflection	gave	us	the	evolutionary	advantage	we	needed	to	survive,	that	it	makes	free	action	possible,	that	it	lends	some	sort	of	normative	authority	to	an	agent’s	actions,	and	that	it	gives	rise	to	our	deepest	existential	anxieties.		Our	ability	to	introspect	allows	us	to	decide	what	matters	to	us,	to	set	goals	and	to	make	plans.		 Not	only	are	human	beings	capable	of	introspection,	they	are	capable	of	taking	evaluative	positions	toward	their	own	inner	states.		They	can	adopt	second	order	desires	about	their	desires	or	second	order	beliefs	about	their	beliefs.		They	can	disavow	their	desire	to	take	a	drug	or	endorse	their	inclination	to	start	to	work	on	that	novel	they	always	intended	to	write.		 If	introspection	and	the	capacity	for	endorsement	set	human	experience	apart,	it	is	not	surprising	that	philosophers	have	been	motivated	to	appeal	to	that	very	feature	to	solve	a	host	of	philosophical	problems	that	trouble	humans—or	beings	sufficiently	like	humans.		Introspection	and	endorsement	are	used	as	the	lynchpins	in	accounts	of	philosophical	topics	like	free	will,	autonomy,	agency,	normativity,	morality,	and	in	accounts	of	justification	in	epistemology.		 One	feature	that	most	of	these	accounts	share	in	common	is	a	faith	in	the	knowledge	of	the	self	that	is	gained	through	introspection.		Most	of	these	views	
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maintain	that	we	come	to	see	pretty	clearly	upon	introspection	the	set	of	things	that	we	truly	care	about,	the	real	motivations	for	our	actions,	and	the	extent	to	which	our	beliefs,	desires,	goals	and	projects	are	internally	consistent.		The	idea	that	we	see	our	“true	selves”	clearly	upon	introspection	seems	to	be,	on	many	accounts,	the	source	of	the	authority	of	its	outputs.		The	value	of	endorsement	is	often	tied	to	the	value	of	authenticity.		 Running	counter	to	the	sense	of	confidence	philosophers	seem	to	have	on	this	topic	are	both	philosophical	arguments	and	evidence	in	empirical	psychology	that	suggests	that	human	beings	don’t	understand	themselves	and	their	motivation	for	action	anywhere	near	as	well	as	they	think	that	they	do.		For	example,	in	their	work,	The	Person	and	the	Situation,	social	psychologists	Nisbett	and	Ross	survey	a	wide	range	of	studies	that	support	the	conclusion	that	our	attributions	of	stable	personality	characteristics,	both	in	others	and	in	ourselves,	are	often	wrong,	and	that	the	motivation	for	a	wide	range	of	human	behavior	actually	has	to	do	with	the	particulars	of	the	external	situation	in	which	people	find	themselves.	If	our	attributions	of	enduring	personality	traits	are	misguided,	then	perhaps	our	affirmation	of	those	very	traits	upon	introspection	is	not	actually	the	promising	tool	in	the	philosopher’s	toolbox	that	it	is	frequently	taken	to	be.			 		It	will	be	my	project	in	this	book	to	evaluate	philosophical	arguments	that	make	use	of	introspection	and	endorsement	to	determine	when,	if	ever,	such	accounts	are	successful.	One	major	challenge	to	the	completion	of	a	project	like	this	is	that	thinkers	use	very	different	language	to	describe	a	very	similar	concept.		Throughout	this	work,	I	will	be	using	Christine	Korsgaard’s	terminology,	“reflective	
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endorsement”	to	describe	the	phenomenon	that	interests	me.		Each	of	the	accounts	that	I	will	survey	uses	different	language	to	describe	the	process	that	is	my	primary	focus.	I	take	them	to	each	have	the	same	general	processes	in	mind—the	process	of	(1)	introspection,	and	(2),	taking	an	evaluative	position	toward	the	inner	states	upon	which	one	introspects.		For	each	account,	this	process	will	be	key	to	solving	some	major	philosophical	puzzle.		
Roadmap	In	the	next	chapter	of	this	work,	I	will	look	at	Christine	Korsgaard’s	use	of	reflective	endorsement	in	her	work	The	Sources	of	Normativity.		I	will	ultimately	argue	that	the	procedure	of	reflective	endorsement	cannot	do	what	she	wants	it	to	do—it	cannot	answer	what	she	calls	“the	normative	question”	in	a	way	provides	a	fundamental	grounding	for	our	normative	judgments.		 In	the	third	chapter,	I	will	look	at	Harry	Frankfurt’s	use	of	the	concept	of	endorsement	in	a	wide	range	of	his	works.		Frankfurt	uses	it	to	explain	a	number	of	key	philosophical	concepts.		Underlying	all	of	these	explanations	is	Frankfurt’s	account	of	caring,	which	fundamentally	relies	on	endorsement.		In	chapter	two,	I	will	argue	that	Frankfurt’s	endorsement-based	approach	to	understanding	caring	doesn’t	capture	the	full	range	of	cases	in	which	human	beings	intuitively	care	about	things.		 	In	the	fourth	chapter,	I	will	look	at	Marilyn	Friedman’s	endorsement	account	of	autonomy.		She	argues	that	autonomous	actions	are	actions	that	issue	from	an	agent’s	“true	self.”		On	this	view,	judgments	that	issue	from	an	agent’s	true	self	have	
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authority	over	actions	that	issue	from	aspects	of	a	person	from	which	that	person	is	alienated.		I	will	argue	that	endorsed	states	do	not	always,	or	even	often,	reflect	an	agent’s	“true	self.”		If	this	is	so,	then	endorsed	behaviors	do	not	have	the	kind	of	authority	that	they	need	to	truly	be	considered	autonomous.		 In	Chapter	Five,	I	will	consider	Allan	Gibbard’s	expressivist	account	of	the	nature	of	normative	judgments.		Gibbard’s	project	is	very	different	from	the	projects	of	the	other	philosophers	presented	here.		I	include	Gibbard	in	this	work	because	he	makes	claims	about	the	relationship	between	motivation,	normative	judgment,	and	reflective	endorsement	that	are	directly	related	to	the	concerns	pertaining	to	moral	psychology	that	I	raise	for	the	other	thinkers	we	will	consider.		I	will	argue	that	the	taxonomy	of	motivation	that	Gibbard	provides	is	too	narrow—his	endorsement	account	of	normative	judgments	leaves	out	other	psychological	events	that	are,	intuitively,	normative	judgments	as	well.		 The	major	theme	of	this	book	will	be	that	reflective	endorsement	cannot	do	all	the	things	that	it	is	claimed	that	it	can	do.		In	Chapter	Six,	I	will	argue	that	one	major	shortcoming	of	the	views	considered	here	is	that	emphasis	is	put	on	the	value	
of	the	process	of	endorsement	itself,	rather	than	how	reliably	it	produces	outputs	that	are	truly	valuable.		In	Chapter	Seven,	I	will	argue	that	reflective	endorsement	is	sometimes	valuable	toward	the	end	of	psychological	health.		Finally,	in	the	last	chapter,	I	will	sketch	a	virtue	theoretic	account	of	the	way	in	which	reflective	endorsement,	under	a	narrow	set	of	conditions,	could	help	to	achieve	a	set	of	values	that	is	more	philosophical	in	nature.	
	
	5	
	
CHAPTER	II	
REFLECTIVE	ENDORSEMENT,	CONSTRUCTIVISM,	AND	NORMATIVE	
GROUNDING	
	In	her	influential	work	The	Sources	of	Normativity,	hereafter	‘SN,’	Christine	Korsgaard	introduces	the	method	of	reflective	endorsement	as	a	way	to	ground	normativity.		She	argues	that	the	very	idea	of	normativity	gives	rise	to	a	general	problem.		Because	we	are	reflective	creatures,	we	can	deliberate	about	our	reasons	for	action.		For	any	normative	claim,	we	can	always	ask	ourselves,	“Why	should	I	accept	that?”		This	leads	to	a	question	about	the	foundations	of	normativity	itself,	that	is,	about	its	ultimate	grounds	or	justification.		For	example,	we	find	ourselves	faced	on	a	daily	basis	with	all	kinds	of	normative	dilemmas.		A	person	who	craves	chocolate	might	ask	herself,	“Should	I	eat	this	slice	of	cake?”		If	she	decides	that	she	shouldn’t	eat	it	because	doing	so	is	unhealthy,	she	might	raise	the	further	question,	“But	why	should	I	care	about	being	healthy?”		We	need	an	answer	to	these	normative	questions	that	provides	some	kind	of	satisfactory	justification.1		We	also	
																																																								1	I’ve	identified	what	might	be	understood	as	two	distinct	questions	here.		The	first	question	is	of	the	form	“Why	should	I	care	about	P?”	and	the	second	is	of	the	form	“What	would	provide	satisfactory	justification	for	P?”		An	answer	to	one	of	these	questions	doesn’t	necessarily	constitute	an	answer	to	the	other.		For	example	it	may	be	the	case	that	we	could	provide	a	full	account	of	the	justification	for	a	normative	claim	without	thereby	providing	any	reason	for	any	particular	agent	to	care	about	that	normative	claim	or	to	be	motivated	by	it.		Korsgaard	rejects	the	idea	that	these	are	two	distinct	questions.		She	contends	that	a	satisfactory	answer	to	the	justificatory	question	will	answer	the	“why	should	I	care?”	question,	if	it	is	answered	correctly.		As	we	will	see,	she	grounds	normativity	in	a	feature	of	ourselves	that	we	
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find	ourselves	faced	with	distinctively	moral	normative	dilemmas.		For	example,	imagine	that	someone	I	love	commits	a	serious	crime.		Should	I	turn	them	in?		In	these	types	of	situations,	morality	might	demand	me	to	substantially	sacrifice	my	own	interests	for	the	sake	of	some	overriding	moral	concern.		For	this	reason,	moral	claims	require	a	special	kind	of	answer	that	explains	why	we	should	be	committed	to	morality	in	the	first	place.		Call	these	various	concerns	about	the	justification	of	normative	claims	the	Normative	Problem.	In	SN,	Korsgaard	claims	that	an	adequate	answer	to	the	Normative	Problem	must	be	able	to	solve	standard	regress	worries.		For	any	normative	claim,	we	can	ask:	“But	why	should	I	care	about	that?”		On	Korsgaard’s	view,	if	we	can	identify	some	reply	about	which	it	would	be	incoherent	to	raise	this	question,	we	have	found	a	satisfactory	answer	to	the	Normative	Problem.2		In	order	to	achieve	this	result,	she	argues	that	the	type	of	value	involved	in	justifying	normative	claims	must	be	both	‘intrinsic’	and	‘final’.		Something	has	‘intrinsic’	value	if	it	has	value	in	itself	and	does	not	derive	its	value	from	any	outside	source.	Something	has	‘final’	or	‘non-instrumental’	value	if	we	value	it	for	its	own	sake	rather	than	for	the	sake	of	achieving	some	other	end.	As	Korsgaard	describes	the	difference	between	these	two	ideas,	the	former	identifies	the	source	of	value	whereas	the	latter	explains	how	we	value	it.34																																																																																																																																																																						can’t	help	but	to	care	about—our	capacity	to	care	about	or	value	things	in	the	first	place.		2	Korsgaard,	Christine.	1996.	The	Sources	of	Normativity,	Cambridge	University	Press.	93.	3	Ibid.,	111.	4	For	further	discussion	of	this	distinction,	see	Korsgaard	1983	where	she	argues	against	the	standard	conflation	of	(1)	something	having	‘intrinsic’	value,	which	she	
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One	final	criterion	Korsgaard	sets	forth	for	a	general	account	of	normativity	is	that	it	must	be	able	to	explain	both	moral	and	non-moral	normative	claims.		It	must	explain	why	we	are	conditionally	committed	to	various	non-moral	normative	claims	and	unconditionally	committed	to	moral	ones.			In	this	chapter,	I	will	argue	that	Korsgaard’s	commitment	to	the	importance	of	reflective	endorsement	generates	a	number	of	problems.		First,	I	will	argue	that	her	view	generates	counterintuitive	results	in	non-moral	cases.		I	will	then	argue	that	her	view	does	not	generate	the	results	that	she	wants	in	moral	cases	either,	because	she	has	established	neither	that	our	humanity	has	intrinsic	value	nor	that	it	has	final	value.		I	will	argue	further	that,	though	she	attempts	to	adopt	only	a	procedural	realism	according	to	which	reflective	endorsement	has	value,	her	view	actually	commits	her,	after	all,	to	substantive	moral	realism.		
Korsgaard’s	Constructivism		Korsgaard	defends	a	constructivist	approach	to	the	Normative	Problem.		While	
realists	maintain	that	there	exist	normative	truths	that	hold	independently	of	our	own	judgments,	attitudes,	or	beliefs,	constructivists	argue	that	what	makes	a	normative	claim	true	is	that	it	is	a	result	of	practical	deliberation	of	a	certain	sort.			As	Samuel	Freeman	explains,	for	constructivism,	“moral	principles	are	correct	(or	true	or	reasonable)	when	they	are	the	outcome	of	a	deliberative	procedure	that	
																																																																																																																																																																					contrasts	with	having	‘extrinsic’	value,	and	(2)	something	having	‘non-instrumental’	or	‘final’	value,	in	contrast	to	being	merely’	instrumentally’	valuable	for	the	sake	of	realizing	some	further	end.		
	8	
incorporates	all	of	the	relevant	criteria	for	correct	reasoning.”5	On	a	constructivist	view,	our	normative	judgments	are	correct	insofar	as	they	issue	from	the	right	kind	of	procedure	of	construction	where	appropriate	constraints	are	placed	upon	our	rational	deliberation.				 In	SN,	Korsgaard	identifies	the	correct	deliberative	procedure	for	action	in	general	in	terms	of	conforming	to	what	she	calls	our	“practical	identities.”			What	is	a	practical	identity?		As	Korsgaard	defines	the	term,	one’s	practical	identity	is	“a	description	under	which	you	value	yourself,	a	description	under	which	you	find	your	life	to	be	worth	living	and	your	actions	to	be	worth	undertaking.”6	To	act	in	accordance	with	a	practical	identity	is	to	reflectively	endorse	reasons	for	action	based	upon	some	specific	conception	of	ourselves.			Most	of	these	identities	are	contingent.	For	example,	a	person	might	conceive	of	herself	as	a	mother,	a	daughter,	a	member	of	a	profession,	or	a	citizen	of	a	state.		Some	identities	are	more	central	to	our	lives	than	others.		The	demands	these	practical	identities	make	on	us	take	priority	over	others	that	are	less	fundamental	to	who	we	are.		All	of	our	practical	identities	in	general	serve	to	ground	normative	claims.		As	Korsgaard	argues,	“Your	reasons	for	acting	express	your	identity,	your	nature;	your	obligations	spring	from	what	that	identity	forbids.”7		For	Korsgaard,	however,	we	have	one	practical	identity	that	is	not	contingent,	namely,	our	‘humanity’.		Humanity	is,	as	she	defines	it,	our	“identity																																																									5	Freeman,	Samuel.	2007	Rawls,	Routledge,	New	York.	292.		6	Korsgaard,	Christine.	1996.	The	Sources	of	Normativity,	Cambridge	University	Press.	101.	7	Ibid.,	101.	
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simply	as	a	human	being,	a	reflective	animal	who	needs	reasons	to	act	and	to	live.”8	As	she	later	explains,	we	are	‘human	beings’	insofar	as	we	“need	to	have	practical	conceptions	of	[our]	identity	in	order	to	act	or	to	live,”	where	this	most	fundamental	identity	“stands	behind”	all	the	other	particular	identities	we	might	have.9		Because	of	its	special	status,	Korsgaard	concludes	that	we	must	value	our	own	humanity—as	well	as	the	humanity	of	everybody	else—unconditionally.		We	can	reconstruct	her	argument	as	follows:			 1.		We	need	reasons	in	order	to	act	or	to	live.10		2:		Our	reasons	for	action	derive	from	our	practical	identities,	or	conceptions	of	ourselves	under	which	we	value	ourselves.11	3.	Our	commitment	to	any	specific	practical	identity	arises	from	our	humanity,	or	our	need	to	act	in	conformity	with	practical	identities	in	general.12	4.	Therefore,	if	we	value	any	specific	practical	identity,	we	must	value	our	own	humanity13			 5.	Therefore,	if	we	are	to	act	at	all,	we	must	value	our	own	humanity.14		6.	“To	treat	our	human	identity	as	normative,	as	the	source	of	reasons	and	obligations,	is	to	have…	[a]	‘moral	identity.’15		7.	“Valuing	humanity	in	your	own	person	rationally	requires	valuing	it	in	the	persons	of	others.”16			This	is	meant	to	be	a	transcendental	argument.		Korsgaard	begins	with	a	claim	that	she	thinks	we	all	accept,	namely,	that	we	need	reasons	in	order	to	act,	where	these	reasons	are	grounded	upon	what	we	value.			She	then	attempts	to	show	that	in	order	for	this	to	be	the	true,	we	need	to	value	our	own	humanity,	which	grounds	the	very																																																									8	Ibid.,	121.	9	Ibid.,	129.	10	Ibid.,	121.	11	Ibid.,	101.	12	Ibid.,	129.	13	Ibid.,	123.	14	Ibid.,	123.	15	Ibid.,	129.	16	Ibid.,	121.	
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possibility	of	valuing	in	general.			She	builds	upon	this	result	to	argue	that,	on	pain	of	rational	inconsistency,	we	must	be	moral.		Morality	requires	that	we	must	value	humanity	as	it	is	found	in	other	people	as	well.17					 There	are	three	main	corollaries	related	to	Korsgaard’s	argument.	In	the	sections	below,	I	show	how	all	three	lead	to	problems	for	Korsgaard’s	overall	view.	Call	the	first	and	most	fundamental	corollary	the	‘Reflective	Endorsement	Thesis’	(RET):		REFLECTIVE	ENDORSMENT	THESIS:		Practical	identities	must	be	reflectively	endorsed,	that	is,	we	must	affirm	them	as	being	valuable.		Without	the	RET,	Korsgaard’s	view	doesn’t	get	off	the	ground.	Korsgaard	embraces	the	RET	because	she	thinks	that	our	conceptions	of	ourselves	spring	from	the	fact	that	we	are	self-reflective	creatures.		The	concept	of	reflective	endorsement	is	a	necessary,	crucial	feature	of	Korsgaard’s	account.	When	we	come	to	regard	a	practical	identity	as	expressive	of	ourselves,	we	reflectively	endorse	that	identity	as	something	we	value.	Call	the	second	corollary	the	‘Source	of	Reasons	and	Obligations	Thesis’	(SROT):		SOURCE	OF	REASONS	AND	OBLIGATIONS	THESIS:		Practical	identities	give	rise	to	reasons	and	obligations.		Korsgaard	offers	the	following	considerations	in	support	of	SROT.			The	practical	identities	we	adopt	explain	why	we	take	some	of	our	desires	to	be	reasons	for	us	and	not	others.		For	example,	we	might	exclude	some	desires	because	they	seem	‘alien’	to	us,	because	we	do	not	identify	with	them	or	want	to	be	moved	by	them.		
																																																								17	For	a	thorough	discussion	of	these	kinds	of	transcendental	arguments,	see	Skidmore	2001.			
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We	view	other	desires	instead	as	reflecting	our	commitments,	as	providing	genuine	reasons	for	action.		Call	the	third	corollary	the	‘Lexical	Ordering	Thesis’	(LOT):	LEXICAL	ORDERING	THESIS:		Reasons	for	action	are	lexically	ordered	as	follows:	a. 	Reasons	for	action	related	to	our	practical	identity	qua	moral	agents	always	take	priority	over	our	other	reasons	for	action.			b. 	Other	reasons	for	action	are	ordered	by	how	central	the	specific	practical	identities	related	to	such	reasons	are	for	our	lives.			Some	reasons	for	action	are	only	prima	facie	obligatory.		Others	count	as	reasons	we	have	all	things	considered.	We	regard	some	reasons	for	action	as	overriding.		LOT	explains	why	this	is	the	case.		Our	practical	identities	are	lexically	ordered	in	terms	of	how	central	they	are	to	our	sense	of	identity,	which	is	in	turn	explained	by	what	we	endorse.		For	Korsgaard,	our	most	fundamental	practical	identity	is	our	humanity,	and	it	is	this	identity	that	gives	rise	to	our	specific	moral	obligations.		As	a	result,	we	are	unconditionally	committed	to	morality.		We	have	other	practical	identities,	however,	that,	while	more	contingent,	are	conceptions	of	ourselves	to	which	we	are	deeply	committed.	These	might	include	our	identities	as	parents,	members	of	certain	religions,	and	so	on.		Other	practical	identities	are	less	fundamental.		For	example,	someone	might	value	being	a	soccer	player,	but	they	would	easily	give	it	up	if	it	conflicted	with	a	practical	identity	that	they	valued	more.				 In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	my	argument	proceeds	as	follows.		First,	in	Section	II,	I	discuss	a	standard	objection	to	constructivism	raised	by	Russ	Shafer-Landau,	which	I	apply	to	Korsgaard’s	own	position.		Second,	in	Sections	III-IV,	I	will	argue	that	it	is	Korsgaard’s	commitment	to	reflective	endorsement	in	particular	that	makes	it	vulnerable	to	both	horns	of	the	dilemma	raised	for	a	more	general	account	
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of	constructivism	posed	by	Shafer-Landau.		I	will	show	how	her	analysis	of	both	non-moral	and	moral	practical	identities	ultimately	fails	to	satisfy	her	own	specified	criteria	for	an	adequate	solution	to	the	Normative	Problem.	Third	and	lastly,	in	Section	V,	I	raise	an	objection	to	Korsgaard’s	overall	approach	in	terms	of	her	appeal	to	the	idea	of	reflective	endorsement	in	general.			 	
General	Objection	to	Constructivism	As	Russ	Shafer-Landau	argues,	there	is	a	fundamental	problem	with	constructivist	views.18.		He	presents	this	as	a	problem	for	constructivism	about	morality,	but	it	is	also	a	problem	for	constructivism	about	normativity	more	generally.		The	worry	is	that	constructivism	faces	a	basic	dilemma:	either	it	lapses	into	a	substantive	moral	realist	position	or	else	it	fails	to	guarantee	that,	by	following	the	constructivist	procedure	of	construction,	we	will	arrive	at	normatively	valid	outcomes.		We	can	reconstruct	Shafer-Landau’s	argument	as	follows:	1. Either	the	initial	conditions	for	the	procedure	of	construction	are	normative	or	they	are	not.	2. If	the	initial	conditions	for	the	procedure	of	construction	are	normative,	then	this	entails	that	there	are	certain	normative	claims	that	exist	independently	of	and	therefore	do	not	arise	from	the	procedure	of	construction	itself.		3. If	the	initial	conditions	for	the	procedure	of	construction	are	not	normative,	then	such	a	procedure	cannot	guarantee	normatively	valid	outcomes					
																																																								18	Shafer-Landau,	Russ.	2003.	Moral	Realism:	A	Defence,	Oxford	University	Press,	New	York.	41-42.		
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How	do	we	determine	how	to	set	up	the	procedure	of	construction	in	the	first	place?		On	the	one	hand,	we	could	be	led	by	normative	considerations	that	are	independent	of	and	prior	to	the	procedure	itself.		By	definition,	such	considerations	cannot	themselves	be	constructed	from	the	procedure	of	construction.	Instead,	they	must	be	normative	principles	to	which	we	are	antecedently	committed,	which	is	just	to	adopt	a	form	of	substantive	moral	realism.			On	the	other	hand,	if	this	procedure	of	construction	is	grounded	upon	non-normative	considerations,	then	it	is	unclear	how	this	starting	point	can	guarantee	results	that	are	normatively	acceptable.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	show	that	the	two	basic	parts	of	Korsgaard’s	view—her	account	of	both	non-moral	and	moral	practical	identities—fall	prey	to	the	two	different	horns	of	this	dilemma.		The	non-moral	part	of	her	view	ends	up	being	overly	subjective.		The	moral	part	of	her	view	fails	by	her	own	criteria,	in	part	because	it	involves	claims	that	can	only	be	justified	by	some	appeal	to	substantive	moral	realism.																																				
Problems	for	Non-Moral	Practical	Identities	In	this	section,	I	focus	on	problems	related	to	Korsgaard’s	account	of	non-moral	practical	identities.19	Specifically,	I	argue	that	Korsgaard’s	normative	framework,	which	involves	acting	in	conformity	with	our	various	reflectively	endorsed	practical	identities,	does	not	provide	us	with	the	right	kind	of	normative	guidance	in	non-																																																								19	Hannah	Ginsborg	(1998)	raises	a	different	type	of	concern	for	Korsgaard’s	position	on	non-moral	identities.		She	argues	that	Korsgaard’s	Kantian	framework	entails	that	actions	that	result	from	our	non-moral	identities	are	not	really	free	actions.		
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moral	cases.		My	first	concern	is	that	Korsgaard’s	account	is	not	able	to	explain	why	
we	should	ever	adopt	any	particular	practical	identity	in	the	first	place.		I	will	argue	that	she	is	not	able	to	adequately	explain	this	because	she	gives	unwarranted	normative	authority	to	the	practice	of	reflective	endorsement,	which	can	generate	identities	with	no	intuitive	normative	force.		If	this	is	true,	then	Korsgaard’s	account	fails	to	adequately	answer	the	normative	question.		My	second	concern	is	that,	for	similar	reasons,	her	view	does	not	provide	a	satisfactory	account	of	the	kinds	of	
identities	that	we	shouldn’t	adopt.		If	this	is	true,	then	Korsgaard’s	account	is	overly	subjective	and	contradicts	our	fundamental	normative	intuitions.		Third	and	lastly,	Korsgaard’s	view	provides	no	way	to	adjudicate	among	competing	non-moral	practical	identities.		If	this	is	true,	then	Korsgaard’s	account	fails	to	adequately	answer	the	normative	question	and	fails	to	capture	our	fundamental	normative	intuitions.		I	will	suggest	that	all	of	these	problems	are	brought	about,	at	least	in	part,	by	the	necessary	role	that	reflective	endorsement	plays	in	her	account.		 The	first	concern	is	related	to	Korsgaard’s	commitment	to	the	Reflective	Endorsement	Thesis	or	RET	as	follows.	Our	practical	identities	provide	us	with	a	first-person	perspective	from	which	to	make	choices	regarding	which	desires	we	should	act	upon.		They	furnish	us	with	reasons	for	choosing	in	the	way	that	we	do.		But	how	do	we	come	to	adopt	any	particular	practical	identity?		To	take	on	an	identity,	we	must	reflectively	endorse	it	or	affirm	it	as	valuable.		In	order	to	do	this,	however,	we	need	reasons	for	valuing	it.		But	on	Korsgaard’s	view,	our	reasons	are	supposed	to	come	from	our	practical	identities	themselves.	So	which	comes	first:	(1)	our	practical	identities,	which	are	supposed	to	provide	us	with	normative	reasons	
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for	action,	or	(2)	our	normative	reasons	for	actions,	on	the	basis	of	which	it	seems	we	should	decide	to	adopt	one	practical	identity	over	another?	If	we	do	not	have	a	practical	identity	that	provides	us	with	reasons	to	act	a	certain	way,	then	it	seems	we	cannot	have	reasons	for	forming	that	specific	practical	identity.		But	if	we	do	not	have	reasons	for	why	we	choose	to	adopt	a	certain	practical	identity	in	the	first	place,	then	our	choice	of	this	specific	identity	seems	groundless	or	arbitrary.	20		 Of	course,	on	Korsgaard’s	view,	there	is	one	practical	identity	that	we	are	committed	to	if	we	are	to	value	anything	at	all,	namely,	our	identity	as	human	beings.		Perhaps	this	identity	provides	us	with	reasons	to	adopt	particular	contingent	practical	identities.		We	need	reasons	to	act	and	to	live,	so	we	must	adopt	conceptions	of	ourselves	as	human	beings	that	we	value.	This	might	explain	why	we	adopt	practical	identities	in	general	as	opposed	to	none	at	all,	but	it	cannot	address	why	we	endorse	any	particular	practical	identity.		All	our	humanity	requires	is	that	to	act	and	to	live	we	must	have	some	conception	of	ourselves.		It	doesn’t	provide	any	guidance	in	picking	out	what	that	conception	should	be.				 Moreover,	it	is	not	clear	that	reflective	endorsement	has	any	normative	force	whatsoever,	nor	is	there	any	feature	of	Korsgaard’s	account	that	establishes	the	necessary	connection	between	reflective	endorsement	and	the	purported	normative	status	of	the	practical	identities	that	we	take	on	through	the	process	of	endorsement.		So,	for	example,	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	the	fact	that	someone	
																																																								20	See,	for	example,	Brady	2003	who	discusses	somewhat	similar	concerns,	although	he	fails	to	consider	the	possible	reply	Korsgaard	could	make	to	this	objection	as	discussed	below.	
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endorses	a	conception	of	themselves	as,	say,	macho	and	strives	to	act	as	a	macho	person	would,	confers	any	normative	status	whatsoever	on	being	macho.			 My	second	concern	is	related	to	both	RET	and	its	corollary,	the	Source	of	Reasons	and	Obligation	Thesis,	or	SROT.		The	problem	is	that	there	are	some	practical	identities	that	we	might	reflectively	endorse	that	do	not	intuitively	give	us	reasons	for	action	at	all.		Korsgaard’s	view	is	not	in	a	position	to	tell	us	which	practical	identities	we	should	not	accept.		There	are	some	practical	identities	that,	although	they	do	not	conflict	with	morality	per	se,	still	seem	like	identities	we	should	not	endorse.	For	example,	consider	Rawls’	famous	description	in	A	Theory	of	
Justice	of	a	person	“whose	only	pleasure	is	to	count	blades	of	grass	in	various	geometrically	shaped	areas	such	as	park	squares	and	well	trimmed	lawns.”21		Or	consider	Nagel’s	example	of	“a	man	who	wastes	his	life	in	the	cheerful	pursuit	of	a	method	of	communicating	with	asparagus	plants.”22	We	are	not	inclined	to	think	that	a	practical	identity	that	provides	one	with	reasons	to	count	blades	of	grass	or	to	attempt	to	cheerfully	communicate	with	asparagus	has	much	value	at	all,	nor	do	those	reasons	seem	to	have	any	real	normative	force.		As	a	result,	if	one	takes	reasons	to	be	inherently	normative,	one	might	not	count	the	outputs	of	the	endorsement	process	to	be	genuine	reasons	at	all.	On	Korsgaard’s	view,	however,	there	is	no	reason	why	we	shouldn’t	adopt	these	identities,	so	long	as	they	don’t	conflict	with	other	identities	we	have	that	are	more	fundamental	to	who	we	are.	
																																																								21	Rawls,	John.	1971.	A	Theory	of	Justice,	Harvard	University	Press.	432-433.	
22	Nagel,	Thomas.	1970.	Death.	Nous	4	(1)	73-80.	
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	 Though	we	might	never	encounter	people	like	those	described	by	Rawls	or	Nagel,	there	are	many	real	people	who	take	on	eccentric	identities	that	don’t	intuitively	have	much	value	at	all.		People	with	obsessive	compulsive	disorders,	for	example,	view	it	as	an	important	part	of	who	they	are	to	be	clean	and	meticulous,	to	always	have	a	tidy	house	or	to	always	deliberately	step	on	every	square	of	the	sidewalk	when	they	walk	down	the	street.		We	find	so	little	value	in	these	identities	that	we	when	we	see	someone	identify	in	this	way,	we	encourage	them	to	seek	professional	assistance	in	order	to	change	who	they	are	and	value	different	things.	We	don’t	see	the	endorsement	of	identities	of	this	type	as	providing	genuine	normative	reasons	for	action.		 There	are	also	less	extreme	cases	than	these	in	which	psychological	disorders	are	not	in	play.		In	a	world	where	the	Internet	has	become	so	central	to	our	lives,	many	people	lose	themselves	online,	adopting	virtual	identities	in	chat	rooms	that	they	place	more	value	upon	than	almost	anything	else.	Others	strongly	associate	with	specific	characters	that	they	create	in	various	role-playing	video	games.		When	people	spend	excessive	amounts	of	time	engaged	in	these	types	of	activities,	our	typical	intuitions	are	that	they	should	get	their	priorities	straight	and	pursue	things	of	real	value.		We	don’t	typically	take	one’s	endorsement	of	one’s	identity	as,	for	example,	a	level	97	wood-elf,	as	providing	real	normative	reasons	for	action.23							
																																																								23	One	might	respond	that	the	only	way	to	understand	the	gamer’s	actions	is	to	stipulate	reasons	for	action.		These,	however,	are	explanatory	reasons,	and	I	take	Korsgaard’s	position	as	an	attempt	to	identify	the	source	of	justificatory	reasons.	
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	 If	our	specific	practical	identities	necessarily	provide	us	with	reasons	for	action,	then	we	must	conclude	that	in	the	cases	described	above,	these	people	do	have	reasons	to	act	in	these	ways.		The	idea	that	such	people	have	reasons	all	things	considered	to	engage	in	such	activities,	since	these	practical	identities	are	central	to	who	they	are	flies	in	the	face	of	our	ordinary	intuitions.		Our	ordinary	judgments	would	likely	be	that	the	person	who	suffers	from	obsessive-compulsive	disorder	should	seek	help.			When	it	comes	to	the	person	who	wastes	their	life	playing	video	games	at	the	expense	of	all	other	identities	he	could	take	on,	we	tend	to	think	that	such	a	person	should	learn	to	practice	some	moderation.		He	never	has	any	reason	to	spend	the	amount	of	time	that	he	does	playing	video	games.		 More	specifically,	if	conforming	with	these	practical	identities	does	not	necessarily	violate	or	conflict	with	any	overriding	moral	duties,	and	if	such	roles	are	most	fundamental	or	central	to	a	person’s	identity,	then	she	has	a	reason	all	things	considered	to	act	upon	the	various	reasons	prescribed	by	such	identities.	There	is	nothing	in	Korsgaard’s	view	that	tells	us	why	we	shouldn’t	adopt	these	identities	that	don’t	seem	to	have	much	value.		In	this	way,	Korsgaard’s	account	is	objectionably	arbitrary	and	fails	to	provide	grounding	for	justificatory	as	opposed	to	mere	explanatory	reasons	for	action.		It	allows	for	all	sorts	of	identities	to	be	construed	as	normative,	including	those	that	our	intuitions	tell	us	we	should	not	be	valuing.24																																																									24Korsgaard	1999	provides	an	account	of	what	goes	wrong	when	people	perform	actions	that	are	immoral	that	may	seem	to	provide	a	reply	to	this	worry	I	have	just	raised.		She	argues	that	true	actions	are	performed	by	agents	acting	in	accordance	with	their	“best	constitution.”		An	agents	“best	constitution”	will	be	a	one	that	is	unified.		Unified	agents	will	act	in	light	of	practical	identities	that	are	consistent.			
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	 My	third	and	final	concern	is	related	to	the	Lexical	Ordering	Thesis	or	LOT,	specifically	part	b	or	the	claim	that,	as	stated	earlier,	“our	non-moral	practical	identities	are	ordered	in	terms	of	how	important	they	are	to	us.”	The	problem	is	that	Korsgaard’s	account	of	normativity	provides	us	with	no	way	of	adjudicating	among	the	various	reasons	which	competing	non-moral	reflectively	endorsed	practical	identities	provide	us.		There	may	be	any	number	of	practical	identities	we	have	endorsed,	all	of	which	are	of	equal	value	to	us,	which	can	sometimes	come	into	conflict	with	one	another.		Imagine	the	following	situation.		A	person,	Elizabeth,	is	CEO	of	a	company	she	helped	to	build	from	the	ground	up.		Throughout	the	years,	she	has	put	a	tremendous	amount	of	effort	into	the	company	and	her	identity	as	a	CEO	is	very	important	to	her.		Her	company	is	having	an	important	meeting	with	its	stockholders	which	cannot	be	rescheduled	and	that	will	dramatically	affect	the	company’s	future.		However,	at	the	same	time,	her	only	daughter	will	be	graduating	from	high	school.	Let’s	say	that	the	identity	she	has	as	a	mother	and	the	identity	she	has	as	a	CEO	both	matter	equally	to	her.		In	this	case,	Korsgaard’s	account	of	normativity	in	terms	of	reflectively	endorsed	practical	identities	will	not	provide	her	with	adequate	normative	guidance.		For	any	reason	she	considers,	she	can	ask	herself	“Why	should	I	take	reasons	for	action	related	to	this	reflectively	endorsed																																																																																																																																																																						When	we	act	immorally,	we	fail	to	reflect	fully	on	the	nature	of	our	constitution.		Such	reflection	would	reveal	that	the	value	we	place	in	our	humanity	provides	us	with	obligations	to	act	morally.		Korsgaard	might	respond	to	my	criticism	by	suggesting	that	when	we	take	on	identities	that	do	not	seem	valuable,	we	make	a	mistake.		We	fail	to	see	that	adopting	the	identity	prevents	us	from	being	fully	unified	agents.		I	don’t	think	that	this	response	is	satisfactory.		First,	it	is	certainly	possible	that	viewing	oneself	as	a	grass-counter	does	not	conflict	with	one’s	moral	identity	or	any	other	identity	that	one	values.		Second,	one	can	raise	the	normative	problem	for	this	aspect	of	Korsgaard’s	account.		We	can	ask	“Why	should	I	care	about	being	a	unified	agent?”	
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practical	identity	to	have	more	priority	than	reasons	for	action	generated	by	the	other	practical	identity	that	I	have	endorsed	to	the	same	degree?”	Furthermore,	Korsgaard’s	answer	fails	to	capture	our	normative	intuitions	as	well.		A	person	might	have	two	identities	that	she	values	equally.		Someone	might	value	her	practical	identity	in	terms	of	her	job	as	much	as	her	role	as	a	mother.		We	tend	to	think,	however,	that	at	the	end	of	the	day,	our	relationship	to	our	children	is	ultimately	more	important	than	achieving	success	in	the	corporate	world.	Korsgaard’s	view	cannot	account	for	these	intuitions.		Her	position	allows	us	to	value	different	practical	identities	equally	which	are	intuitively	not	of	equal	importance.		It	may	also	be	the	case	that	there	is	no	fact	of	the	matter	regarding	which	of	the	two	identities	she	values	more.		Her	account	provides	us	no	way	to	resolve	this	issue.	Here,	again,	her	view	seems	objectionably	arbitrary.			 	
Problems	for	Moral	Practical	Identities	In	this	section,	I	argue	that	Korsgaard’s	account	of	moral	practical	identities	does	not	provide	an	adequate	answer	to	the	Normative	Problem.		Recall	that	Korsgaard	claims	that	the	type	of	value	involved	in	justifying	normative	claims	must	be	both	intrinsic	and	final.			I	shall	argue	that	she	fails	to	establish	that	our	humanity	has	these	types	of	value.		I	shall	argue	further	that	her	commitment	to	the	claim	that	humanity	has	intrinsic	value	exposes	her	to	the	first	horn	of	Shafer-Landau’s	dilemma,	that	is,	it	commits	her	to	substantive	moral	realism.25		Lastly,	I	challenge	
																																																								25	I	intend	this	as	an	internal	critique	of	Korsgaard’s	view.		I	am	not	committed,	at	this	point,	to	any	particular	position	regarding	substantive	moral	realism.		The	
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Korsgaard’s	Lexical	Ordering	Thesis	or	LOT,	a	corollary	of	the	reflective	endorsement	thesis,	by	arguing	that	she	fails	to	show	that	our	moral	practical	identities	should	have	overriding	priority	over	all	our	other	identities.	If	Korsgaard	has	not	shown	that	we	really	are	unconditionally	committed	to	morality,	then	she	has	provided	no	motivation	to	see	reasons	for	action	endorsed	by	our	moral	practical	identity	as	something	we	should	unconditionally	value.		 	Let’s	consider	Korsgaard’s	transcendental	argument	for	the	claim	that	we	must	value	our	own	humanity—as	well	as	the	humanity	of	everybody	else—unconditionally.			1.		We	need	reasons	in	order	to	act	or	to	live.	2:		Our	reasons	for	action	derive	from	our	practical	identities,	or	conceptions	of	ourselves	under	which	we	value	ourselves.	3.	Our	commitment	to	any	specific	practical	identity	arises	from	our	humanity,	or	our	need	to	act	in	conformity	with	practical	identities	in	general.			 4.	Therefore,	if	we	value	any	specific	practical	identity,	we	must	value	our							own	humanity		 5.	Therefore,	if	we	are	to	act	at	all,	we	must	value	our	own	humanity.	6.	“To	treat	our	human	identity	as	normative,	as	the	source	of	reasons	and	obligations,	is	to	have…	[a]	‘moral	identity’”26		7.	“Valuing	humanity	in	your	own	person	rationally	requires	valuing	it	in	the	persons	of	others.”27		In	what	follows,	I	will	be	particularly	concerned	with	claims	4,	5,	and	7.			I	begin	with	an	examination	of	how	we	should	understand	the	notion	of	‘must’	involved	in	premises	4	and	5.	We	can	interpret	this	in	two	very	different	ways.	Both	interpretations	create	problems	for	Korsgaard’s	view.		The	first	reading	of	‘must,’	the	way	it	is	used	in	claims	4,	5	and	7,	involves	some	kind	of	psychological	necessity.																																																																																																																																																																						substantive	moral	realist	position,	however,	is	one	to	which	Korsgaard	is	attempting	to	provide	an	alternative.	26	Korsgaard	129.	27	Ibid.,		121.	
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That	is,	there	is	some	feature	of	our	human	psychology	that	makes	it	the	case	that	we	cannot	act	if	we	do	not	simultaneously	value	our	own	humanity.			But	this	claim	seems	to	be	just	empirically	false.		Even	if	(3)	is	true,	that	is,	even	if	our	commitment	to	any	of	our	specific	practical	identities	arises	from	our	humanity,	or	our	need	to	act	on	practical	identities	in	general,	it	may	not	be	the	case	that	we	actually	value	our	humanity	itself.		For	example,	imagine	that	I	have	a	practical	identity	as	a	student,	one	that	I	reflectively	endorse	and	value	in	my	various	pursuits.	It	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	that,	psychologically	speaking,	I	must	be	simultaneously	valuing	my	humanity,	that	is,	my	identity	as	a	creature	who	necessarily	operates	with	some	practical	identities	whenever	I	act.		I	may	never	even	reflect	upon	the	fact	that	I	have	such	an	identity	at	all.	One	additional	worry	is	that,	on	this	psychological	reading	of	‘must,’	the	fact	that	we	unconditionally	value	our	humanity	now	rests	upon	merely	empirical	foundations.	But	if	this	is	the	case,	then	our	commitment	to	morality	is	not	unconditional.		It	instead	rests	upon	a	purely	contingent	psychological	fact.		 On	the	second	reading	of	‘must’,	the	way	it	is	used	specifically	in	claim	7,	“must”	instead	involves	a	kind	of	logically	necessity.	That	is,	if	we	unconditionally	value	our	own	humanity,	then,	upon	pain	of	rational	inconsistency,	we	must	unconditionally	value	the	humanity	of	everybody	else	as	well.		The	main	problem	with	this	interpretation	is	that	it	does	not	commit	us	unconditionally	to	morality	either.		Instead,	it	makes	our	commitment	to	the	unconditional	value	of	the	humanity	of	others	merely	derivative	of	a	more	fundamental	identity	we	have,	namely,	one	of	being	a	rationally	consistent	thinker;	if	we	don’t	care	about	whether	
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our	behavior	is	consistent,	we	no	longer	have	an	argument	for	why	we	should	value	the	humanity	of	others	in	the	first	place.	 		 On	a	third	and	more	plausible	reading	of	‘must’,	Korsgaard’s	claims	in	4,	5,	and	7	involve	a	kind	of	transcendental	necessity.	That	is,	in	order	to	value	anything,	we	must	value	our	own	humanity	since	it	constitutes	our	very	capacity	to	value	anything	at	all.			But	understanding	the	value	of	our	humanity	in	this	sense—namely,	that	it	represents	the	capacity	for	us	to	value	anything	else—only	shows	why	we	must	see	our	own	humanity	as	valuable	in	an	instrumental	sense,	as	the	condition	for	the	possibility	of	valuing	anything	else.		This	again,	however,	fails	to	show	why	we	must	unconditionally	value	our	own	humanity,	since	our	humanity	becomes	merely	instrumentally	valuable	for	the	sake	of	realizing	any	other	ends	we	might	value	for	their	own	sake.			None	of	these	three	readings	of	how	Korsgaard	uses	the	term	‘must’	in	claims	4,	5,	and	7	establishes	the	conclusion	that	we	are	unconditionally	committed	to	morality.		The	fact	that	Korsgaard’s	argument	fails	in	this	way	points	to	a	more	fundamental	problem	with	her	account,	namely,	that	she	fails	to	show	that	the	type	of	value	that	we	place	upon	our	own	humanity	or	upon	the	humanity	of	others	must	be	understood	as	either	intrinsic	or	final.		Recall	that	Korsgaard	claims	that	these	features	are	essential	to	any	adequate	solution	of	the	Normative	Problem.		She	writes:	The	entity	that	brings	a	regress	of	justification	to	a	satisfactory	end	must	
combine	these	two	conceptions.		It	must	be	something	that	is	final,	good	or	right	for	its	own	sake,	in	virtue	of	its	intrinsic	properties,	its	intrinsic	structure.		
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As	mentioned	before,	Korsgaard	understands	the	distinction	between	‘final’	or	‘non-instrumental’	and	‘instrumental’	value	in	terms	of	how	we	value	something.		Things	with	‘final	value’	are	valued	for	their	own	sake	rather	than	for	the	sake	of	realizing	something	else.		Korsgaard	does	not	establish	that	this	is	true	of	humanity.		All	her	argument	shows	is	that	we	must	value	our	humanity	if	we	want	to	act.		We	must	value	our	humanity	for	the	sake	of	our	being	able	to	act	at	all.		A	similar	point	applies	to	the	type	of	value	that	the	humanity	of	other	people	has	for	us.		As	we	have	seen,	Korsgaard’s	argument	does	not	show	that	we	are	committed	to	unconditionally	valuing	others	for	their	own	sake.		All	that	it	shows	is	that	we	are	required	to	value	the	humanity	of	others	if	we	want	to	be	rationally	consistent.		We	don’t	value	the	humanity	of	others	in	a	final	or	non-instrumental	way;	we	value	it	for	the	sake	of	consistency.	And	if	Korsgaard	has	not	established	that	our	humanity	or	the	humanity	of	other	people	has	final	value,	then	she	has	not	provided	an	adequate	response	to	the	Normative	Problem.		Recall	that	an	answer	to	the	normative	problem	must	also	provide	a	satisfactory	response	to	the	regress	problem.		That	is,	the	source	of	our	normative	obligations	must	be	such	that	it	would	be	incoherent	to	ask	“But	why	should	I	care	about	that?”	But	it	does	seem	perfectly	coherent	to	ask	“But	why	should	I	care	about	acting,	or	about	being	rationally	consistent,	in	the	first	place?”			 Korsgaard	also	fails	to	show	that	our	humanity	has	intrinsic	as	opposed	to	extrinsic	value.		As	she	writes	elsewhere,	this	is	a	distinction	“between	things	which	have	their	value	in	themselves	and	things	which	derive	their	value	from	some	other	
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source.”28	Korsgaard	can	establish	each	person’s	own	humanity	has	intrinsic	value.		As	she	argues:	But	this	reason	for	conforming	to	your	particular	practical	identities	is	not	a	reason	that	springs	from	one	of	those	particular	practical	identities.		It	is	a	reason	that	springs	from	your	humanity	itself,	from	your	identity	simply	as	a	
human	being,	a	reflective	animal	who	needs	reasons	to	act	and	to	live.		And	so	it	is	a	reason	you	have	only	if	you	treat	your	humanity	as	a	practical,	normative	form	of	identity,	that	is,	if	you	value	yourself	as	a	human	being.29				On	Korsgaard’s	view,	the	value	of	our	own	humanity	derives	from	the	fact	that	we	endorse	it	as	a	normative	identity	for	ourselves.		That	is,	the	value	of	our	humanity	comes	from	the	fact	that	we	ourselves	simply	are	human	beings.		Thus,	the	value	of	humanity	is	intrinsic	insofar	as	it	comes	from	no	source	other	but	our	own	self-reflexive	valuing	of	ourselves.		But	Korsgaard	has	not	shown	that	the	value	of	the	humanity	of	others	is	similarly	intrinsic.		For	Korsgaard,	things	have	value	because	we	value	them.	She	writes:	“It	is	the	natural	condition	of	living	things	to	be	valuers,	and	that	is	why	value	exists.”30	But	if	this	is	the	case,	then	it	seems	that	the	humanity	of	other	people	has	value	for	us	because	we	value	them.			And	if	this	is	true,	then	the	value	that	the	humanity	of	other	people	has	must	be	extrinsic.		That	is,	the	source	of	their	value	is	
us.		It	is	the	fact	that	we	value	humanity	in	others	that	makes	it	valuable.		 On	behalf	of	Korsgaard,	we	might	reply	to	such	concerns	by	arguing	that	the	value	of	the	humanity	of	others	does	not	rest	in	the	fact	that	we	value	it	but	that	
other	people	value	their	own	humanity.		In	this	way,	their	humanity	has	‘intrinsic’																																																									28	Korsgaard,	Christine.	1989.	‘Two	Distinctions	of	Goodness’,	The	Philosophical	
Review,	vol.	92,	no.2,	pp.169-195.	29	Korsgaard	1996	121	30	Ibid.,161.	
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value	in	exactly	the	same	way	that	ours	does	since	they	also	self-reflexively	value	themselves.		But	even	if	this	is	true,	this	still	does	not	show	why	we	should	unconditionally	value	their	humanity	in	the	way	that	morality	requires.		To	be	committed	to	this	claim	is	to	be	committed	to	the	idea	that	we	must	value	all	things	which	are	intrinsically	valuable	simply	because	they	derive	their	source	from	themselves.	But	it	seems	perfectly	coherent	to	ask	at	this	point,	“Why	should	we	care	about	that?”		 In	order	to	establish	this,	we	need	to	invoke	some	additional	normative	principle,	one	that	insists	that	we	should	value	anything	that	has	intrinsic	value.		But	this	principle	does	not	follow	from	Korsgaard’s	constructivist	procedure	of	construction	itself,	but	instead	seems	to	be	an	independent	normative	principle	we	are	just	brutely	committed	to.	Indeed,	it	is	simply	a	central	tenet	underlying	all	substantive	moral	realist	views,	a	normative	principle	that	is	binding	on	us	entirely	independently	of	our	beliefs	or	attitudes	about	it.		Therefore,	Korsgaard’s	argument	for	why	the	intrinsic	value	of	the	humanity	of	others	unconditionally	commits	us	to	morality	itself	only	succeeds	if	she	abandons	her	constructivism	and	embraces	a	normative	principle	defended	by	substantive	moral	realism	itself.	 	To	summarize	the	results	of	the	last	two	sections,	we	have	shown	how	Korsgaard’s	account	of	normativity	in	terms	of	acting	in	conformity	with	both	moral	and	non-moral	practical	identities	that	we	reflectively	endorse	falls	prey	to	both	horns	of	the	dilemma	raised	by	Shafer-Landau.		When	it	comes	to	non-moral	normative	questions,	the	framework	of	practical	identities	does	not	yield	normatively	valid	reasons.		It	gives	us	no	normative	guidance	when	it	comes	to	
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taking	on	practical	identities	in	the	first	place,	identifying	the	practical	identities	that	we	shouldn’t	adopt,	or	adjudicating	among	competing	identities	that	are	endorsed	equally.		This	is	because	reflective	endorsement	itself	has	no	normative	power.		 Korsgaard’s	account	of	moral	identities	impales	her	on	the	other	horn	of	Shafer-Landau’s	dilemma.		She	cannot	explain	why	we	must	value	the	humanity	of	others	without	committing	herself	to	the	realist	principle	that	we	ought	to	value	things	that	are	intrinsically	valuable.			
Reflective	Endorsement	As	we	have	seen,	Korsgaard	is	fundamentally	committed	to	the	Reflective	Endorsement	Thesis	or	RET,	which	claims	that	“practical	identities	must	be	reflectively	endorsed,	that	is,	we	must	affirm	them	as	being	valuable”.		This	thesis	also	underlies	her	Source	of	Reasons	and	Obligations	Thesis	or	SROT	since	our	practical	identities	can	only	be	the	source	of	our	reasons	or	obligations	insofar	as	we	have	reflectively	endorsed	them	in	the	first	place.	Indeed,	Korsgaard	goes	so	far	as	to	identify	our	‘humanity’	simply	with	our	ability	to	reflectively	endorse	our	desires	as	reasons	for	action	in	general.		Broadly,	this	chapter	has	attempted	to	take	issue	with	the	importance	Korsgaard	places	upon	reflective	endorsement.	In	this	section	I	will	focus	on	the	particulars	of	her	account	of	reflective	endorsement.	I	take	the	account	to	have	three	key	features:	1. The	general	stance	an	agent	A	adopts	when	pursuing	her	desire	x	to	be	a	reason	to	act	is	the	first	person	deliberative	perspective.	
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2. In	order	for	her	desire	x	to	count	as	a	reason	for	action	for	A,	A	must	see	the	desire	x	as	a	reason	to	act	in	light	of	some	practical	identity	she	endorses,	i.e.,	some	normative	conception	A	has	of	herself.	3. In	order	for	her	desire	x	to	count	as	a	reason	for	action	for	A,	s	must	rationally	deliberate	about	and	affirm	her	desire	x	as	something	she	genuinely	values.		Consider	(1)	first.		In	determining	whether	or	not	we	should	accept	it,	we	should	ask	whether	all	of	our	actions	necessarily	involve	or	arise	out	of	the	first	person	deliberative	perspective.	This	seems	decidedly	false.	Consider	the	case	of	purely	habituated	actions.		I	have	a	close	friend	who	always	walks	on	the	left	side	of	the	person	he	is	accompanying.		I	spend	a	lot	of	time	with	this	person	and	so	have	become	accustomed	to	walking	on	the	right.		One	day,	another	friend	brought	it	to	my	attention	that	whenever	I	walk	with	her,	I	always	make	sure	I	am	walking	on	the	right.	If	I	found	myself	on	the	left,	I	would	move.		I	didn’t	even	realize	that	this	was	the	case	since	I	did	it	routinely.		My	always	moving	to	the	right	of	whomever	I	am	walking	next	to	is	an	action	I	perform.		Nonetheless,	it	is	not	something	I	self-consciously	endorse	from	a	first-person	deliberative	perspective.	Rather,	it	is	simply	a	behavior	I	have	become	habituated	or	accustomed	to	perform.		Such	cases	are	commonplace.		We	wake	up	in	the	morning	and	stumble	into	the	bathroom	to	take	a	shower	or	brush	our	teeth.		Often	we	do	not	adopt	a	first	person	perspective	and	consciously	deliberate	upon	whether	we	reflectively	endorse	these	reasons	for	action.	We	perform	such	actions	out	of	sheer	habit.		 Consider	(2),	the	claim	that	we	must	always	act	in	light	of	some	practical	identity	or	other.		A	person	may	self-consciously	adopt	a	particular	identity,	and	yet	the	reasons	he	has	for	acting	in	a	certain	way	may	not	come	from	that	identity	or	
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from	any	other	identity	that	he	explicitly	endorses.	In	Unprincipled	Virtue,	Nomy	Arpaly	describes	such	a	case	as	follows:		Imagine	Peter,	who	believes,	in	his	own	words,	that	“morality	is	for	wimps.”		He	advocates	a	quasi-Nietzschean	view	according	to	which	one	should	be	selfish	and	strive	to	increase	one’s	own	power.		Yet	Peter	does	not	perform	wrongfully	selfish	acts	and	he	performs	many	unselfish	acts	for	unselfish	motives.		When	asked	about	this,	he	offers	rationalizations	as	if	he	were	rationalizing	the	breaking	of	a	diet	(“But	I	was	being	selfish,	no	really)	or	sometimes	he	blushes	and	says,	honestly,	“Well	I	guess	I	am	a	wimp.”		But	he	continues	to	act	well	nonetheless.31			The	case	Arpaly	discusses	here	shows	that	a	person	can	act	even	though	the	reasons	they	have	for	acting	do	not	come	from	any	conception	of	themselves	that	they	value.		They	might	be	blamelessly	ignorant	about	what	their	actual	practical	identity	even	is.			Intuitively,	cases	like	Peter’s	are	not	examples	of	weakness	of	will.		Our	intuition	about	Peter’s	case	is	not	that	he	is	being	overwhelmed	by	some	compulsion	and	so	fails	to	act	rationally.		Rather,	our	intuition	is	that	Peter	is	really	a	good	guy	but	simply	doesn’t	realize	it.		He	is	a	moral	person	who	just	unfortunately	misunderstands	what	his	character	is	really	like.		Thus,	he	acts	on	reasons	that	are	normative	for	him	even	though	he	never	reflectively	endorsed	them	in	light	of	some	practical	identity	he	affirms.				 Arpaly	discusses	many	cases	of	this	general	sort,	such	as	when	a	person	has	certain	inclinations	that	they,	for	whatever	reason,	refuse	to	adopt	as	an	identity.		Consider	the	case	of	a	lesbian	who	strongly	desires	to	be	heterosexual.		Her	homosexual	desires	appear	to	her	as	intruders	in	her	own	mind,	impulses	she	wishes	would	go	away.		Her	homosexuality	can	motivate	her	to	act,	but	when	it	does																																																									31	Arpaly,	Nomy.	2003.	Unprincipled	Virtue,	Oxford	University	Press,	New	York.	8.		
	30	
so,	she	views	the	act	as	an	instance	of	weakness	of	will.		In	this	case,	our	normal	intuition	is	that	when	the	woman	acts	on	her	homosexual	desires,	she	is	not	acting	out	of	weakness	of	will.		Rather,	she	is	acting	on	legitimate	reasons,	though	she	is	unwilling	to	explicitly	affirm	the	practical	identity	that	such	desires	seem	to	imply.		 These	types	of	cases	show	that	we	can	act	even	if	our	reasons	for	action	are	not	desires	that	we	ever	accept	from	the	first	person	deliberative	perspective.		Moreover,	we	may	think	a	particular	identity	provides	us	with	reasons	for	action	when	it	turns	out	we	are	just	mistaken	about	who	we	are.		This	will	be	a	common	critique	of	all	of	the	philosophical	positions	in	this	book	that	employ	the	method	of	reflective	endorsement.		 		Consider	the	case	of	somebody	who	thinks	of	himself	as	a	serious	film	critic	with	impeccable	taste.		This	is	how	he	represents	himself	to	all	of	his	friends	and	family.		He	goes	on	about	the	virtues	of	various	obscure	foreign	films,	the	merits	of	certain	camera	angles	and	lighting	techniques,	and	he	praises	the	effective	use	of	artistic,	nonlinear	approaches	to	filmmaking.		The	man	entirely	embraces	this	conception	of	himself.		Nonetheless,	every	time	he	suggests	going	to	a	movie	with	his	friends,	he	always	picks	a	vapid	action	film	or	romantic	comedy.		In	this	case,	the	man’s	conception	of	himself	is	simply	wrong.		He	is	utterly	self-deceived	and	does	not	make	decisions	about	which	movies	to	see	on	the	basis	of	the	practical	identity	he	endorsed	as	an	astute	film	critic	at	all.	All	the	cases	described	here	seem	like	paradigmatic	examples	of	action.		But	if	so,	then	it	seems	that	requirements	(1)	and	(2)	above	are	implausibly	strong	restrictions	upon	what	counts	as	genuine	reasons	
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for	action.		They	rule	out	all	sorts	of	things	that	we	ordinarily	take	to	be	full-fledged	human	actions.		 Counterexamples	to	(3)	are	abundant.		We	perform	actions	every	day	that	do	not	involve	any	self-reflective	affirmation	or	endorsement.	Habituation,	or	some	other	form	of	less	than	conscious	motivation	produces	many	of	our	behaviors.		The	idea	that	reflective	endorsement	must,	at	some	stage,	be	involved	with	our	actions	over-intellectualizes	our	everyday	experiences.			
Conclusion	In	this	chapter,	I	have	argued	that	Korsgaard’s	attempt	to	solve	the	normative	problem	is	not	successful.		Each	of	my	criticisms	pertains,	fundamentally,	to	the	value	that	Korsgaard	places	on	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement.		I	have	argued	that	reflective	endorsement	can’t,	on	it’s	own,	explain	either	our	conditional	commitment	to	non-moral	obligations	our	unconditional	commitment	to	moral	obligations.		The	fundamental	reason	that	this	is	so,	or	so	I	have	argued,	is	that	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement	itself	is	not	sufficient	to	generate	outputs	that	are	truly	normative.		 In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	turn	to	a	thinker—Harry	Frankfurt—who	shares	many	of	Korsgaard’s	commitments,	but	parts	ways	with	her	in	many	respects.		One	crucial	point	of	similarity	is	their	commitment	to	the	importance	of	reflective	endorsement.		A	crucial	dissimilarity	is	the	role	that	reflective	endorsement	plays	in	their	respective	accounts.	
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CHAPTER	III	
REFLECTIVE	ENDORSEMENT	AND	THE	CONCEPT	OF	A	PERSON		Harry	Frankfurt	makes	use	of	the	concept	of	reflective	endorsement	to	account	for	a	number	of	different	philosophical	phenomena.		He	argues	that	we	use	reflective	endorsement	to	identify	with	certain	mental	events	and	distance	ourselves	from	others.		Identification	is	crucial	to	his	philosophical	program	because	it	is	necessary,	for	personhood,	freedom32,	and	moral	responsibility.		Like	Korsgaard,	Frankfurt	also	maintains	that	identification	and	endorsement	are	the	source	of	reasons	for	action,	though	his	explanation	for	why	this	is	so	is	quite	different	from	the	one	that	Korsgaard	offers.			 In	this	chapter,	I	will	first	provide	an	account	of	the	role	that	reflective	endorsement	plays	in	Frankfurt’s	philosophical	system.		I	will	then	argue	that	Frankfurt’s	account	of	caring,	which	relies	on	the	notion	of	reflective	endorsement,	rules	out	intuitive	cases	of	genuine	caring.				
Free	Will	and	the	Concept	of	a	Person			In	his	groundbreaking	paper,	Alternate	Possibilities	and	Moral	Responsibility33,	Frankfurt	argues	that	the	contemporary	debate	on	the	issue	of	free	will	and	moral	responsibility	rests	on	a	mistaken	assumption.		He	calls	this	assumption	The																																																									32	The	literature	that	comprises	the	free	will	debate	is	vast	and	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	dissertation.		I	will	not	engage	that	debate	here.		I	discuss	Frankfurt’s	account	of	freedom	here	because	of	its	connection	to	Frankfurt’s	account	of	personhood.	33	Frankfurt,	Harry	“Alternate	Possibilities	and	Moral	Responsibility”	The	Journal	of	
Philosophy	Vol.	66,	No.	23	(Dec.	4,	1969),	829-839.	
	33	
Principle	of	Alternate	Possibilities	(PAP).		PAP	is	the	principle	that	a	person	is	morally	responsible	for	an	action	that	they	perform	only	if	they	could	have	done	otherwise.	Frankfurt	thinks	that	PAP	is	mistaken	because	the	question	of	whether	an	agent	could	have	done	otherwise	is	irrelevant	to	the	question	of	whether	that	person	is	morally	responsible	for	what	they	have	done.	He	argues	that,	even	if	an	action	is	overdetermined,	that	is,	even	if	the	same	action	would	have	been	performed	no	matter	what	the	agent	did,	the	agent	is	both	free	and	morally	responsible	if	he	performed	the	action	because	he	wanted	to	perform	the	action.			 On	many	occasions	throughout	his	body	of	work34,	Frankfurt	provides	an	example	of	a	person	he	calls	“the	willing	addict.”		The	willing	addict	is	addicted	to	drugs,	but	does	not	know	that	he	is	addicted.		When	the	opportunity	arises	for	the	addict	to	indulge	in	his	drug	of	choice,	he	takes	the	drug	because	he	wants	to	take	it.		Unbeknownst	to	him,	he	would	not	be	able	to	refrain	from	taking	the	drug	even	if	he	wanted	to.		If	he	didn’t	want	to	take	it,	his	addiction	would	kick	in	and	he	would	find	himself	incapable	of	refraining.		Even	if	the	addict	would	take	the	drug	no	matter	what,	when	he	takes	it	because	he	wants	to	take	it,	he	performs	his	action	freely	and	he	is	morally	responsible	for	it.		 Frankfurt’s	willing	addict	is	free	in	this	case	because	the	decision	to	take	the	drug	issues,	not	from	anything	alien	or	external	to	him,	but	from	the	very	features	
that	make	him	a	person.		Frankfurt	contends	that	the	concept	of	personhood	has	not	received	the	philosophical	attention	that	it	deserves.		The	term	“person”	is	appropriately	applied,	not	to	a	particular	biological	type,	but,	instead,	to	a	certain																																																									34	Frankfurt,	Harry,	The	Importance	of	What	We	Care	About:	Philosophical	Essays	Cambridge	University	Press,	1988.	
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philosophical	type.		The	criteria	for	personhood	should	capture,	“those	attributes	which	are	the	subject	of	our	most	humane	concern	with	ourselves	and	the	source	of	what	we	regard	as	most	important	and	most	problematical	in	our	lives.”35			For	Frankfurt,	this	will	be	the	basic	structure	of	our	wills.		He	sets	out,	then,	to	provide	an	account	of	the	basic	structure	of	the	will.	To	begin,	he	distinguishes	between	what	he	calls	“First	Order	Desires,”	“Second	Order	Desires,”	and	“Second	Order	Volitions.”		We’ll	begin	with	First	Order	Desires.			
First	Order	Desire:		“simply	[a]	desire	to	do	or	not	do	one	thing	or	the	other.”36		First	Order	Desires	are	the	kinds	of	desires	that	we	share	in	common	with	non-human	animals.		Both	a	non-human	animal	and	a	person	may,	for	example,	desire	to	consume	sugar.		We	can	imagine	that	it	may	actually	be	unpleasant	for	both	the	non-human	animal	and	the	person	to	have	this	desire.		To	alleviate	the	unpleasant	sensation,	the	non-human	animal	has	only	one	option—to	satisfy	the	desire.		Or,	perhaps,	they	will	be	lucky	enough	to	become	distracted	and	forget	the	desire	altogether.		The	person,	by	contrast,	can	alleviate	the	unpleasantness	of	the	desire	in	more	than	one	way.	Like	the	animal,	the	person	could	satisfy	the	desire.		Unlike	the	animal,	however,	they	could	also	be	rid	of	the	desire	by	changing	the	desire	itself.		This	can	be	done	through	the	formation	of	what	Frankfurt	calls	“Second	Order	Desires.”	
Second	Order	Desire:		A	desire	to	have	or	not	have	a	particular	kind	of	desire.	
																																																								35	Ibid.,	12.	36	Ibid.,	page	12.	
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Consider	the	case	of	a	lifelong	smoker.		The	smoker	has	the	first	order	desire	to	smoke	the	cigarette.		He	experiences	this	desire	as	a	strong	compulsion.		He	understands	that	smoking	is	bad	for	him.		He	finds	the	social	stigma	unpleasant.		He	has	a	second	order	desire	about	his	first	order	desire—he	desires	to	not	desire	to	smoke.		He	desires	his	first	order	desire	to	be	different	from	the	one	that	he	actually	has.		 A	Second	Order	Desire	is	not	enough,	in	itself,	to	motivate	a	person	to	action.		A	person	can	desire	to	desire	all	sorts	of	things.		The	smoker	can	desire	to	no	longer	desire	to	smoke.		The	reluctant	student	may	desire	to	desire	to	work	harder.		The	compulsive	eater	might	desire	to	desire	to	eat	healthier.		But	we	can	imagine	that,	in	many	of	these	cases,	nothing	ever	comes	out	of	having	a	second	order	desire	for	your	first	order	desire	to	be	different.		Having	a	meta-level	desire	about	a	first	order	desire	won’t	motivate	action	unless	the	agent	desires	that	second	order	desire	to	be	
their	will.		Frankfurt	calls	these	components	of	the	will,	Second	Order	Volitions.	
Second	Order	Volitions:		“Someone	has	volitions	of	the	second	order	when	he	simply	wants	to	have	a	certain	desire	or	wants	a	certain	desire	to	be	his	will.”37		The	formulation	of	second	order	volitions	requires	introspection.		As	human	beings,	we	take	our	endeavors	and	ourselves	seriously.		Frankfurt	says,	“Taking	ourselves	seriously	means	that	we	are	not	prepared	to	accept	ourselves	just	as	we	come.		We	want	our	thoughts,	our	feelings,	our	choices,	and	our	behavior	to	make	sense.		We	are	not	satisfied	to	think	that	our	ideas	are	formed	haphazardly,	or	that	our	actions	are	driven	by	transient	and	opaque	impulses	or	by	mindless	decisions.		We	need	to																																																									37	Ibid.,	16.	
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direct	ourselves—or	at	any	rate	to	believe	that	we	are	directing	ourselves—in	thoughtful	conformity	to	stable	and	appropriate	norms.		We	want	to	get	things	right.”38		To	know	whether	we	ought	to	identify	with	or	endorse	an	action	or	a	conception	of	ourselves,	we	need	to	check	it	against	other	things	that	we	care	about.		To	do	this,	we	need	to	take	a	step	back	and	take	an	evaluative	stance	toward	our	attitudes	themselves.		He	says,		We	are	unique	(probably)	in	being	able	simultaneously	to	be	engaged	in	whatever	is	going	on	in	our	conscious	minds,	to	detach	ourselves	from	it,	and	to	observe	it—as	it	were—from	a	distance.		We	are	then	in	a	position	to	form	reflexive	or	higher	order	responses	to	it.	For	instance,	we	may	approve	of	what	we	notice	ourselves	feeling,	or	we	may	disapprove;	we	may	want	to	remain	the	sort	of	person	we	observe	ourselves	to	be,	or	we	may	want	to	be	different.”39				The	capacity	for	reflective	endorsement	is	what	makes	taking	this	kind	of	a	stance	possible.		We	are	now	in	a	position	to	identify	a	central	component	of	Frankfurt’s	position.	
Identification	as	Endorsement	Thesis:		We	identify	with	a	mental	state	if	and	only	if	we	reflectively	endorse	that	mental	state.		And,	relatedly,	we	can	identify	another	crucial	feature	of	his	position	pertaining	to	the	nature	of	personhood	itself.		
Personhood	as	Identification	Thesis:		We	exhibit	personhood	when	we	identify	with	our	mental	states.			Now	we	are	in	a	position	to	see	the	role	that	reflective	endorsement	plays	in	Frankfurt’s	account	of	personhood.		Identification	with	a	mental	state	is	what	makes																																																									38	Frankfurt,	Harry,	Taking	Ourselves	Seriously	and	Getting	it	Right,	(Stanford	University	Press:	2006)	e-book.	Location	74.	39Ibid.,	Loc.	91.	
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a	person	a	person.		What	it	is	to	identify	with	a	mental	state	is	to	reflectively	endorse	that	state.		Therefore,	the	capacity	that	we	have	to	evaluate	and	endorse	or	reject	a	mental	state	is	what	makes	us	persons.			 		 To	return	to	Frankfurt’s	example,	we	can	say	that	the	willing	addict’s	decision	to	take	the	drug	is	an	expression	of	his	personhood.		The	addict	doesn’t	simply	want	to	take	the	drug;	he	wants	to	want	to	take	the	drug.	He	has	endorsed	and	has	therefore	identified	with	the	desire	to	take	the	drug.			 Frankfurt	distinguishes	his	willing	addict	from	addicts	of	two	other	types.		The	first	type	of	addict	is	purely	at	the	mercy	of	her	addiction.		She	has	formed	no	second	order	volitions	about	taking	drugs.		She	goes	where	her	addiction	takes	her.	This	type	of	addict	is	the	type	that	Frankfurt	would	describe	as	“the	wanton.”		Of	the	wanton,	Frankfurt	says,		What	distinguishes	the	rational	wanton	from	other	rational	agents	is	that	he	is	not	concerned	with	the	desirability	of	his	desires	themselves.		He	ignores	the	question	of	what	his	will	is	to	be.	Not	only	does	he	pursue	whichever	course	of	action	he	is	mostly	strongly	inclined	to	pursue,	but	he	does	not	care	which	of	his	inclinations	are	the	strongest.40			Frankfurt	thinks	that	human	beings	rarely	if	ever	behave	as	wantons	all	of	the	time.		However,	it	is	theoretically	possible	that	someone	could.		Such	a	person	would	not	exhibit	personhood.		He	or	she	does	not	reflect	on	his	or	her	desires	and,	as	a	result,	does	not	identify	with	any	of	them,	and,	as	we	have	seen,	endorsement	and	identification	are	essential	to	personhood.		 The	second	type	of	addict	knows	herself	to	be	an	addict.	She	finds	herself	swept	away	by	the	strength	of	the	addiction.		She	doesn’t	want	to	take	the	drug—it																																																									40	Frankfurt,	Harry,	The	Importance	of	What	We	Care	About:	Philosophical	Essays	Cambridge	University	Press,	1988.	17.	
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is	not	a	desire	with	which	she	identifies.		Nevertheless,	she	takes	the	drug.	An	addict	of	this	type,	though	she	may	exhibit	personhood	regularly,	performs	actions	that	do	not	issue	from	those	aspects	of	her	character	that	make	her	a	person	in	this	particular	case.		In	this	case,	she	does	not	behave	freely	and	is	not	fully	morally	responsible	for	what	she	does.		 The	willing	addict,	by	contrast,	exhibits	personhood	because	she	endorses	and	therefore	identifies	with	her	desire	to	take	the	drug.		Here,	it	will	be	useful	to	point	out	a	way	in	which	Frankfurt’s	account	differs	from	Korsgaard’s.	Korsgaard	maintains	that	reasons	that	are	genuinely	normative	issue	forth	from	the	practical	identities	that	individuals	endorse.		We	are	committed	to	the	normativity	of	our	endorsements	because	of	our	fundamental	commitment	to	the	value	of	choice	that	makes	endorsing	such	identities	possible	at	all.		Imagine	that	the	willing	addict	truly	identifies	with	her	conception	of	herself	as	an	addict.		On	Korsgaard’s	view,	it	seems	that	this	way	of	identifying	gives	the	addict	reasons	with	genuine	normative	force	for	taking	the	drug.		Now,	intuitively,	we	might	think	that	she	has	no	reason	to	take	the	drug	and	that,	indeed,	she	has	good	reasons	to	refrain	from	taking	the	drug.		It’s	not	clear	that	Korsgaard’s	view	can	capture	that	intuition.		 By	contrast,	Frankfurt	is	not	committed	to	the	existence	of	reasons	that	are	somehow	fundamentally	grounded	in	anything.		Indeed,	Korsgaard	is	trying	to	answer	a	different	question,	The	Normative	Question.		She	is	trying	to	provide	an	account	of	the	fundamental	grounding	of	normative	claims.		Frankfurt	is	attempting	to	provide	an	account	of	a	different	philosophical	concept—the	concept	of	
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personhood.41		Frankfurt’s	view	is	thus	immune	from	the	criticism	that	a	decision	to	willingly	take	drugs	cannot	be	fundamentally	grounded.		As	we	will	see,	he	will	agree	with	Korsgaard	to	some	degree	that	our	endorsements	provide	us	with	reasons	for	action,	but	he	will	disagree	that	those	endorsements	are	fundamentally	normatively	grounded.	His	view	admittedly	contains	a	certain	element	of	subjectivity	when	it	comes	to	reasons.	
	
Identification	and	Reasons	for	Action		Frankfurt	thinks	that	motivating	reasons	cannot	be	external	to	the	self.	For	something	to	count	as	a	reason,	an	agent	has	to	care	about	it	in	some	way.		However,	not	just	any	desire	counts	as	a	reason.		Our	second	order	volitions	create	reasons	for	us.		That	is,	the	desires	that	create	reasons	are	those	desires	that	we	endorse	or	those	with	which	we	identify.		 This	account	of	reasons	allows	us	to	distinguish	reasons	from	alien	impulses.	He	discusses	a	case	in	which	he	feels	an	alien	impulse	to	shoot	his	own	son,	whom	he	dearly	loves.		There	is	a	desire	involved	here,	though	it	strikes	the	agent	as	foreign	and	unpleasant.		Frankfurt	argues	that,	though	there	is	a	desire	of	some	magnitude	present	in	this	case,	it	provides	him	with	no	reason	whatsoever	to	shoot	
																																																								41	It	is	likely	that	Korsgaard	would	say	that	her	account	is	an	account	of	personhood	also—a	Kantian	account	according	to	which	personhood	consists	in	our	ability	to	make	autonomous	choices.		The	point	that	I	am	stressing	is	that	Korsgaard	sets	out	to	provide	a	solution	to	the	Normative	Problem,	and	to	do	so,	she	invokes	a	certain	concept	of	humanity	(broadly	construed)	and	personhood.		She	thinks	that	this	account	can	fundamentally	ground	normativity.		Frankfurt	is	not	attempting	to	arrive	at	fundamental	grounding	for	normativity.	
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his	son.		The	desire	revolts	him—he	wholeheartedly	disavows	it.		It	is	only	the	desires	with	which	we	identify	that	set	for	us	real	reasons	for	action.				 In	his	later	work,	Frankfurt	develops	an	account	of	caring	and	love	that	further	explicates	his	notion	of	the	relationship	between	identification	and	reasons	for	action.		It	is	to	that	feature	of	his	account	that	we	will	now	turn.		
Caring	and	Love	Frankfurt	highlights	the	fundamental	importance	of	care	and	love	to	human	life.	He	emphasizes	that	there	is	a	differences	between	merely	wanting	or	desiring	a	thing	and	caring	about	that	thing.	An	addict	may	want	a	drug,	but	it	does	not	follow	that	he	or	she	cares	about	the	drug	(though,	of	course,	some	addicts	might).	Caring	about	things	is	a	matter	of	endorsing	or	identifying	with	them	and	is	a	position	that	we	arrive	at	through	introspection	and	reflection.		Caring	also	has	a	temporal	component.		He	says,	“when	we	do	care	about	something,	we	go	beyond	wanting	it.		We	want	to	go	on	wanting	it,	at	least	until	the	goal	has	been	reached.		Thus,	we	feel	it	as	a	lapse	on	our	part	if	we	neglect	the	desire,	and	we	are	disposed	to	take	steps	to	refresh	the	desire	if	it	should	tend	to	fade.”42		The	caring	entails,	in	other	words,	an	ongoing	commitment	to	the	object	of	care.	He	says,	“By	our	caring,	we	maintain	various	thematic	continuities	in	our	volitions.”43		Though	all	instances	of	caring	involve	second	order	volitions,	the	converse	is	not	true.		Not	all	second	order	volitions	represent	instances	of	caring	because	of	the	temporal	component	involved																																																									42	Frankfurt,	Harry,	Taking	Ourselves	Seriously	and	Getting	it	Right,	(Stanford	University	Press:	2006)	e-book.		43	Ibid.	
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in	caring.			He	says,	“Caring	about	something	implies	a	diachronic	coherence,	which	integrates	itself	throughout	time.”		I’ll	call	this	general	requirement	Frankfurt’s	
Dispositional	Requirement	for	Caring.		
Dispositional	Requirement	for	Caring:		If	we	care	about	something,	we	are	“disposed	to	take	steps	to	refresh	the	desire	should	it	tend	to	fade.”		Frankfurt	also	identifies	a	third	category	of	evaluative	attitude—there	are	some	things	that	we	come	to	love.		When	we	love	things,	we	often	have	very	little,	or	no	control	at	all,	over	whether	we	love	them.		The	things	that	we	love	and	that	we	can’t	help	but	to	care	about	are	what	Frankfurt	calls	“volitional	necessities.”		He	says,	“The	objects	of	our	love	represent	our	most	fundamental	commitments	and	provide	us	with	overriding	reasons	for	action.		When	we	love	something,	we	see	it	as	having	value	in	itself,	and	we	see	the	interests	of	the	thing	or	the	person	that	we	love	as	worthy	of	pursuit	for	their	own	sake.”44					 Like	Korsgaard,	Frankfurt	identifies	the	source	of	our	most	compelling	set	of	obligations	as	the	set	of	things	that	we	would	die	rather	than	to	give	up.		For	him,	these	things	are	volitional	necessities.		Frankfurt,	again,	like	Korsgaard,	also	has	something	of	a	lexical	ordering	thesis	for	reasons.		The	things	that	we	love	provide	us	with	our	most	compelling	reasons	for	action,	followed	by	the	reasons	that	are	provided	by	the	things	that	we	care	about.		Like	Korsgaard,	then,	Frankfurt	thinks	that	what	explains	the	value	of	the	things	that	we	care	about	is	the	very	fact	that	we	
value	them.		 One	of	the	most	striking	differences	between	Frankfurt’s	view	and	Korsgaard’s	is	that	Frankfurt	does	not	think	that	our	commitment	to	these	identities																																																									44	Ibid.,	229.	
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is	tied	in	any	way	to	the	commands	of	rationality.	We	can	perfectly	well	recognize	that	some	thing	or	other	is	required	by	the	demands	of	rationality,	but	we	may	find	that	the	recognition	that	it	so	follows	doesn’t	motivate	us	in	any	way.	This	may	be	because	we	simply	don’t	care	amount	the	demands	of	rationality.		He	says,	“Explaining	to	a	person	that	he	has	violated	the	requirements	of	rationality	may	lead	him	to	regret	and	be	ashamed	of	his	error,	but	in	itself	provides	him	with	no	basis	at	all	for	feeling	guilty	about	what	he	has	done.”45			The	simple	understanding	of	the	demands	of	rationality	isn’t	enough,	in	itself,	to	generate	the	reactive	attitudes	associated	with	moral	judgments.				 He	argues	further	that	an	analysis	of	a	person’s	purely	rational	processes	doesn’t	tell	us	anything	at	all	about	their	character,	but	it	is	assessment	of	character	that	is	relevant	to	moral	assessment.		He	claims,	“Our	response	to	sinners	is	not	the	same	as	our	response	to	fools.”46		 Unlike	Korsgaard,	then,	Frankfurt	does	not	maintain	that	our	status	as	beings	that	need	reasons	to	act	and	to	live	antecedently	commits	us	to	morality	or	to	the	demands	of	rationality.		Rather,	in	order	to	live,	we	must	be	beings	that	love	and	care	
about	things.	The	things	that	we	love	and	care	about	that	create	reasons	for	us,	nothing	deeper	or	more	fundamental,	like	a	fundamental	respect	for	humanity.		He	says,		 I	do	not	believe	that	anything	is	inherently	important.		In	my	judgment,	normativity	is	not	a	feature	of	a	reality	that	is	independent	of	us.		The	standards	of	volitional	rationality	and	of	practical	reason	are	grounded,	so	far	as	I	can	see,	only	in	ourselves.		More	particularly,	they	are	grounded	only																																																									45	Ibid.	46	Ibid.,	Loc.	258.	
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in	what	we	cannot	help	caring	about	and	cannot	help	considering	important.47		Though	nothing	has	 fundamental	 value	on	Frankfurt’s	 account,	 he	does	 think	 that	there	 are	 some	 things	 features	 of	 our	 external	 environment	 that	 human	 beings	overwhelmingly	tend	to	care	about	 in	common.	 	These	features	 include	an	 intense	commitment	to	the	external	conditions	that	provide	for	our	own	continued	survival,	or	our	commitment	to	the	survival	of	our	children.					 Reflective	endorsement	plays	a	substantial	role	in	Frankfurt’s	account	of	free	will,	moral	responsibility,	and	personhood.		It	is	also	essential	to	his	account	of	what	it	is	to	care	about	something	and	what	it	is	to	love	something.	 	Because	caring	and	loving	are	the	source	of	reasons	for	action,	reflective	endorsement	is	also	essential	to	his	account	of	reasons	for	action.		In	what	follows,	I	will	provide	some	challenges	to	the	claim	that	reflective	endorsement	really	should	play	such	a	prominent	role	in	our	understanding	of	all	of	these	important	philosophical	concepts.		
Caring	Across	Time	In	this	section,	I	will	raise	some	concerns	for	Frankfurt’s	account	of	caring.		Specifically,	I	will	take	issue	with	the	idea	that	caring	requires	renewed	endorsement	across	time.		I	will	provide	cases	in	which	a	person	cares	about	something	even	though	it	is	not	a	thing	that	they	have	endorsed	consistently	(or	at	all)	through	time.		Instead,	the	caring	in	these	cases	will	be	demonstrated	by	the	agent’s	behavior	across	time.	I’ll	suggest	that	dispositions	to	behave	consistently	count	as	better	evidence	of	caring	than	dispositions	to	realign	one’s	second	order																																																									47	Ibid.,	Loc.	363.	
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volitions.		Agents	that	ignore	their	consistent	behaviors	in	favor	of	their	second	order	volitions	seem	to	be	ignoring	something	important	about	who	they	are.				 As	we	have	seen,	Frankfurt	thinks	that	reasons	arise	out	of	the	things	that	we	care	about.		If	my	arguments	for	the	claim	that	some	caring	does	not	require	identification	are	compelling,	then	it	follows	that,	if	all	instances	of	caring	provide	us	with	reasons	for	action,	some	reasons	are	not	generated	by	identification,	and	are,	therefore	reasons	that	have	their	source	in	something	other	than	a	process	of	endorsement.				 In	an	earlier	section,	we	looked	at	Frankfurt’s	Dispositional	Requirement	for	
Caring:	
Dispositional	Requirement	for	Caring:		If	we	care	about	something,	we	are	“disposed	to	take	steps	to	refresh	the	desire	should	it	tend	to	fade.”		To	test	this	requirement,	consider	the	case	of	Jane	the	aspiring	lawyer.		Jane	identifies	with	her	desire	to	be	a	lawyer.		The	causes	of	her	identification	with	this	desire	are	complex.			She’s	been	raised	in	a	family	that	values	high	earning	potential,	she	views	being	a	lawyer	as	consistent	with	her	general	commitment	to	justice,	she	has	respect	for	friends	and	family	members	that	are	lawyers,	and	so	on.			When	she	introspects,	she	affirms	the	value	of	a	career	in	law.		Accordingly,	Jane	graduates	with	her	bachelor’s	degree	and	she	enrolls	in	law	school.			 		 An	additional	fact	that	is	true	of	Jane	is	that,	throughout	her	childhood,	she	frequently	created	art	in	her	free	time.		Her	parents	repeatedly	emphasized	throughout	the	years	that	interest	in	the	arts	was	for	entertainment	only.		Pursuit	of	a	career	in	the	arts	or	humanities	simply	wasn’t	practical	or	valuable.		Jane	took	these	lessons	to	heart,	and	whenever	she	reflects	on	her	desire	to	create	art,	she	
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disavows	it	as	frivolous—as	almost	a	weakness.		Nevertheless,	all	these	years	later,	the	basics	components	of	Jane’s	character	remain	unchanged.		She	is	now	in	law	school,	but	her	law	notebooks	are	filled	with	fairly	skilled	drawings	of	people	and	landscapes.		Her	eyes	glaze	over	when	she’s	left	to	complete	her	readings	for	class,	and	she	finds	herself	sketching	or	painting	when	she	should	be	studying.		She	tries,	repeatedly,	to	recommit	herself	to	the	study	of	law.		Jane	is	disposed	to	try	to	refresh	her	desire	to	study	law	when	it	tends	to	fade.	On	many	occasions,	when	she	recognizes	that	she	is	sketching	rather	than	studying,	she	tries	to	direct	herself	back	to	her	proper	course.		Over	time,	however,	she	loses	the	ability	to	focus	on	her	legal	studies.		By	Frankfurt’s	lights,	she	has	stopped	caring	about	the	law.		She	flames	out	of	law	school.		Years	later,	however,	she	still	finds	herself	sketching	and	painting.		 If	we	apply	Frankfurt’s	analysis	of	caring	to	Jane’s	case,	the	following	seems	true:	(1)	Jane	once	cared	about	studying	law,	(2)	Jane	no	longer	cares	about	studying	law	because	she	is	no	longer	disposed	to	refresh	the	desire	when	it	tends	to	fade.			Frankfurt’s	analysis	seems	to	get	both	of	these	cases	right.		But	what	would	Frankfurt	say	about	Jane’s	commitment	to	create	art?		 Jane’s	commitment	to	being	a	lawyer	required	constant	refreshing.		Indeed,	she	couldn’t	muster	up	the	motivation	to	study	without	an	active	refreshing	of	her	desires.		By	contrast,	Jane	did	feel	a	persistent	desire	to	create	art.	Her	disposition	to	create	art	was	so	persistent	that	she	did	not	even	need	to	refresh	it.		It	is	appealing	to	say	that	Jane	cares	about	creating	art	very	deeply.		The	fact	that	a	revival	of	her	desire	to	create	art	isn’t	necessary	suggests	that	she	cares	more	about	creating	art	
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than	she	does	about	becoming	a	lawyer,	not	less.		She	cares	about	it	so	much	that	her	commitment	to	it	never	even	requires	her	conscious	attention.			 The	intuition	that	Jane	cares	about	creating	art	cannot	be	captured	by	Frankfurt’s	account	of	caring,	but	his	dispositional	insight	is	useful.		If	we	think	of	caring	in	terms	of	being	reliably	motivated	to	behave,	we	can	capture	the	intuition	that	Jane	cares	about	art.	Caring	as	Reliable	Motivation	Thesis:		An	agent,	S,	cares	about	something	(P),	if	S	is	reliably	moved	to	action	by	a	desire	to	promote	P.		This	principle	is	able	to	capture	all	of	the	intuitions	generated	by	the	cases	above.		Early	in	her	schooling,	Jane	is	reliably	motivated	to	pursue	her	interest	in	law.		During	that	time,	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	she	cares	about	law.		When	she	is	no	longer	reliably	motivated	to	study	the	law,	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	she	no	longer	cares	about	it.		It	also	allows	us	to	account	for	the	apparent	care	that	Jane	has	for	creating	art.		 This	motivational	reliability	thesis	has	several	additional	explanatory	benefits.		First,	it	seems	like	external	observers	are	often	in	the	position	to	know	what	people	care	about.		Suppose	that	Congresswoman	Smith	is	running	for	re-election	in	her	district.		She	lives	in	a	district	in	which	a	lack	of	clean	air	has	caused	much	concern	for	the	majority	of	her	constituency.		At	town	hall	meetings,	when	distressed	voters	raise	these	concerns,	she	behaves	as	if	she	too	is	deeply	concerned	by	lack	of	access	to	breathable	air.		She	is	re-elected.		After	the	election,	her	actions	demonstrate	no	commitment	to	solving	problems	of	air	quality.		She	is	consistently	motivated	by	other	considerations—considerations	that	run	counter	to	the	interests	
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of	those	concerned	by	the	health	and	safety	risks	posed	by	poor	quality	air.		It	seems	reasonable	for	the	voters	in	this	case	to	say,	“Congresswoman	Smith	misrepresented	her	position	on	air	quality.		She	doesn’t	actually	care	about	it.”		It	would	not	be	possible	for	external	observers	to	determine	whether	Congressmen	Smith	cared	about	air	quality	if	that	caring	was	purely	a	matter	of	some	state	internal	to	the	congresswoman	and	invisible	to	the	citizens.		 The	motivational	reliability	account	of	caring	also	has	a	second	explanatory	virtue	that	Frankfurt’s	account	does	not	have.		People	care	about	some	things	more	than	they	care	about	others.		This,	too,	is	often	obvious	to	external	observers.		Congresswoman	Smith	may	care	about	clean	air	after	all;	she	just	might	not	care	about	it	as	much	as	she	cares	about	getting	re-elected	in	the	future,	which	requires	the	financial	contributions	of	major	corporations	who	are	interested	in	reducing	environmental	regulations.		The	motivational	reliability	account	of	caring	can	better	explain	how	we	are	in	a	position	to	say	that	people	care	about	some	things	more	than	they	care	about	others.		Congresswoman	Smith	may	have	a	disposition	to	refresh	her	desire	to	pursue	clean	air	should	that	desire	happen	to	fade.		She	might	also	have	a	disposition	to	refresh	her	desire	to	earn	money	for	her	re-election	campaign,	should	that	desire	happen	to	fade.	She	has	then,	in	both	cases,	met	the	basic	requirements	of	caring	put	forth	by	Frankfurt.		But	these	two	desires	turn	out,	in	the	real	world,	to	be	mutually	exclusive.		Intuitively,	her	actions	reveal	which	of	these	two	things	she	cares	about	more,	and	it	turns	out	to	be	her	re-election.		The	motivational	reliability	account	is	in	a	better	position	to	explain	this	fact.	
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	 This	general	discussion	highlights	what	I	take	to	be	the	main	problem	with	accounts	that	implement	reflective	endorsement	components	to	solve	major	philosophical	problems	or	to	account	for	noteworthy	features	of	human	experience.		Reliance	on	reflective	endorsement	puts	emphasis	on	what	we	take	ourselves	to	care	about,	but	what	we	seem	to	care	about	may	be	distinct	from	what	we	actually	care	about.		There	are	studies	in	empirical	science	that	support	this	contention.		We’ll	turn	to	those	in	chapter	six.		
The	Transparency	of	Caring	Critique	Frankfurt’s	account	of	caring	puts	each	individual	in	a	privileged	position	with	regard	to	knowledge	pertaining	to	what	they	care	about.		In	this	section,	I	will	argue	that	the	level	of	privilege	we	are	afforded	is	unwarranted.		I	take	Frankfurt	to	be	committed	to	all	of	the	following	epistemic	claims:	1. An	agent	can’t	care	about	something	without	knowing	that	they	care	about	it.		2. An	agent	can’t	be	wrong	in	the	judgment	that	they	care	about	something.	3. An	agent	can’t	be	wrong	in	their	assessment	that	they	don’t	care	about	something.	The	reason	that	an	agent	has	this	kind	of	infallibility	on	Frankfurt’s	account	is	that	caring	is	a	state	that	is	actually	constructed	by	an	internal	process	performed	by	an	agent.		It	requires	reflection	on	and	avowal	of	one’s	attitude’s	toward	the	subjects	of	caring.		If	the	agent	performs	the	process,	the	agent,	by	definition,	cares.		I	will	argue	that	1-3	are	counterintuitive.	
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	 Let’s	consider	(1)	first.		Imagine	a	man,	Ted,	who	is	not	very	self-assured.		No	one	who	knows	him	well	fails	to	detect	deep	currents	of	insecurity	surging	through	his	personality.		Some	have	even	said,	of	him	that	“he	would	rather	die	than	be	humiliated.”		Ted’s	actions	are	constantly	aimed	toward	avoiding	humiliation	and	ensuring	that	everyone	around	him	views	him	as	intelligent	and	successful.		Ted	is	not	aware	of	this	aspect	of	his	own	personality.		He	certainly	has	never	reflected	on	his	need	to	avoid	humiliation.		Yet,	the	desire	to	avoid	humiliation	motivates	Ted	so	reliably,	it	seems	implausible	to	say	that	it	is	not	something	that	Ted	cares	about.		His	need	is	to	avoid	humiliation	is	so	reliable	that	people	can	frequently	predict	his	behavior	in	certain	kinds	of	circumstances.				 Similarly,	imagine	Linda,	who	hates	crowds.		She	avoids	shopping	malls,	never	goes	to	sporting	events	or	amusement	parks,	and	does	her	grocery	shopping	in	the	middle	of	the	night.	Linda	has	never	carefully	reflected	on	her	dislike	of	crowds,	she	has	simply	found	herself	feeling	unpleasant	when	crowds	are	present.		It	seems	like	the	only	plausible	way	to	describe	her	actions	is	to	say	that	Linda	cares	about	avoiding	crowds.		It	seems	like	both	Ted	and	Linda	care	about	things	without	knowing	that	they	care	about	them.		 Now	let’s	look	at	(2).		Peter	loves	to	appear	well	read	at	cocktail	parties.		To	this	end,	he	looks	up	the	most	noteworthy	thinkers	in	history	on	Wikipedia	to	get	a	general	sense	of	the	nature	of	their	philosophy,	poetry,	art,	etc.		He	arrives	at	social	functions	ready	with	one-liners	about	Marx,	Nietzsche,	Klimt	and	Wagner.		The	foundation	for	certain	important	aspects	of	his	self-esteem	is	that	he	cares	about	education	and	culture.		The	truth	is,	however,	that	Peter	does	not	actually	care	about	
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either	education	or	culture.		What	he	cares	about,	though	he	doesn’t	recognize	it,	is	that	he	appears	both	educated	and	cultured.		It	seems,	in	this	case,	that	Peter	is	wrong	in	his	assessment	that	he	cares	about	education	and	culture.		 Finally,	let’s	look	at	(3).		An	agent	can	be	wrong	in	their	assessment	that	they	
don’t	care	about	something.		Consider	Julia,	a	lifelong	student	of	philosophy.		Julia	has	recently	decided	that	her	commitment	to	philosophy	has	been	a	waste	of	time.		Her	considered	opinion,	when	she	reflects,	is	that	she	has	spent	ungodly	amounts	of	time	considering	questions	without	answers.		She	always	dreamed	of	making	a	difference	in	the	world	and	her	official	take	on	the	matter	now	is	that	the	study	of	philosophy	will	never	provide	her	with	anything	she	needs	to	really	make	concrete	changes	in	the	real	world.		Thinking	long	and	hard	about	the	matter,	she	disavows	the	study	of	philosophy.		She	decides	to	dedicate	her	time	to	other	pursuits.		And	yet,	Julia	finds	herself	reading	new	philosophy	books	in	her	down	time.		She	gets	excited	when	her	friends	discuss	a	new	response	to	the	liar’s	paradox,	and	she	is	downright	incapable	of	extricating	herself	from	philosophical	discussions	on	social	media.		Despite	Julia’s	protestations,	despite	the	”official	position”	that	Julia	advances	on	the	subject,	it	seems	that,	after	all,	Julia	does	still	care	about	philosophy.		Her	reliable	behavior	makes	that	clear.		 The	idea	that	reflective	endorsement	is	crucial	for	caring	grants	a	special	epistemic	status	to	an	agent	with	regard	to	what	they	care	about.		This	status	ensures	that	an	agent	can’t	care	about	something	without	knowing	that	they	care	about	it,	an	agent	can’t	be	wrong	in	the	judgment	that	they	care	about	something,	and	an	agent	can’t	be	wrong	in	their	assessment	that	they	don’t	care	about	
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something.		I	have	argued	that	each	of	these	claims	is	implausible.		The	question	of	what	a	person	cares	about	should	be	resolved	by	appealing	to	a	more	diverse	description	of	an	agent	than	simply	what	they	affirm	upon	reflection.		
Guidance	Critique	Frankfurt	emphasizes	the	importance	of	the	concept	of	guidance	at	various	points	throughout	his	work,	and	he	might	appeal	to	the	notion	of	guidance	to	address	some	of	the	concerns	that	I’ve	raised	here.			He	might	take	issue	with	the	motivational	reliability	thesis	because,	though	the	examples	I	have	provided	above	are	examples	of	persistent	behavior,	they	are	not	examples	of	guided	behavior.	In	the	titular	paper	of	his	book	of	essays,	The	Importance	of	What	We	Care	About,	he	highlights	the	importance	of	guidance	for	the	notion	of	caring.		He	says,	“As	for	the	notion	of	what	a	person	cares	about,	it	coincides	in	part	with	the	notion	of	something	with	reference	to	which	the	person	guides	himself	in	what	he	does	with	his	life	and	his	conduct.”48		The	endorsement	component	of	caring	is	what	makes	guidance	possible.		Guidance	is	reflexive.			Motivational	reliability	is	not	enough,	on	Frankfurt’s	view,	because	behavioral	patterns	are	“discernable…even	in	the	lives	of	creatures	who	are	incapable	of	caring	about	anything.”49		 He	says,	further,	that	“the	notion	of	guidance,	and	hence	the	notion	of	caring,	implies	a	certain	consistency	or	steadiness	of	behavior;	and	this	presupposes	some	degree	of	persistence.			A	person	who	cared	about	something	just	for	a	single	
																																																								48	Ibid.,	82.	49	Ibid.,	83.	
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moment	would	be	indistinguishable	from	someone	who	was	being	moved	by	impulse.		He	would	not	in	any	sense	be	guiding	or	directing	himself	at	all.”				 There	is	much	to	discuss	here.		Let’s	begin	with	Frankfurt’s	idea	that	caring	something	for	a	single	moment	is	indistinguishable	from	a	person	who	was	moved	by	instinct.		This	looks	like	a	very	external	way	of	determining	whether	caring	is	taking	place.		It	may	well	be	true	that	the	two	acts	are	indistinguishable	(though	it	may	also,	in	many	cases,	be	false—more	on	that	later).		More	important	for	our	purposes	is	that	this	test	for	whether	the	two	things	are	indistinguishable	does	not	seem	to	be	consistent	with	what	Frankfurt	has	to	say	elsewhere.		One	significant	source	that	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	this	account	is	Frankfurt’s	original	view	on	free	will	and	moral	responsibility.		Consider	Frankfurt’s	own	paradigm	case	of	compatibilist	free	action	and	moral	responsibility.	Briefly	put,	Smith	is	contemplating	the	question	of	whether	he	should	shoot	Jones.		Black	wants	Jones	dead.		He	has	planted	a	chip	in	Smith’s	brain	that	can	detect	whether	or	not	Smith	decides	to	shoot	Jones.		If	Smith	wants	to	shoot	Jones,	and	acts	on	desire,	the	chip	does	nothing.		If	it	detects	that	Smith	will	not	shoot	Jones,	the	chip	activates	and	causes	Smith	to	shoot	Jones.		Smith’s	decision	to	shoot	Jones	is	overdetermined.		It	might	even	be	indistinguishable	from	the	way	it	would	look	for	Jones	to	shoot	Smith	because	he	was	forced,	for	whatever	reason,	to	shoot	Smith.		But	on	Frankfurt’s	own	view,	If	Jones	shoots	Smith	because	he	wants	to	shoot	Smith,	then	Jones	shoots	Smith	freely	and	is	morally	responsible	for	his	actions.		It	looks	like	the	case	that	he	is	describing	is,	by	hypothesis,	one	in	which	Jones	is	not	merely	acting—he	is	guiding	his	action.		In	this	case,	the	question	of	whether	he	is	guiding	his	action	
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seems	to	be	entirely	a	matter	of	what	is	going	on	with	him	internally,	regardless	of	how	it	appears,	externally,	to	anyone	else.		The	distinguishability	test,	then,	doesn’t	seem	like	a	consistent	one	for	Frankfurt	to	appeal	to	when	determining	whether	actions	are	guided.				 Further	textual	evidence	for	this	claim	comes	from	Frankfurt’s	account	of	action	in	Identification	and	Externality.		Here,	Frankfurt	argues	that	what	distinguishes	actions	from	mere	bodily	motions	are	their	internality.		He	doesn’t	give	a	full	account	of	the	distinction	between	the	internal	and	the	external	in	that	paper,	but	he	does	argue	that	one	key	difference	is	that	identification	is	a	necessary	feature	of	those	things	that	are	internal.		So,	the	determining	factor	for	whether	a	bodily	movement	counts	as	an	action	or	not	has	to	do	with	whether	identification	is	happening	internally	or	not.		This	description	of	the	distinction	between	actions	and	mere	bodily	movements	seems	to	be	a	far	cry	from	an	external	distinguishability	test.		In	other	words,	why	would	it	matter	that	the	actions	are	indistinguishable?		 It	appears	that	the	distinguishability	requirement	for	guided	action	is	something	of	a	red	herring.		It	may	however,	be	correct	to	say	that	there	is	some	value	to	behavior	guided	by	internal	states	that	are	reflectively	accessible.		It	doesn’t	follow,	however,	that	guided	behaviors	are	the	only	kinds	of	behaviors	that	demonstrate	that	caring	is	present.		
The	Importance	of	What	We	Don’t	Care	About—First	Order	Volition	Critique	From	the	reflective	perspective,	some	things	matter	to	us	and	some	things	don’t.		Frankfurt	is	right	about	that.		But,	even	if	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	human	essence,	I	
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will	argue,	he	hasn’t	made	the	case	that	second	order	volitions,	rather	than	first	order	volitions,	are	the	source	of	that	essence.		In	other	words,	I	think	it	is	perfectly	conceivable	that	the	essence	can	be	established,	in	many,	if	not	most	cases,	by	looking	at	the	first	order	volitions	that	she	is	inclined	to	have.		Why,	after	all,	should	we	identify	an	agent	with	the	desires	that	she	wants	to	have	rather	than	the	desires	that	she,	in	fact,	has?		 Consider	the	case	of	Paul.		Paul	is	the	son	of	an	earnest	but	uneducated	man	who	made	his	living	working	with	his	hands.		Young	Paul	enjoyed	school.		He	liked	discussing	politics	and	philosophy	(to	the	extent	that	it	came	up	early	in	his	young	life).		Due	to	circumstances	over	which	he	had	little	control,	Paul	dropped	out	of	school	before	he	could	graduate.		He	spends	his	adult	life	working	with	his	hands	for	very	little	pay,	and	he	has	difficulty	putting	food	on	the	table	for	his	wife	and	the	large	brood	of	children	that	they	eventually	have	together.		Despite	Paul’s	difficulties	in	life,	he	has,	over	time,	become	a	staunch	Republican.		Though	his	family	benefits	from	various	types	of	welfare	programs,	he	has	no	doubt	that	this	state	of	affairs	is	only	temporary.		He	believes	that	his	family	could	survive	without	it,	and	he	doesn’t	believe	in	governmental	assistance.		He	believes	that	if	people	want	to	be	successful	in	life,	they	should	pull	themselves	up	by	the	bootstraps	and	do	something	with	their	life.		He	doesn’t	believe	that	a	person’s	origin	story	defines	them;	rather,	he	believes	that	every	human	individual	is	the	sole	author	of	their	own	story.		When	he	votes,	he	votes	Republican.		Republican	policies	don’t	really	benefit	him	(in	fact,	they	actually	harm	him),	but	he	believes	that	they	will	come	to	benefit	him	in	time.		He	considers	himself,	as	the	saying	goes,	a	“temporarily	embarrassed	millionaire.”	
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	 Let’s	consider	Paul’s	volitions.		Paul	is	not	a	bad	person.		He	is	a	decent	guy	who	loves	his	family	and	tries	his	best.		But	his	first	order	volitions	do	not	line	up	with	his	second	order	volitions.		Let’s	look	specifically	at	the	kinds	of	behaviors	in	which	Paul	is	likely	to	engage	when	he	is	presented	with	the	opportunity	to	better	himself.		Recognizing	that	blue-collar	jobs	increasingly	require	a	working	knowledge	of	computers	and	other	technology,	Paul’s	employer	offers	to	pay	for	additional	schooling	for	all	employees.		Though,	on	introspection,	Paul	believes	that	success	in	life	involves	embracing	opportunities	as	they	come,	Paul	does	not	take	his	employer	up	on	the	opportunity	to	go	back	to	school.		He	doesn’t	attend	trainings	at	work	that	would	increase	his	overall	skill	set	and	make	him	more	eligible	for	promotions	and	raises.		He	becomes	increasingly	frustrated	as	younger	employees	rapidly	begin	to	advance	up	the	career	ladder,	while	he	remains	on	an	early	rung.		He	does,	indeed,	strongly	identify	with	his	second	order	volitions	about	work	ethic	and	merit	based	advancement.		He	simply	fails	to	realize	that	his	first	orders	desires	are	simply	more	telling	about	what	is	actually	important	to	him	than	the	set	of	things	that	he	wants	to	have	move	him	when	he	reflects	on	the	matter.		 Jean	Paul	Sartre’s	discussion	of	“bad	faith”50	will	provide	a	useful	framework	to	identify	what	has	gone	wrong	with	Paul	here.		To	be	in	“bad	faith”	is	to	live	inauthentically.		This	can	happen	in	a	variety	of	ways.		One	of	these	ways	is	to	define	oneself	too	much	in	terms	of	one’s	facticity.		A	person’s	facticity	is	the	sum	number	of	things	that	are	true	of	that	person.		A	person’s	facticity	includes	things	about	their	past,	such	as	who	their	parents	were,	where	they	were	born,	etc.		If	a	person																																																									50	Sartre,	Jean-Paul.	1966.	Being	and	nothingness;	an	essay	on	phenomenological	
ontology.	New	York:	Washington	Square	Press.	
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identifies	too	strongly	with	their	facticity,	they	are	rejecting	the	broader	range	of	possibilities	for	themselves—they	are	rejecting	what	Sartre	calls	their	“transcendence.”	Just	as	a	person	can	identify	too	strongly	with	their	facticity,	they	can	also	identify	too	strongly	with	their	transcendence.		They	may	reject	descriptions	of	themselves	that	are	true	in	favor	of	descriptions	of	themselves	that	might	someday,	be	true.		But	then	again,	those	descriptions	of	themselves	may	never	be	true.		 I	think	that	Sartre’s	way	of	describing	bad	faith	is	useful	for	understanding	Paul’s	case	here	for	a	number	of	reasons.		Paul	identifies	strongly	with	his	second	order	volitions.		He	believes,	along	with	Frankfurt,	that	the	set	of	desires	that	he	wants	to	be	effective	in	motivating	him	are	the	desires	that	best	represent	who	he	is	as	a	person.		But,	as	our	example	illustrates,	Paul	is	very	rarely,	if	ever,	actually	motivated	by	his	second	order	volitions.		His	first	order	volitions,	though	he	may	not	ever	even	fully	realize	it,	are	the	desires	that	actually	motivate	him	to	act.		In	this	way,	Paul	behaves	inauthentically.	Paul	defines	himself	too	much	in	terms	of	the	second	order	volitions	and	fails	to	acknowledge	the	facts	that	actually	apply	to	him—that	his	motivations	are	almost	always	supplied	by	his	first	order	desires.				 Indeed,	it	might	be	quite	accurate	to	say	of	Paul	that	other	people	in	his	life	understand	his	set	of	motivations	much	better	than	he	understands	them	himself.		Frankfurt	might	be	tempted	to	say	that	what	has	happened	to	Paul	is	just	a	garden-variety	instance	of	weakness	of	will.		Paul	wants	his	desires	to	lift	himself	up	from	his	own	bootstraps	to	be	effective,	but	he	simply	can’t	get	it	to	turn	out	this	way	at	the	end	of	the	day.		This	isn't	the	only	possible	description	of	what	is	happening	with	
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Paul	in	this	case.		He	doesn’t	think	he	is	in	bad	faith.		He	simply	fails	to	realize	that,	in	a	vast	majority	of	cases,	he	fails	to	be	motivated	by	his	second	order	volitions.		He	thinks	that	his	endorsements	control	his	behavior,	but	they	actually	don’t.		
Conclusion	I	have	argued	in	this	chapter	that	Frankfurt’s	account	of	personhood	paints	a	picture	of	persons	and	of	human	motivation	that	is	too	shallow.		I	have	argued	that	too	much	value	has	been	assigned	to	reflectively	endorsed	states,	and	too	little	has	been	assigned	to	other	potential	demonstrations	of	personhood.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	consider	the	role	that	reflective	endorsement	plays	in	Marilyn	Friedman’s	account	of	autonomy.		I	will	draw	similar	conclusions.		 	
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CHAPTER	IV	
REFLECTIVE	ENDORSEMENT	AND	AUTONOMY		In	her	book	Autonomy,	Gender,	Politics,51	hereafter,	AGP,	Marilyn	Friedman	uses	a	philosophical	approach	that	resembles,	in	its	key	features,	the	other	approaches	we	have	considered	so	far.	Like	the	other	thinkers	we	have	considered,	Friedman	also	identifies	the	capacity	to	reflect	on	our	own	inner	states	as	crucial	to	some	fundamental	aspect	of	our	humanity.		In	AGP,	she	outlines	an	account	of	autonomy	as	reflective	endorsement.				 For	Friedman,	Autonomy	is	normative.		Autonomous	actions	are	more	valuable	than	actions	that	are	not	autonomous.		Regardless	of	the	particular	action	that	is	being	performed,	the	action,	if	autonomous,	is	valuable	for	its	own	sake	(at	least	to	the	degree	that	it	is	autonomous.		Other	considerations	could,	potentially,	override	the	value	of	autonomy).	She	suggests	that	autonomy	is	normative	in	two	ways.		First,	autonomous	actions	have	some	special	status	over	non-autonomous	actions	because	autonomous	actions	reflect	a	person’s	real	self.		The	real	self,	for	Friedman	is	the	reflectively	endorsed	self.		She	says,	“For	choices	and	actions	to	be	autonomous,	the	choosing	and	acting	self	as	the	particular	self	she	is	must	play	a	role	in	determining	them.”52	Second,	autonomous	actions	are	normative	in	the	sense	that	they	provide	the	justification	for	our	other	social	practices.		So,	as	we’ll	see,	honoring	the	capacity	for	autonomy	is	what	it	is	to	show	respect	for	other	human																																																									51	Friedman,	Marilyn,	Autonomy,	Gender,	Politics.	(Oxford	University	Press,	2003).		52	Ibid.,	Loc.	79-80.	
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beings.		The	possibility	of	social	and	political	participation	and	the	potential	for	justified	public	policy	is	contingent	on	the	capacity	to	exercise	autonomy	possessed	by	the	individuals	involved.		Friedman	discusses	at	great	length	the	implications	that	her	account	of	autonomy	has	for	political	philosophy	and	social	policy.		 In	this	chapter,	I	will	outline	and	evaluate	Friedman’s	view	with	an	eye	toward	determining	whether	a	reflective	endorsement	component	provides	an	effective	account	of	autonomy.			
Autonomous	Behavior	and	the	Process	of	Reflective	Endorsement	There	are	several	similarities	between	Korsgaard’s	account	and	Friedman’s	account.		One	central	similarity	is	their	respective	commitments	to	procedural	realism	rather	than	substantive	realism.		As	we	have	seen,	Korsgaard	thinks	that	the	substantive	realist	position	cannot,	even	in	principle,	hope	to	answer	the	normative	problem	because	it	will	always	be	subject	to	Moore’s	open	question	argument.		For	any	explanation	offered	for	why	one	ought	to	perform	or	value	an	action,	one	can	always	ask,	“why	should	I	care	about	that?”	In	her	account	of	autonomy,	Friedman	also	rejects	substantive	accounts	in	favor	of	a	procedural	account.		Substantive	accounts	of	autonomy	maintain	that	there	are	some	constraints	on	the	kinds	of	behaviors	that	count	as	autonomous.		For	example,	a	person	cannot	autonomously	consent	to	an	arrangement	that	deprives	them	of	their	very	capacity	for	autonomy.		Friedman	thinks	that	accounts	of	this	type	define	autonomy	too	narrowly.	She	thinks	that	people	are	capable	of	autonomous	behavior	in	a	wider	range	of	cases	than	those	which	substantive	accounts	of	autonomy	would	be	willing	to	grant.		For	Friedman,	
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an	appropriate	account	of	autonomy	would	identify	the	procedure	that	makes	an	action	an	autonomous	action.	As	we	will	see,	this	procedure,	for	Friedman,	is	a	procedure	of	reflective	endorsement.	Another	key	similarity	between	Korsgaard’s	account	and	Friedman’s	account	is	that	they	both	emphasize	the	importance	of	the	different	identities	that	a	person	takes	on	from	the	standpoint	of	reflective	evaluation.53		For	Friedman,	in	order	for	an	agent	to	behave	autonomously,	she	must	judge	her	actions	to	be	consistent	with	one	of	her	“perspectival	identities.”	Perspectival	Identities	are	the	set	of	wants,	desires,	beliefs,	and	related	traits	that	we	embrace	from	a	reflective,	evaluative	position.		This	element	of	her	account	highlights	what	we	will	call	the	Reflective	
Endorsement	Requirement	for	Autonomy:	
Reflective	Endorsement	Requirement		“To	realize	autonomy	a	person	must	first	somehow	reflect	on	her	wants,	desires,	and	so	on	and	take	up	an	evaluative	stance	with	respect	to	them.”54		On	this	view,	engaging	in	truly	autonomous	behavior	is	more	than	just	a	matter	of	acting	intentionally.		Autonomous	action	must	issue	from	states	that	the	agent	has	reflected	upon,	evaluated,	and	approved	as	part	of	her	perspectival	identity.		 Friedman	contrasts	our	Perspectival	Identities	with	what	she	calls	our	“Trait-Based-Identities.”55		Our	trait-based	identities	are	comprised	of	features	like	our																																																									53		In	one	sense,	Korsgaard	and	Friedman	are	engaged	in	two	distinct	projects.		Korsgaard	is	providing	an	account	of	the	source	of	normativity	and	Friedman	is	providing	an	account	of	the	nature	of	autonomy.		In	another	sense,	however,	insofar	as	Korsgaard’s	view	is	Kantian,	autonomy	is	crucial	to	her	account.			54	Ibid.,	Loc.	80.	55	Friedman’s	discussion	of	traits	centers	on	identity	groups	to	which	a	person	might	belong.		In	chapter	Six,	I	will	be	used	the	term	“traits”	differently,	to	connote	enduring	personality	characteristics	(or	perceived	enduring	personality	characteristics).	
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race,	gender,	socio-economic	status,	sexual	orientation,	and	so	forth.		These	traits	may	dictate	the	kinds	of	lives	we	lead	in	both	obvious	and	non-obvious	ways.		For	Friedman,	however,	our	trait-based	identities	are	only	relevant	to	the	question	of	autonomous	behavior	to	the	extent	that	we	choose	to	take	them	on	as	elements	of	our	perspectival	identities.		She	says,		On	my	view,	what	counts	for	autonomy	is	someone's	perspectival	identity,	her	wants,	desires,	cares,	concerns,	values,	and	commitments.	The	non-perspectival	kinds	or	traits	she	instantiates	or	exemplifies	are	relevant	to	her	autonomy	only	if	they	matter	to	her,	only	if	they	are	features	of	herself	she	cares	deeply	about.	Otherwise	they	do	not	ground	her	autonomous	choices	or	actions.56				Friedman	also	proposes	a	condition	that	is	similar	to	Korsgaard’s	Lexical	Ordering	Thesis.		She	claims	that	actions	are	most	autonomous	when	they	reflect	what	is	most	important	to	the	agent.	
Importance	Requirement,		“Autonomous	actions	and	choices	also	stem	from	what	an	agent	cares	deeply	about.		They	stem	from	wants	and	values	that	are	relatively	important	to	the	acting	person.”57				Our	Perspectival	Identities	are	comprised	of	those	desires,	wants,	and	values,	that,	upon	reflection,	we	realize	are	the	most	important	to	us.		The	actions	that	demonstrate	the	greatest	degree	of	autonomy	are	those	that	issue	from	those	most	important	associations.		Autonomous	decisions	can	arise	from	states	that	we	care	about	only	trivially,	but,	as	we	will	see,	those	actions	are	less	autonomous	than	actions	that	issue	from	endorsed	states	that	are	more	important	to	the	agent.		Friedman	says,		
																																																								56	Ibid.,	196-198.	57	Ibid.,	109.	
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Wants	and	values	are	"deep"	when	they	are	abiding	and	tend	to	be	chosen	over	other	competing	wants	and	values.	Wants	and	values	are	also	deep	when	they	constitute	the	overarching	rationales	that	an	agent	regards	as	justifying	many	of	her	more	specific	choices.	Wants	and	values	are	"pervasive"	when	they	are	relevant	to	a	great	many	situations	that	a	person	faces.	They	are	frequently	salient	in	someone's	life	and	she	chooses	in	accord	with	them	often.	When	someone	reflectively	reaffirms	wants	or	values	that	are	important	to	her	in	the	sense	just	described,	they	become	part	of	the	perspective	that	defines	her	as	the	particular	person	she	is.	They	embody	the	"nomos"	of	her	self:	relatively	stable,	enduring	concerns	and	values	that	give	her	a	kind	of	identity	as	the	person	she	is.	Someone	is	self-determining	when	she	acts	for	the	sake	of	what	matters	to	her,	what	she	deeply	cares	about,	and,	in	that	sense,	who	she	"is."58			Friedman	claims	that	autonomous	actions	are	“reflective”	in	two	distinct	senses	of	the	word:	1. 	“They	are	partly	caused	by	a	person’s	reflection	on,	or	attentive	consideration	of,	wants	and	desires	that	already	characterize	her.”59	2. 	“They	must	reflect	or	mirror,	the	wants,	desires,	cares,	concerns,	values,	and	commitments	that	someone	reaffirms	when	attending	to	them.”60		Friedman	doesn’t	spend	a	lot	of	time	unpacking	these	two	conditions,	but	it	is	not	difficult	to	get	a	sense	of	what	she	has	in	mind.	Let’s	first	consider	(1).		It	is	not	enough	that	a	person	performs	an	action	and	that	action	just	so	happens	to	comport	with	the	wants	and	desires	that	categorize	the	agent.		It	also	must	be	the	case	that	the	actions	are	brought	about	by	states	on	which	the	agent	has	reflected.		There	are	at	least	two	senses	in	which	this	is	true:	(a)	the	external	world	must	be	such	that	it	allows	the	agent	to	make	autonomous	decisions.61	As	we	will	see,	some	external																																																									58	Ibid.,	114-120.	59	Ibid.,	92.	60	Ibid.,	103.	61	If	determinism	rules	out	free	will,	then	the	external	world	is	not	one	in	which	actions	can	ever	be	autonomous.		Friedman	provides	a	compatibilist	answer	to	this	problem.		She	says,	“A	compatibilist	answer	to	this	criticism,	to	which	I	subscribe,	is	that	autonomy	s	a	matter	of	degree	and	requires	agents	simply	to	harbor	the	capacities	for	certain	sorts	of	reflection	and	agency,	however	these	are	acquired	or	
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conditions	eliminate	the	possibility	of	autonomous	behavior	entirely.	The	second	sense	in	which	(1)	is	true	is:	(b)	The	mental	states	that	cause	an	action	must	be	states	that	have	been	reflected	upon,	rather	those	that	have	not	been	reflected	upon.			 Let’s	consider	some	examples	in	which	condition	(a)	fails	to	be	satisfied.		One	category	of	cases	in	which	(a)	is	violated	are	cases	in	which	conditions	in	an	agent’s	external	environment	are	not	favorable	to	autonomous	choice.	Friedman	makes	a	distinction	between	factors	that	are	constitutive	of	autonomy	itself,	and	the	causal	conditions	that	make	the	exercise	of	autonomy	possible.		She	says,		The	nature	of	autonomy	itself	consists	of	the	conditions	that	choices	actions	must	meet	in	order	to	be	autonomous.	These	conditions	constitute	autonomy.	These	are	distinct	from	the	causal	conditions,	both	past	and	present	that	must	obtain	for	choices	and	actions	to	manifest	the	constitutive	conditions	in	virtue	of	which	they	are	autonomous.	The	distinction	between	the	constitutive	and	the	causal	conditions	required	for	autonomy	will	be	particularly	important	for	appreciating	the	role	that	social	relationships	and	cultural	context	play	in	the	realization	of	autonomy.”62			This	first	category	of	cases	that	we	will	discuss	involve	cases	in	which	autonomy	is	not	realized,	not	because	the	constitutive	conditions	for	autonomy	are	lacking,	but	because	the	necessary	causal	conditions	are	lacking	that	would	ordinarily	provide	the	right	kind	of	environment	for	autonomous	action	to	take	place.	For	example,	imagine	that	Sarah	has,	as	one	of	her	most	fundamental	concerns,	a	desire	to	feed	her	family	only	the	healthiest	food.		While	at	the																																																																																																																																																																						are	interconnected	with	the	agency	of	others.	Those	reflective	and	practical	capacities	together	with	wants	and	desires	must	constitute	a	self	who,	as	a	self,	plays	a	determining	role	in	the	process	leading	to	her	behavior.		Self-determination	may,	ontologically	speaking,	be	merely	an	intermediate	causal	process	in	a	causal	sequence	extending	backward	and	forward	to	infinity.		Such	causal	connectedness	does	not	undermine	its	character	as	the	kind	of	causal	stage	in	the	process	that	it	is:		the	part	determination	by	a	self	of	her	own	behavior.”	(AGP	Loc	647).	62	Ibid.,	75-78.	
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supermarket,	Sarah	picks	up	what	she	takes	to	be	her	favorite	breakfast	cereal.		In	fact,	it	is	a	different	brand	displayed	in	a	similar	box.		A	supermarket	employee	accidentally	placed	the	imposter	in	the	wrong	location	on	the	store	shelf	because	of	its	resemblance	to	Sarah’s	preferred	brand.	When	she	arrives	home,	Sarah	realizes	her	mistake.		Happily,	it	turns	out	that	the	cereal	she	brought	home	is	actually	
healthier	(and	more	delicious)	than	the	one	she	normally	buys.		In	this	case,	Sarah	is	the	beneficiary	of	some	good	luck,	but	she	did	not	behave	autonomously	because	the	acquisition	of	this	particular	cereal	was	not	caused	by	states	that	she	endorsed.		In	a	case	of	this	type,	factors	in	Sarah’s	epistemic	environment	made	it	the	case	that	Sarah	could	not	ensure	that	values	that	she	had	reaffirmed	from	a	reflective	perspective	could	actually	play	a	causal	role	in	her	action.		 This	insight	might	be	useful	to	explain	why	autonomy	is	lacking	in	cases	in	which	sufficient	information	is	not	provided.		It	might,	for	example,	be	useful	for	understanding	the	concept	of	free	and	informed	consent.		An	individual	cannot	truly	behave	autonomously	if	they	aren’t	in	the	right	kind	of	epistemic	environment;	they	can’t	exercise	their	autonomy	if	they	don’t	have	the	right	kind	of	information.		It	might	also	provide	us	with	tools	for	understanding	the	difference	between	autonomous	actions	and	merely	intentional	actions.		Not	all	intentional	actions	are	truly	autonomous.		Depending	on	how	the	action	is	individuated,	Sarah	intentionally	picked	up	the	breakfast	cereal.		She	did	not,	however,	autonomously	pick	up	the	breakfast	cereal.		Picking	up	this	breakfast	cereal	in	particular,	given	that	she	didn’t	know	anything	about	it,	was	not	something	she	would	have	endorsed	from	a	reflective	perspective.	
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	 There	are	also	cases	in	which	an	agent’s	endorsements	are	barred	from	being	causally	efficacious,	but	do	not	involve	epistemic	challenges.		For	example,	if	a	person	is	being	kept	as	a	prisoner,	they	will	be	prevented	from	acting	autonomously.		I’ll	discuss	this	type	of	case	in	more	detail	later	in	the	chapter.			 Now	let’s	consider	cases	of	type	(b)	above.	These	are	cases	in	which	a	person’s	own	mental	state	deprives	her	of	full	autonomy.	Cases	of	type	(b)	are	cases	in	which	the	correct	sort	of	external	causal	conditions	are	in	place	for	the	exercise	of	autonomy,	but	the	constitutive	conditions	are	not	met.	Suppose	that	Sarah,	as	a	matter	of	routine,	does	the	dishes	every	night	after	dinner.		She	engages	in	this	behavior	without	reflection	on	what	she	is	doing	or	on	whether	she	values	what	she	is	doing,	while	the	rest	of	her	family	goes	on	to	enjoy	their	evening,	unburdened	by	chores.		Sarah	has	a	husband	and	several	older	children	who	are	perfectly	capable	of	doing	the	dishes	and	helping	around	the	house.	Her	behavior	in	this	case	would	be	far	from	fully	autonomous,	since	she	has	never	really	reflected	on	the	question	of	whether	norms	or	values	that	require	her	to	do	the	dishes	every	night	rather	than	spreading	the	chores	out	among	the	other	members	of	her	family	is	consistent	with	values	and	norms	that	she	would	actually	endorse.		Again,	for	Sarah’s	behavior	to	be	fully	autonomous	in	this	case,	it	must,	be	“partly	caused	by	a	person’s	reflection	on,	or	attentive	consideration	of,	wants	and	desires	that	already	characterize	her.”		Sarah	hasn’t	met	this	requirement.		 Because	Friedman’s	account	of	autonomy	is	procedural	rather	than	
substantive,	Sarah	need	not	come	to	some	objectively	correct	answer	concerning	what	behavior	would	actually	count	as	autonomous.		What	matters	for	autonomy	is	
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the	process	that	Sarah	goes	through.		Upon	reflection,	she	could	conclude	that	the	rest	of	her	family	ought	to	be	taking	care	of	their	fair	share	of	the	dishwashing	responsibilities.		It	would	also	be	open	to	her	to	come	to	the	conclusion	that	she	really	is	the	one,	after	all,	that	ought	to	do	all	the	dishes.		What	really	matters	here,	when	it	comes	to	the	question	of	whether	Sarah	is	autonomous,	is	whether	her	actions	are	caused	by	norms	that	she	endorses.		Pre-reflection,	Sarah	is	not	fully	autonomous.		If	she	recognizes	that	her	dishwashing	habits	are	consistent	with	norms	that	she	endorses,	then	she	behaves	autonomously	subsequent	to	that	recognition.	Now	let’s	consider	(2)—the	second	sense	in	which	autonomous	actions	are	reflective.		Recall	that	Friedman	says,	“They	must	reflect	or	mirror,	the	wants,	desires,	cares,	concerns,	values,	and	commitments	that	someone	reaffirms	when	attending	to	them.”63	This	condition	requires	that	the	actions	that	are	candidates	for	autonomous	action	must	in	fact	mirror	the	states	that	the	agent	has	endorsed.		Consider	another	choice	that	Sarah	makes	at	the	supermarket.		When	choosing	breads,	it	matters	very	much	to	Sarah	that	she	feeds	her	family	the	recommended	daily	amount	of	whole	grains.		She	has	certain	beliefs	about	what	this	means,	chief	among	them	that	the	requirement	is	never	going	to	be	met	by	purchasing	white	bread.		She	knows	very	little	about	how	to	select	the	healthiest	bread,	however,	so	she	selects	the	loaf	that	has	Heart	Healthy	printed	in	big	letters	on	the	bag.		She	learns	later	that	the	bread	she	selected	was	actually	not	particularly	heart	healthy	at	all.		In	fact,	Heart	Healthy	was	just	the	name	of	the	product.		In	this	case,	though	her																																																									63	Ibid.,	103.	
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intention	was	to	purchase	healthy	bread	for	her	family,	her	choice	was	not	fully	autonomous	because	the	decision	she	made	did	not	actually,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	mirror	the	states	she	reflectively	endorsed.		To	summarize,	Friedman	provides	a	procedural	account	of	autonomy	according	to	which	autonomous	behavior	is	behavior	upon	which	the	agent	has	reflected	and	has	endorsed	in	light	of	her	deeper	wants	and	desires.		Autonomous	behavior	is	reflective	both	in	the	sense	that	a	process	of	reflection	is	at	least	partially	causally	responsible	for	an	agent’s	action,	and	in	the	sense	that	the	action	actually	reflects	or	mirrors	the	agent’s	wants	and	desires.		
Additional	Requirements	for	Autonomy	The	reflective	endorsement	requirement	of	Friedman’s	account	is	its	most	fundamental	component.		There	are	number	of	corollaries	to	the	reflective	endorsement	requirement	that	are	worth	mentioning	here.	First,	for	Friedman,	action	is	not	autonomous	if	it	is	coerced.	
Absence	of	Coercion,	Deception,	or	Manipulation	Requirement		“For	self-reflection	to	be	effective	in	practice,	it	must	not	be	impeded	by	interfering	conditions.		Coercion,	deception,	and	manipulation	by	others	are	the	paradigm	examples	of	conditions	that	interfere	with	the	practical	effectiveness	of	someone’s	self-reflections.”64		If	autonomy	requires	reflective	endorsement,	conditions	that	make	reflective	endorsement	difficult	or	impossible	will	also	make	the	exercise	of	autonomy	difficult	or	impossible.		The	Absence	of	Coercion	requirement	provides	at	least	one	of	the	reasons	that	oppression	and	unjust	social	conditions	are	problematic—they																																																									64	Ibid.	
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prevent	those	people	who	suffer	under	them	from	being	fully	autonomous.		Some	oppressive	social	conditions	will	be	so	restrictive	that	they	will	prohibit	agents	from	exhibiting	much	autonomy	at	all.				 Even	when	a	person	is	being	coerced	or	manipulated,	she	may	still	be	capable	of	exercising	some	minimal	level	of	autonomy,	under	certain	conditions.		Friedman	maintains	that	autonomy	admits	of	degrees.		I	will	call	this	the	“Continuum	Thesis.”	
Continuum	Thesis:	“Autonomy	is	a	matter	of	degree.		No	finite	being	is	thoroughly	self-determined.		Even	self-reflection	itself	can	range	along	a	continuum.		The	more	extensively	one	reflects	on	one’s	values	and	commitments,	the	greater	is	one’s	autonomy	with	respect	to	them.”65		Human	lives,	even	under	oppressive	conditions,	are	often	reasonably	self-determined.		Even	in	conditions	in	which	options	for	what	to	value	or	how	to	act	are	severely	restricted,	an	agent	can	reflect	on	the	options	available	to	her	and	endorse	those	that	are	most	consistent	with	her	overall	character.		Friedman	maintains	that	autonomy	is	valuable,	even	when	exercised	minimally.		Ideally,	however,	societies	will	construct	social	policies	that	allow	for	the	optimal	exercise	of	autonomy	by	its	members.		 The	matter	of	whether	an	agent	can	act	autonomously	will	be	determined	by	whether	she	has	developed	what	Friedman	calls	“autonomy	competency.”	
Autonomy	Competency		“…autonomy	competency	is	the	effective	capacity,	or	set	of	capacities,	to	act	under	some	significant	range	of	circumstances	in	ways	that	reflect	and	issue	from	deeper	concerns	that	one	has	considered	and	reaffirmed.”66																																																										65	Ibid.,	Loc.	133.	66	Ibid.,	Loc.	231.	
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Sadly,	it	is	possible	for	a	person	to	be	in	a	position	in	which	there	is	no	possibility	for	the	development	of	autonomy	competency.		For	example,	individuals	that	were	sold	into	slavery	as	children	and	who	remain	slaves	through	adulthood,	their	lifestyles	tightly	monitored	and	controlled,	might	not	have	developed	autonomy	competency.		Autonomy	competency	is	developed	by	repeated	opportunities	to	choose	from	among	various	options	in	a	way	that	mirrors	the	things	that	you	have	reaffirmed	are	deeply	important	to	you.		Those	that	have	been	barred	from	choosing	among	options	could,	theoretically,	never	have	developed	this	competency	at	all.		This	kind	of	situation	would	be	exceedingly	rare.		
Searching	for	the	“True	Self”	My	main	objection	to	Friedman’s	account	of	autonomy	is	her	identification	of	the	
true	self	with	set	of	wants	and	desires	that	are	affirmed	through	the	reflective	endorsement	process.		Friedman	thinks	that	autonomy	is	valuable	because	it	involves	self-determination.		Indeed,	one	of	the	main	reasons	she	gives	for	advocating	a	procedural	rather	than	a	substantive	account	of	autonomy	is	that	a	procedural	account	emphasizes	the	importance	of	reflection	on	the	set	of	affirmed	traits	that	constitutes	an	individual’s	“true	self.”		 The	objection	that	I	want	to	raise	to	this	is	a	standard	self-knowledge	problem	that	I	have	raised	throughout	this	book	and	that	should	be	familiar	by	now.		People	aren’t	always	the	best	judges	of	what	is	truly	important	to	them.		Friedman	anticipates	this	objection.		She	acknowledges	that	agents	may	not	be	in	an	epistemic	
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position	to	know	which	states	are	really	the	most	representative	of	what	they	sincerely	value.		She	puts	the	point	in	the	following	way,	A	second	version	of	the	criticism	that	self-determination	is	impossible	challenges	the	presumption	that	selves	can	reliably	understand	their	own	wants	and	values,	that	they	are	transparently	accessible	to	themselves.		To	the	extent	that	autonomy	depends	on	self-understanding,	it	is	vulnerable	to	the	vicissitudes	of	self-knowledge.67		She	identifies	two	main	sources	for	the	claim	that	barriers	to	self-knowledge	pose	a	problem	for	her	account	of	autonomy.		She	first	looks	at	psychoanalysis.		The	premise	of	psychoanalysis	is	that,	through	psychoanalytic	therapy,	we	can	come	to	know	facts	about	ourselves	about	which	we	were	previously	unaware.		If	psychoanalysis	really	can	serve	this	function,	then	it	seems	like	it	is	not	uncommon	for	us	to	harbor	wants	and	desires	about	which	we	are	unaware.		If	this	is	the	case,	it	would	make	autonomy	of	the	type	that	Friedman	outlines	difficult,	if	not	impossible	to	achieve.		 Friedman	points	out	that	there	is	some	reason	to	be	dubious	about	psychotherapy,	and	I	agree	with	her	on	this	point.		But	she	identifies	another	field	that	gives	us	reason	to	doubt	the	extent	to	which	we	can	really	know	the	wants	and	desires	that	motivate	our	actions—empirical	social	science.		She	discusses	studies	done	by	Nisbett	and	Ross68		that	suggest	that	the	particulars	of	our	practical	environments	have	much	more	to	do	with	the	decisions	that	we	make	than	the																																																									67	Ibid.,	Loc.	669.	68	Nisbett	and	Ross,	The	Person	and	the	Situation:	Perspectives	of	Social	Psychology.	(McGraw-Hill,	1991)		
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character	traits,	or	sets	of	wants	and	desires,	that	we	take	ourselves	to	have.		If	this	is	true,	when	we	take	ourselves	to	be	acting	in	a	particular	way	because	of	some	set	of	wants	and	desires	that	we	have	endorsed,	we	may	be	entirely	wrong	about	our	own	motivations.69		 She	thinks	that	none	of	this	is	inconsistent	with	her	account	of	autonomy.		Reflecting	on	our	behavior	in	practical	contexts	and	noticing	the	things	that	Ross	and	Nisbett	point	out	may	serve	as	an	important	test	to	check	to	see	if	a	choice	made	in	any	given	situation	is,	truly,	autonomous.		She	says,	“Thus,	rather	than	undermining	the	practical	significance	of	attempts	at	self	knowledge,	psychoanalysis	and	empirical	social	psychology	support	autonomy	by	enabling	us	to	correct	our	misconceptions	and	improve	our	prospects	for	self	knowledge.”70	I	think	she	gives	this	objection	short	shrift,	as	I	will	explain	in	what	follows.		 	Friedman	acknowledges	that,	if	what	autonomy	requires	is	reflection	on	a	person’s	internal	states,	that	might	sometimes	pose	a	problem	for	her	account	of	autonomy.		She	thinks	that	reflection	on	our	internal	states	is	sometimes,	but	not	always	effective.		It	is	possible	for	an	agent	to	meet	Friedman’s	requirement	for	agency	if,	rather	than	reflecting	on	her	internal	states,	that	agent	reflects	on	her	own	past	behavior.	After	all,	that	behavior	might	be	a	more	reliable	source	when	it	comes	to	the	issue	of	what	the	agent’s	beliefs	and	desires	actually	are.	She	puts	the	point	in	the	following	way,	Self-reflection	needs	to	be	reflection	on	oneself	as	an	agent,	but	it	does	not	need	to	be	reflection	on	a	private	inner	realm.		It	can	equally	be	reflection	on																																																									69	I	will	discuss	studies	in	empirical	social	science	in	much	more	detail,	including	those	conducted	or	provided	by	Nisbett	and	Ross,	in	chapter	seven.	70	Op.	cit.,	Loc.	704.	
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one’s	past	behavior.	It	can	also	be	cautiously	and	narrowly	linked	to	clear-cut	evidence.		As	long	as	accurate	self-knowledge	is	at	all	possible,	even	the	frequent	occurrence	of	self-misunderstanding	would	not	undermine	accounts	of	autonomy	based	on	reflective	self-understanding.71			In	this	passage,	Friedman	acknowledges	that	reflection	on	one’s	own	past	behavior	rather	one’s	internal	states	may	sometimes	prove	to	be	more	telling	when	it	comes	to	the	issue	of	what	the	agent	really	values.		The	language	that	she	uses	here,	however,	seems	to	indicate	that	she	does	not	take	the	problem	to	be	a	serious	one.		Notice	that	she	uses,	in	one	part	of	this	passage,	the	language	that	self-reflection	
need	not	constitute	reflection	on	one’s	inner	states,	but	might	“equally	be	reflection	on	one’s	past	behavior.”		This	suggests	that	reflection	on	one’s	behavior	is	not	superior	to	reflection	on	one's	inner	states,	but	is,	rather,	equally	good.		That	she	chooses	to	use	the	language	“It	can	also	be	cautiously	and	narrowly	linked	to	clear	cut	evidence”	is	also	telling.		It	suggests	that	her	account	of	autonomy	can	be	expressed	as	a	disjunction—that	reflection	on	either	one’s	internal	states	or	reflection	on	one’s	past	behavior	would	be	sufficient	for	the	exercise	of	autonomy.		I	will	argue	that	there	are	problems	for	understanding	autonomy	as	a	disjunction	of	this	type	for	a	number	of	reasons.		1.	If	the	reason	that	autonomy	is	valuable	is	because	autonomous	actions	issue	from	an	agent’s	true	self,	then	if	a	certain	type	of	reflection	doesn’t	actually	accurately	identify	one’s	true	self,	then	that	reflection	isn’t	valuable,	or	at	least	it	is	not	valuable	for	that	reason.		
																																																								71	Ibid.,	Loc.	703.	
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	2.	(1)	seems	to	suggest	a	substantive	truth	about	what	the	real	self	consists	in.		If	this	is	the	case,	the	answer	to	the	question	of	what	autonomy	consists	in	may	be	substantive	rather	than	procedural.			(3)	There	are	cases	in	which	reflection	on	one’s	past	behaviors	and	reflection	on	one’s	inner	states	generate	different,	contradictory	results.			To	illustrate	the	tension	present	in	Friedman’s	disjunction,	I’ll	present	three	test	cases.		First,	let’s	consider	a	case	that	works	out	well	on	Friedman’s	account.		Imagine	that	Martha	is	a	woman	who	is	attempting	to	make	a	choice	about	whether	or	not	to	have	her	own	biological	child.		She	is	single	and	is	not	getting	any	younger.		She	is	worried	that,	if	she	waits	any	longer,	the	child	will	be	susceptible	to	health	problems.		Martha	has	read	Friedman’s	account	of	autonomy	and	is	on	board	with	the	theory.		She	recognizes	that,	historically,	women	often	feel	pressure	to	become	mothers.		She	wants	to	make	sure	that	her	decision	to	become	a	mother	is	not	coerced	either	explicitly	or	implicitly	by	societal	expectations.		She	wants	to	be	sure	that	her	choice	in	this	very	important	matter	is,	truly,	autonomous.	In	scenario	one,	Martha	reflects	on	her	internal	states	and	finds	a	strong	maternal	instinct	and	a	passionate	desire	for	children.		As	it	turns	out,	her	past	behavior	also	indicates	that	she	has	a	strong	desire	to	be	a	mother.		She	recalls	numerous	occasions	in	the	past	in	which	she	has	either	expressed	to	others	or	thought	privately	about	how	her	picture	of	a	flourishing	human	life	fundamentally	includes	raising	another	human	being.		She	remembers	feeling	pangs	of	emptiness	when	observing	the	relationships	that	her	friends	enjoy	with	their	children.		It	is	not	difficult	for	her	to	recall,	in	the	past,	exhibiting	a	certain	attentiveness	to	books	and	
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articles	that	describe	the	healthiest	practices	for	raising	children.		Martha	chooses	to	go	through	in	vitro	fertilization	so	that	she	can	give	birth	to	her	own	biological	child.		If	there	truly	is	such	a	thing	as	an	autonomous	choice,	it	seems	likely	that	Martha	has	made	one	in	this	case.		Importantly,	Martha	arrives	at	the	same	result,	both	when	she	reflects	on	her	inner	states	and	when	she	reflects	on	her	past	behavior.		 Now	consider	Scenario	Two.		In	Scenario	Two,	Martha’s	internal	states	indicate	that	she	wants	to	be	a	mother,	but	her	past	behavior	suggests	that	she	does	not.		Martha	does	not	respond	well	to	children.		Patience	is	not	her	strong	suit.		She	has	a	history	of	becoming	irritable	easily	when	things	do	not	go	precisely	as	she	wants	them	to	go.		Historically,	she	has	strongly	valued	the	ability	to	do	exactly	what	she	wants	to	do,	exactly	when	she	wants	to	do	it.		When	she	is	seated	next	to	young	children	on	an	airplane,	she	feels	frustrated	and	is	not	empathetic	when	they	begin	to	cry	on	the	flight.		She	has	nieces	and	nephews	and,	though	she	expresses	love	for	them,	truth	be	told,	she	finds	spending	time	with	them	to	be	something	of	a	burden.		She	simply	doesn’t	like	doing	the	types	of	things	that	children	tend	to	like	to	do.	However,	when	Martha	reflects	on	her	internal	states,	she	finds	that	she	strongly	desires	to	be	a	mother.		It	is	unclear	to	Martha	whether	she	should	view	her	past	behavior	as	representative	of	her	“true	self”	or	whether	her	inner	states	demonstrate	her	“true	self.”		 Finally,	let’s	consider	Scenario	Three.		In	Scenario	Three,	if	and	when	Martha	reflects	on	her	internal	states,	they	indicate	to	her	either	that	she	simply	does	not	have	positive	attitudes	toward	the	idea	of	being	a	mother,	or	that	she	even	has	a	strong	aversion	to	the	idea	of	being	a	mother.		Her	past	behavior,	however,	is	exactly	
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the	same	as	that	described	in	Scenario	One,	and	strongly	suggests	that	she	does	want	to	be	a	mother.		In	this	scenario,	Martha	doesn’t	know	which	action	is	truly	autonomous.		Should	she	act	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	what	she	finds	when	she	reflects	on	her	own	internal	states?		Or,	should	she	recognize	that	she	is	really	self-blind	when	it	comes	to	this	issue	and	that	the	truly	autonomous	thing	to	do	would	be	to	act	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	her	past	behavior?		 Friedman’s	Importance	Thesis	may,	perhaps,	provide	some	guidance	in	the	resolution	of	this	question.		Recall	that,	for	Friedman,	actions	that	are	maximally	autonomous	issue	from	wants	and	desires	that	are	relatively	important	to	the	agent.		How	instructive	this	turn	out	to	be,	however,	depends	on	how	we	understand	the	word	“important”	in	this	context.		If	what	is	meant	by	“important”	is	that,	upon	reflection,	the	agent	values	it	highly,	then	it	seems	like	the	agent	should	defer	to	what	she	affirms	in	her	reflection	on	her	inner,	private	realm.		After	all,	it	is	easy	to	imagine	that	the	agent’s	past	behavior	simply	doesn’t	matter	to	her	at	all.		If	an	action	is	more	autonomous	to	the	extent	that	it	is	important	to	an	agent,	then	it	doesn’t	much	matter	whether	she	is	acting	in	accordance	with	what	constitutes	the	best	evidence	for	what	really	constitutes	an	agent’s	“true	self.”		 If,	by	contrast,	if	what	is	meant	by	“important”	is	that	a	consideration	or	set	of	considerations	frequently	moves	an	agent	to	action,	then	it	seems	that	the	action	that	is	truly	autonomous	is	the	action	that	is	consistent	with	the	agent’s	past	behavior.		 The	criticism	that	I	am	raising	here	can	be	understood	as	a	dilemma	argument	as	follows:	
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A	Dilemma	Argument	Against	Friedman’s	Reflective	Account	of	Autonomy	P1:		Autonomous	behavior,	issuing	from	the	“true	self”	is	either	born	from	the	act	of	endorsement	itself,	or	it	arises	out	of	consideration	of	the	particulars	of	one’s	past	behavior.		P2:		If	autonomous	behavior,	issuing	from	the	“true	self,”	is	born	from	the	act	of	endorsement	itself,	then	there	are	no	substantive	considerations	(including	past	behavior)	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account	in	order	for	an	action	to	count	as	autonomous.		P3:		If	autonomous	behavior,	issuing	from	the	“true	self,”	arises	out	of	consideration	of	the	particulars	of	one’s	past	behavior,	then	the	act	of	endorsement	isn’t	sufficient	to	render	an	action	autonomous.		C:		Therefore,	either	there	are	no	substantive	considerations	(including	past	behavior)	that	need	to	be	taken	into	account	in	order	for	an	action	to	count	as	autonomous	or	the	act	of	endorsement	isn’t	sufficient	to	render	an	action	autonomous.			If	the	argument	is	sound,	these	two	possibilities	for	achieving	autonomy	aren’t	really	as	consistent	as	they	seem.				 The	first	premise	of	the	argument	comes	from	Friedman	herself.			As	we	have	seen,	she	thinks	that	an	agent’s	behavior	counts	as	autonomous	if	it	either	comes	about	as	a	result	of	endorsement	or	if	it	includes	careful	consideration	of	one’s	past	behaviors.		Textual	evidence	does	not	support	the	view	that	consideration,	on	the	part	of	the	agent,	of	their	own	past	behavior	is	necessary	for	autonomy,	but,	rather,	that	such	behavior	could	be	reflected	upon	in	order	to	arrive	at	an	autonomous	decision.				 Textual	evidence	from	most	of	the	work	suggests	that	Friedman	thinks	that	the	act	of	endorsement	alone	is	sufficient	for	autonomous	behavior.		For	example,	she	wants	to	provide	space	for	people	who	might	be	entirely	blind	to	their	own	past	behavior,	to	be	understood	as	autonomous	agents.	She	thinks	that,	so	long	as	an	
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agent	has	autonomy	competency,	or	the	ability	to	reflect	and	endorse	or	reject	different	options	and	values,	they	count	as	autonomous.		If	there	are	substantive	requirements	for	what	they	must	consider	upon	reflection,	that	starts	to	look	like	a	
substantive	rather	than	a	procedural	account	of	autonomy.		She	explicitly	argues	against	substantive	accounts	of	autonomy	as	too	narrow	in	a	substantial	portion	of	the	first	sections	of	her	book.72				 The	justification	for	the	third	premise	has	been	provided	already	in	examples	above.		There	are	cases	in	which	behavioral	evidence	is	at	odds	with	what	we	might	be	inclined	to	endorse	upon	reflection.		If	reflection	on	the	right	kind	of	evidence,	namely,	behavioral	evidence,	is	what	makes	an	action	autonomous,	then	the	endorsement	itself	isn’t	doing	any	work,	and,	again,	under	these	conditions,	the	account	starts	to	look	substantive	rather	than	procedural.		
Self-Blindness	The	idea	that	introspection	might	not	reveal	an	agent’s	“true	self”	is	problematic	for	Friedman’s	view	in	a	fundamental	way.	One	of	the	reasons	that	she	favors	a	procedural	account	over	a	substantive	account	of	autonomy	is	that	the	procedural	account	captures	the	value	of	self-determination,	even	in	circumstances	in	which	the	conditions	that	might	be	required	for	substantive	autonomy	do	not	exist.		On	a	procedural	account	of	autonomy,	an	agent’s	decisions	that	issue	from	reflection	are	valuable	because	they	issue	from	an	agent’s	“true	self.”		If	decisions	made	from	that																																																									72	In	a	later	chapter,	I	will	argue	that	Friedman	is	onto	something	when	she	argues	that	behavioral	evidence	should	be	reflected	upon.		I	will	argue	that	her	account	can’t	give	the	weight	to	behavioral	evidence	that	such	evidence	deserves	because	her	account	is	procedural	rather	than	substantive.	
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perspective	do	not	truly	issue	from	the	“true	self,”	then	there	is	no	longer	any	value	in	those	“autonomous”	decisions.				 One	might	find	what	Nisbett	and	Ross	say	about	the	true	motivations	behind	our	actions	compelling.		One	might	also	agree	with	Friedman	that	it	is	valuable	for	an	agent’s	actions	to	issue	from	their	“true	self.”	As	a	result,	one	think	that	the	most	reliable	way	to	ensure	that	decisions	do,	in	fact,	issue	from	the	“true	self”	is	to	reflect	on	past	behaviors.		One’s	“true	self”	in	this	case	would	be	revealed	by	what	they	consistently	do	or	refrain	from	doing.		The	way	to	truly	act	autonomously	would,	in	this	case,	be	to	behave	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	the	way	that	one’s	“true	self”	would	behave.		 There	are	several	problems	with	proceeding	in	this	way.		First,	it	isn't	a	strategy	that	is	consistent	with	Friedman’s	Importance	Requirement.		After	all,	as	I	mentioned	earlier,	the	way	that	an	agent	has	behaved	in	the	past	may	not	be	important	to	the	agent	at	all.	An	agent	might	take	any	number	of	pro	attitudes	toward	their	own	past	behavior.		 Noamy	Arpaly’s	example	of	the	reluctant	Nietzschean	is	applicable	here.	The	example,	as	you	will	recall,	is	the	following,		Imagine	Peter,	who	believes,	in	his	own	words,	that	“morality	is	for	wimps.”		He	advocates	a	quasi-Nietzschean	view	according	to	which	one	should	be	selfish	and	strive	to	increase	one’s	own	power.		Yet	Peter	does	not	perform	wrongfully	selfish	acts	and	he	performs	many	unselfish	acts	for	unselfish	motives.		When	asked	about	this,	he	offers	rationalizations	as	if	he	were	rationalizing	the	breaking	of	a	diet	(“But	I	was	being	selfish,	no	really)	or	sometimes	he	blushes	and	says,	honestly,	“Well	I	guess	I	am	a	wimp.”		But	he	continues	to	act	well	nonetheless.73																																																											73	Arpaly,	Nomy.	2003.	Unprincipled	Virtue,	Oxford	University	Press,	New	York.	
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Imagine	that	Peter	is	in	the	grips	of	an	important	decision.		He	wants	to	behave	autonomously.		He	is	sympathetic	to	the	idea	that	one’s	past	behavior	is	the	best	way	of	determining	their	“true	self.”		He	proceeds	to	reflect	on	his	past	behavior.		When	he	does	so,	he	sees	that,	time	and	again,	he	has	performed	unselfish	acts	for	unselfish	motives.	Others	have	witnessed	Peter’s	behavior	and	they	believe	him	to	be	a	generally	selfless	person.		In	this	case,	the	evidence	suggests	that	others	know	Peter	better	than	Peter	knows	himself.	For	when	Peter	reflects	on	his	past	behavior,	he	is	ready	with	his	standard	rationalizations.		He	believes	that,	though	he	performs	far	more	selfless	actions	than	selfish	ones,	all	of	this	is	due	to	weakness	of	will.		His	
real	values	are	selfish	values,	he’s	just	too	weak	to	consistently,	or	even	often,	demonstrate	those	values	in	action.				 Peter	denies	that	his	past	behavior	is	illustrative	of	his	“true	self.”		Peter’s	perception	of	himself—that	he	embraces	Nietszchean	values—is	a	self-deception.		Friedman	suggests	that	reflections	on	our	past	behaviors	can	help	us	refine	our	conceptions	of	ourselves	and	that,	as	a	result,	we	will	behave	more	autonomously.		But	what	if	we	reject	what	we	find	when	we	reflect?		Why	should	we	understand	the	actions	that	follow	from	Peter’s	self-deception	as	more	autonomous	than	those	actions	that	issue	from	his	consistent	character?				 In	a	less	extreme	case,	a	person	may	not	outright	reject	their	past	behavior	when	they	reflect	on	it,	they	may	simply	fail	to	care	about	it.		Imagine	that	Jane	is	about	to	embark	on	a	new	career	as	a	chef.		Suppose	further	that	this	new	career	involves	spending	a	lot	of	money	on	related	supplies—a	set	of	quality	knives,	high-end	cookware,	a	set	of	fresh	herbs,	etc.		Jane’s	financial	situation	is	somewhat	dire,	
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but	she	thinks	that	she	ought	to	buy	the	supplies	because	they	are	necessary	for	her	new	career.	As	Jane	reflects	on	her	past	behavior,	she	realizes	that	she	has	really	never	followed	through	with	a	long-term	plan	in	her	life.		At	the	moment,	she	is	full	of	enthusiasm	for	her	new	plan,	and	though	she	doesn’t	reject	her	past	behavior	as	unconnected	to	her	“real	self,”	she	simply	fails	to	care	about	that	past	behavior.		Jane	lives	in	the	moment.	She	buys	the	cookware.		A	month	later,	she	is	broke,	and	she	has	lost	the	drive	to	be	a	chef	entirely.	Again,	though	past	behavior	may	be	relevant	to	who	an	agent	really	is,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	an	agent	will	care	about	it.		So	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	notion	of	who	an	agent	really	is—how	we	determine	her	“true	self”	and	the	notion	of	what	the	agent	cares	about	come	apart.		Which	one	is	really	relevant	to	autonomy,	who	one	truly	is,	or	what	one	takes	oneself	to	care	about?		
Conclusion		I	have	argued	that,	like	Korsgaard	and	Frankfurt,	Friedman	puts	too	much	emphasis	on	the	value	of	reflective	endorsement.		She	provides	some	valuable	insights	about	the	relationship	between	endorsement	and	analysis	of	past	behavior,	but,	because	her	account	is	procedural	rather	than	substantive,	she	doesn’t	seem	entitled	to	claims	about	substantive	considerations	that	must	be	considered	upon	reflection.		I	will	share	some	thoughts	on	the	weaknesses	of	procedural	accounts	in	a	later	chapter,	but	not	before	considering	Allan	Gibbard’s	endorsement-based	account	of	the	nature	of	normative	judgments.	
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CHAPTER	V	
DO	NORMATIVE	JUDGMENTS	EXPRESS	STATES	OF	ENDORSEMENT?		Normative	judgments,	when	expressed,	sound	quite	a	bit	like	ordinary	expressions	of	belief.		“Murder	is	wrong,”	structurally,	looks	quite	a	bit	like	the	sentence		“the	book	is	on	the	table.”		When	we	express	the	later,	we	attribute	a	property	to	the	book,	namely,	the	property	of	being	on	the	table.			Similarly,	it	may	be	that	when	we	express	the	former,	we	attribute	a	property	to	the	act	of	murder—the	property	of	being	wrong.			If	this	is	what	we	are	really	doing,	moral	judgments	and,	more	broadly,	normative	judgments	in	general,	are	ordinary	expressions	of	beliefs	about	objects	and	properties.	There	is	disagreement	over	the	type	of	mental	state	that	is	expressed	when	people	make	normative	judgments.	Cognitivists	believe	that	the	similarities	that	appear	to	exist	between	normative	judgments	and	expressions	of	belief	are	not	deceptive.		They	maintain	that	normative	judgments	are	expressions	of	beliefs.		Non-
cognitivists	argue	that,	though	normative	judgments	and	beliefs	seem	to	have	similar	properties,	normative	judgments	express	a	type	of	mental	state	that	is	distinct	from	belief.		There	are	a	number	of	different	proposals	on	offer	for	the	mental	state	that	normative	judgments	express.		In	this	chapter,	I	will	look	specifically	at	one	proposal—that	normative	judgments	express	the	mental	state	of	endorsement.	
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	 The	proposal	that	I	will	consider	is	the	one	offered	by	Allan	Gibbard	in	his	book,	Wise	Choices,	Apt	Feelings.74	The	motivation	for	his	non-cognitivism	is	the	observation	that	normative	judgments	are	intrinsically	motivational.		In	this	sense,	Gibbard	is	what	I’ll	call	a	motivational	internalist.	
Motivational	Internalism:		The	view	that,	when	an	agent,	S,	sincerely	judges	that	she	ought	to	perform	action	x,	S	is	motivated,	at	least	to	some	degree,	to	perform	action	x.			In	the	tradition	of	Hume	and	subsequent	non-cognitivists	like	Ayer	and	Stevensen,	Gibbard	contends	that	cognitivism	can’t	account	for	the	motivational	nature	of	normative	judgments.	He	argues	that	endorsement	can	explain	this	necessary	connection.		 In	this	chapter	I	will	argue	that,	if	normative	judgments	don’t	express	beliefs	but,	rather,	some	other	mental	state,	it	is	not	plausible	that	the	state	in	question	is	endorsement	or	first	personal	acceptance	of	norms.	I	will	not	argue	either	for	or	against	non-cognitivism	in	general.		Instead,	I	will	focus	specifically	on	the	plausibility	of	the	claim	that	normative	judgments	express	states	of	endorsement.	Gibbard	is	straightforward	about	the	fact	that	the	mental	state	that	he	sketches,	that	of	endorsement,	or	accepting	a	norm,	is	not	a	state	that	we	can	define	precisely.	His	analysis,	he	admits,	is	psychologically	speculative.	The	evidence	to	which	he	points	in	order	to	substantiate	the	existence	of	such	a	state,	“consist[s]	in	part	in	commonsense	belief	and	vocabulary,	and	in	part	of	observation,	both	systematic	and	casual.”75	I	will	argue	that	the	evidence	does	not,	in	fact,	support	the																																																									74	Gibbard,	A.,	1990,	Wise	Choices,	Apt	Feelings,	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press.	75	Ibid.,	56.	
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existence	of	such	a	unified	state	of	“endorsement”	or	“acceptance	of	a	norm,”	and,	as	a	result,	Gibbard’s	norm	expressivist	account	is	not	successful	as	an	account	of	the	state	that	normative	judgments	express.		
The	Non-cognitivist	Tradition	and	the	Move	to	Expressivism	Hume	famously	argued	that	reason	alone	is	not	motivational.	Our	moral	judgments,	by	contrast,	by	their	very	nature	do	motivate.		Moral	judgments,	then,	cannot	be	judgments	of	reason.		Hume	says,	Morals	excite	passions,	and	produce	or	prevent	actions.	Reason	of	itself	is	utterly	impotent	in	this	particular.	The	rules	of	morality,	therefore,	are	not	conclusions	of	our	reason.76		If	we	accept	what	Hume	has	to	say	on	this	point,	we	are	left	with	the	conclusion	that	normative	judgments	function	more	like	desires	than	beliefs.		Michael	Smith	provides	a	useful	way	of	thinking	about	the	difference	between	beliefs	and	desires.	We	can	understand	the	difference	between	the	roles	of	these	two	mental	states	by	evaluating	them	in	terms	of	what	he	calls	their	“direction	of	fit.”77	Smith	points	out	that	when	a	belief	is	successful	(when	it	is	a	true	belief),	what	is	in	an	individual’s	mind	comes	to	match	what	is	in	the	world.		He	calls	this	a	“world–to-mind”	direction	of	fit.	If	I	am	in	the	process	of	forming	a	belief	about,	say,	the	number	of	students	my	logic	class,	I	strive	to	get	the	number	in	my	head	to	match	the	number	of	students	that	really	are	in	the	class.	
																																																								76	Hume,	David,	David	Fate	Norton,	and	Mary	J.	Norton.	2000.	A	treatise	of	human	
nature.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	77	Smith,	M.,	1987.	“The	Humean	Theory	of	Motivation,”	Mind,	96:	36–61.	
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	 Desires	have	a	different	direction	of	fit.		They	have	what	Smith	calls	a	“mind-to-world”	direction	of	fit.		When	we	have	desires,	our	goal	is	to	get	the	world	to	match	what	is	in	the	mind.		When	I	desire	to	successfully	run	a	marathon,	my	goal	is	to	get	the	state	of	the	world	to	match	what	is	in	my	mind—I	want	to	change	the	world	such	that	it	is	one	in	which	I	run	a	marathon.		 Normative	judgments	appear	to	have	more	in	common	with	desires	in	this	regard	because	they	are	concerned	with	the	way	the	world	ought	to	be.		The	goal,	then,	is	to	get	the	world	to	match	what	is	in	the	mind,	not	to	get	the	mind	to	match	what	is	in	the	world.				 If	normative	judgments	structurally	seem	to	have	more	in	common	with	desires	than	they	do	with	beliefs,	then	perhaps	such	judgments	don’t	actually	express	beliefs.		This	would	go	a	long	way	toward	explaining	the	connection	between	normative	judgments	and	motivation.			This	insight	alone,	if	accurate,	is	just	a	starting	point.		If	Hume	is	right	and	normative	judgments	are	not	expressions	of	belief,	what,	exactly,	do	they	express?		Gibbard’s	Expressivist	account	is	quite	recent.		It	was	developed,	in	part,	as	an	alternative	to	other	non-cognitivist	accounts	that	suffered	from	seemingly	insurmountable	difficulties.	An	early	suggestion	was	that	normative	judgments	express	emotions.	This	is	the	approach	that	AJ	Ayer	took	in	Language,	Truth	and	Logic.7879	Ayer’s	view,	called																																																									78	Ayer,	A.J.	1936,	Language,	Truth,	and	Logic,	London:	Gollancz,	2nd	Edition,	1946.	
79	Ayer’s	motivation	for	adopting	Emotivism	had	much	to	do	with	his	logical	positivism.		He	thought	that	normative	judgments	had	no	literal	significance	because,	in	his	view,	they	are	neither	empirically	verifiable	nor	analytic.		As	I	have	
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emotivism,	was	that	ethical	judgments	do	not	express	propositions	at	all.			He	argues	that	normative	judgments	add	nothing	to	the	proposition	being	expressed.		He	says,	“If	I	say	to	someone,	“You	acted	wrongly	in	stealing	the	money,”	I	am	not	stating	anything	more	than	if	I	had	simply	said	“You	stole	the	money.”		In	adding	that	the	action	is	wrong,	I	am	not	making	any	further	statement	about	it	I	am	simply	evincing	my	moral	disapproval	of	it.	It	is	as	if	I	had	said,	“You	stole	the	money,”	in	a	particular	tone	of	horror,	or	written	it	with	the	addition	of	some	special	exclamation	marks.”80	Moral	judgments	often	are	intended	as	commands.	When	this	is	the	case,	Ayer	argues	that	the	strength	of	the	emotion	being	expressed	varies	with	the	perceived	degree	of	the	importance	of	the	command.	For	example,	a	person	expresses	a	stronger	emotion	when	they	assert,		“It	is	your	duty	to	tell	the	truth,”	than	they	do	when	they	assert,	“It	is	good	to	tell	the	truth.	”		In	the	first	case,	the	moral	emotion	expressed	is	stronger	than	it	is	in	the	second	case.	In	Ethics	and	Language,	Charles	Stevenson	proposes	an	alternative	candidate	for	the	mental	state	that	moral	judgments	express.		He	says,	”Moral	judgments	are	involved	with	recommending	something	for	approval	or	disapproval.”81	Like	Ayer,	Stevenson	thinks	that	normative	judgments	add	nothing	new	to	the	proposition	being	expressed.		Normative	judgments	are	not	truth-apt.		Instead	of	adding	emotion,	however,	Stevenson	thinks	that	we	express	recommendation	for	or	against																																																																																																																																																																						indicated,	there	are	independent	reasons	to	think	that	normative	judgments	express	states	other	than	beliefs.		Emotivism	is,	therefore,	a	non-cognitivist	view	that	is	worthy	of	consideration	regardless	of	the	plausibility	of	logical	positivism.	80	Ibid.	107.	81	Stevenson,	C.L.	1944,	Ethics	and	Language,	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press.		
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something	when	we	make	normative	judgments.			In	this	way,	Stevenson	is	able	to	account	for	the	phenomenon	of	disagreement	about	normative	issues	in	a	way	that	it	is	not	clear	that	Ayer	can.		For	Stevenson,	there	are	two	different	types	of	disagreement:	disagreement	in	belief	and	disagreement	in	attitude.		Two	people	disagree	in	belief	when	they	disagree	about	the	facts.	They	disagree	in	attitude	when	one	favors	something	that	the	other	disfavors.	If	Bob	and	Sally	disagree	about	where	the	ice	cream	shop	is	located,	they	have	a	disagreement	of	belief.		If	they	disagree	about	whether	the	action	of	going	to	get	ice	cream	is	favorable	or	disfavorable,	they	have	a	disagreement	in	attitude.	Traditional	non-cognitivist	accounts	like	those	provided	by	Ayer	and	Stevenson	are	subject	to	a	problem	raised	in	different	places	by	both	Frege	and	Geach.82	The	problem	has	come	to	be	known	as	“the	Frege-Geach	Problem.”		It	is	also	frequently	referred	to	as	“the	problem	of	embedded	contexts.”	The	concern	is	that,	though	attempts	to	understand	normative	judgments	as	expressions	of	something	like	emotion	or	recommendation	seem	to	work	reasonably	well	in	straightforward	cases	of	normative	judgments	such	as	“murder	is	wrong”,	they	don’t	fare	as	well	when	normative	language	is	used	in	other	ways.		For	example,	normative	expressions	can	be	used	as	the	antecedents	in	conditional	statements	(e.g.,	if	murder	is	wrong,	it	should	be	illegal).		They	can	be	used	in	questions	(Is	it	wrong	to	provide	tax	breaks	for	the	wealthy?)		They	can	also	be	used	as	premises	in	arguments.		If	normative	judgments	express	emotions	or	recommendations,	then,	since	such	judgments	do	not	have	truth-values,	they	cannot	contribute	to	the																																																									82	Geach,	P.	1960:	Ascriptivism.	Philosophical	Review	69.	
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validity	or	invalidity	of	an	argument	and	yet	there	seem	to	be	straightforwardly	valid	arguments	making	use	of	normative	premises.		Stevenson	is	thus	unable	to	account	for	the	obvious	validity	of	arguments	such	as	the	following:	(P1)		Murder	is	wrong.	(P2)	If	murder	is	wrong,	then	what	John	did	is	wrong.	(C)	What	John	did	is	wrong.	In	light	of	this	problem,	if	the	non-cognitivist	position	is	to	be	maintained,	a	satisfactory	theory	regarding	the	mental	state	that	normative	judgments	express	should	be	able	to	explain	how	we	can	use	normative	language	meaningfully	in	ways	other	than	straightforward	expression	of	moral	judgments.				
Gibbard’s	Account	Gibbard	proposes	that	we	start	from	scratch.		Instead	of	beginning	with	the	assumption	that	normative	judgments	express	beliefs,	we	should	instead	assume	that	they	express	states	of	endorsement	and	then	see	how	much	explanatory	power	that	assumption	has.	He	suggests	that	we	“fix	on	the	dictum	‘To	call	a	thing	rational	is	to	endorse	it.’	And	search	for	a	sense	of	‘endorse’	for	which	the	dictum	holds	true.”83	He	argues	that	any	analysis	will	strain	the	concept	being	analyzed.		When	we	are	comparing	competing	analyses,	then,	we	need	to	look	at	the	ways	in	which	the	concept	is	being	strained.		Does	the	analysis	require	us	to	abandon	intuitions	that	are	fundamental?		His	strategy	is	to	show	that	his	own,	non-cognitivist,	analysis	strains	the	concept	of	normative	judgment	less	than	do	the	cognitivist	alternatives.																																																									83	Op.	Cit.,	6.	
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	 As	a	first	approximation,	Gibbard	offers	the	following	account	of	what	it	is	to	say	that	something	is	“rational.”		
Expressivist	Endorsement	Thesis:	“to	call	something	rational	[to	say	that	it	is	“the	thing	to	be	done]84	is	to	express	one’s	acceptance	of	norms	that	permit	it.”85		Gibbard’s	project	is	to	provide	a	general	account	of	normative	guidance	and	control.			He	argues	that	the	account	he	provides	makes	sense	from	an	evolutionary	perspective.	Normative	systems,	like	the	one	that	allows	us	to	endorse	norms,	would	be	fitness	promoting	in	the	human	species—they	would	make	members	of	the	species	more	likely	to	survive	to	pass	along	their	genes—because	such	systems	would	aid	in	coordination,	both	simple	and	complex.	It	would	have	been	evolutionarily	advantageous	for	humans	to	develop	different	types	of	motivational	systems.	Taken	together,	these	systems	of	motivation	provide	a	general	system	of	normative	guidance	and	control.		Context	determines	which	of	the	systems	will	be	controlling	in	the	circumstances.		The	first	system	he	identifies	is	the	most	basic.		He	calls	it	the	Animal	Control	System.	
Animal	Control	System	(ACS):		The	system	of	motivation	that	involves	bodily	appetite,	such	as	hunger,	craving,	or	addiction.	Non-human	animals	also	have	a	control	system	of	this	type.			Again,	from	an	evolutionary	standpoint,	it	makes	sense	that	animals	of	all	sorts	would	develop	this	kind	of	motivational	system.		The	animal	control	system	guides	us	in	the	pursuit	of	our	basic	survival	needs.			
																																																								84	Throughout	Wise	Choices,	Apt	Feelings,	Gibbard	uses	the	language	of	normativity	and	the	language	of	rationality	interchangeably.	85	Ibid.,	7.	
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Not	all	of	our	motivations	are	of	this	type.		We	are	also	strongly	motivated	toward	pursuits	that	don’t	have	to	do	with	our	basic	survival	needs.		For	example,	I	might	be	motivated	to	engage	in	certain	hobbies,	to	pursue	career	goals,	or	to	advance	my	education.			What	kind	of	motivational	system	can	explain	motivations	of	this	type?			Gibbard	proposes	a	system	that	he	calls	“The	Normative	Control	System.	“	It	is	this	system	that	he	thinks	generates	normative	judgments,	so	it	is	this	system	that	will	be	most	important	for	our	discussion	in	this	chapter.	
Normative	Control	System	(NCS):		The	linguistically	infused	motivational	system	that	involves	the	acceptance	of	norms.			To	understand	how	the	NCS	works,	we	need	to	understand	what	it	is	to	accept	a	norm.		
Acceptance	of	a	Norm:		To	accept	a	norm	is	to	be	prepared	to	avow	it	in	normative	discussion.	When	we	are	prepared	to	avow	a	norm,	we	expose	ourselves	to	demands	for	consistency.		The	notion	of	Acceptance	of	a	Norm,	and,	by	extension,	the	notion	of	the	normative	control	system,	has	three	main	corollaries:	1)	Imaginative	Rehearsal	and	Consistency	Thesis	(IRCT):	To	effectively	enter	into	normative	discussion,	one	must	be	prepared	to	respond	to	demands	for	consistency.		In	order	to	do	this,	an	agent	must	engage	in	imaginative	rehearsal	to	ensure	that	the	things	she	endorses	and	is	prepared	to	avow	are	consistent	with	one	another.				When	an	agent	truly	accepts	a	norm,	she	will	have	gone	through	a	process	where	she	has	reflected	on	the	norm	in	absent	situations	(in	a	cool	hour,	in	situations	in	which	she	is	not	tasked,	at	the	moment	she	is	considering	it,	with	actually	acting	on	the	norm).		In	these	moments,	she	has	concluded	that	the	norm	is	something	she	would	be	willing	to	avow	in	normative	discussion	because	she	has	concluded	that	it	
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is	not	inconsistent	with	any	other	norms	that	she	also	accepts.		Gibbard	describes	the	process	in	the	following	way,		“From	this	imaginative	rehearsal,	then,	a	kind	of	imaginative	persona	may	emerge,	an	“I”	who	develops	a	consistent	position	to	take	in	normative	discussion.		It	is	then	that	we	can	speak	most	clearly	about	what	the	person	accepts,	he	has	a	worked	out	normative	position	to	take	in	unconstrained	contexts.”86		The	next	corollary	is	a	claim	about	the	connection	between	imaginative	rehearsal	and	motivation.		We’ll	call	this	the	Normative	Governance	Thesis.		 2)	Normative	Governance	Thesis	(NGT):		Working	out	what	to	do,	what	to	think,	and	how	to	feel	in	absent	situations	will	influence	what	we	do,	think,	and	feel	in	actual,	like	situations.87			The	NGT	follows	from	the	IRCT,	taken	together	with	Gibbard’s	commitment	to	motivational	internalism.	If	we	have	reflected	on	and	formed	judgments	with	regard	to	what	we	ought	to	do,	then,	if	motivational	internalism	is	true,	we	will	be	motivated,	at	least	to	a	certain	degree,	to	do	the	thing	that	we	have	judged	that	we	ought	to	do.	The	final	corollary	is	a	claim	about	how	normative	governance	works	to	allow	for	coordination	in	groups.			 3)	Normative	Discussion	Thesis	(NDT):		Working	out	in	groups	what	to	do,	what	to	think	and	how	to	feel	will	involve	a	move	toward	consensus	through	mutual	influence	and	responsiveness	to	demands	for	consistency.		Normative	discussion	is	crucial	for	cooperation	and	cooperation	makes	the	human	species	well	suited	to	survive	in	its	environment.		Language	acquisition	was	crucial	to	our	ability	to	coordinate.			It	provided	us	with	the	capacity	to	convey	our	needs	to																																																									86	Ibid.,	75.	87	Ibid.,	72.	
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others	and	to	understand	others	when	they	conveyed	their	needs	to	us.		We	became	more	capable	of	working	together	to	satisfy	common	goals.		The	Animal	Control	System	served	us	well	when	it	came	to	motivation	of	a	certain	sort,	but	the	Normative	Control	System,	made	possible	by	language	acquisition,	provided	us	with	a	unique	new	form	of	motivation	that	effected	both	individual	and	group	behavior,	and	further	contributed	to	the	fitness	we	had	to	survive	in	our	environment.		The	guidance	that	the	ACS	provides	will	sometimes	be	at	odds	with	the	guidance	that	the	NCS	provides.		This	conflict,	Gibbard	argues,	accounts	for	many	common	cases	of	weakness	of	will.	If	I	am	on	a	diet,	but	I	crave	a	slice	of	the	birthday	cake,	my	ACS	and	my	NCS	are	at	odds	with	one	another.		My	ACS	provides	me	with	a	strong	craving	for	the	cake.		My	NCS	is	more	reflective.		Though	I	recognize	the	strength	of	my	craving,	it	isn’t	a	craving	that	I	want	to	have.		My	NCS	recognizes	that	eating	the	cake	is	not	consistent	with	other	things	that	I	endorse	(e.g.,	that	it	is	important	to	eat	healthy	food,	that	I	desire	to	maintain	a	certain	weight,	etc.).	If	I	succumb	to	my	desires	and	eat	the	cake,	my	weakness	of	will	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	motivation	provided	by	my	ACS	was	stronger	in	this	particular	case	than	the	motivation	provided	by	my	NCS.	Not	all	cases	of	weakness	of	will	are	explainable	in	terms	of	a	conflict	between	the	ACS	and	the	NCS.		Some	cases	of	weakness	of	will	are	cases	in	which	nothing	like	the	sensation	of	craving	is	involved.		These	cases	often	involve	competing	social	motivations.	
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	 Gibbard	uses	the	famous	Milgram88	experiments	as	examples	of	this	kind	of	weakness	of	will.		In	these	experiments,	subjects	were	asked	to	administer	electric	shocks	to	other	subjects.		The	subjects	that	were	asked	to	administer	shocks	(group	A)	were	made	aware	that	the	shocks	could	be	extremely	painful	and	might,	potentially,	even	be	lethal.		Unbeknownst	to	group	A,	shocks	were	not	really	being	administered.		As	group	A	administered	what	they	understood	to	be	shocks,	they	witnessed	subjects	hooked	up	to	the	device	(group	B)	exhibit	signs	of	pain	and	distress.		Some	of	the	group	A	subjects	were	troubled	by	the	fact	that	they	thought	they	were	causing	the	people	in	group	B	pain,	but	the	researchers	insisted	that	the	experiment	continue.	Two	thirds	of	the	members	of	group	A	complied	with	the	demands	of	the	researchers.				 Gibbard	argues	that	the	conclusion	to	draw	in	these	cases	is	not	that	the	subjects	administering	the	shocks	lost	all	sense	of	the	difference	between	right	and	wrong.		On	some	level,	even	while	administering	the	shocks,	they	still	believed	it	was	wrong	to	hurt	other	people.		They	continued	to	accept	or	endorse	the	norms	against	inflicting	pain.		Despite	that	recognition,	complex	social	motivations	that	demand	politeness	and	a	willingness	to	comply	with	authority	were	controlling	in	this	particular	case.	Gibbard	argues	that	the	explanation	for	this	kind	of	behavior	has	to	do,	again,	with	competing	motivational	systems,	but	this	time	there	is	a	conflict	of	a	different	sort.	He	makes	the	distinction	between	acceptance	of	a	norm	and	the	mental	state	he	refers	to	as	being	in	the	grip	of	a	norm.		To	understand	what	
																																																								88	Milgram,	S.	(1963).	Behavioral	study	of	obedience.	Journal	of	Abnormal	and	Social	
Psychology,	67,	371-378.	
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it	is	to	be	in	the	grip	of	a	norm,	we	first	have	to	understand	the	notion	of	
internalizing	a	norm.	
Internalizing	a	Norm:		To	internalize	a	norm	is	to	have	a	motivational	tendency	of	a	particular	kind	to	act	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	a	set	of	rules	that	come	about	as	a	result	of	social	training,	but	are	not	made	explicit.				Internalization	of	a	norm	works	independently	of	normative	discussion.		A	sophisticated	observer	might	be	able	to	formulate	principles	by	watching	the	patterns,	but	no	such	patterns	needs	to	be	explicitly	recognized	by	the	person	who	internalizes	the	norm.			Consider	the	case	of	speech	volume.		We	speak	softly	when	we	are	in	a	library,	movie	theater,	church,	or	cemetery.		When	we	are	at	parties,	speaking	before	an	audience,	or	participating	in	most	kinds	of	outdoor	activities,	we	speak	more	loudly.		Contingent	social	circumstances	may	alter	the	unarticulated	rules,	so	the	standards	of	appropriateness	may	vary	from	culture	to	culture.		Children	learn	the	appropriate	level	of	volume	for	their	voice	in	certain	circumstances	just	from	watching	the	behavior	of	others.	Children	follow	these	rules,	though	they	might	not	be	able	to	articulate	them.	Emotional	responses	might	also	be	internalized.		There	are	certain,	unwritten	rules	that	govern	responses	of	this	type.		Those	responses,	again,	vary	from	culture	to	culture.	For	example,	different	cultures	might	have	different	unwritten	rules	regarding	the	appropriate	conditions	under	which	a	male	should	show	emotion	that	might	be	different	from	the	circumstances	under	which	a	female	can	show	emotion.		In	many	cultures,	men	are	socialized	in	such	a	way	that	they	feel	it	is	not	appropriate	to	cry	or	express	distress	in	public.		The	men	themselves	might	be	
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unaware	that	they	have	internalized	these	norms,	but	they	are	motivational	all	the	same.			In	some	cases,	when	a	person	has	internalized	a	norm,	they	are	also	in	a	state	that	Gibbard	calls	being	“in	the	grip	of	a	norm.”	
The	State	of	Being	in	the	Grip	of	a	Norm:	A	person	is	in	the	grip	of	a	norm	when	they	find	themselves	motivated	by	a	norm	they	have	internalized,	despite	the	fact	that	the	norm	in	question	is	at	odds	with	norms	the	person	accepts.		Gibbard	suggests	that	the	participants	in	the	Milgram	study	exhibited	weakness	of	will	because	they	were	“in	the	grip”	of	norms	that	call	for	politeness	and	obedience.		Ordinarily	it	is	not	bad	to	be	motivated	by	these	types	of	norms,	but	in	this	case,	participants	were	motivated	by	norms	that	they	did	not	accept.			 For	Gibbard,	to	endorse	a	norm	is	not	just	to	express	approval	of	a	particular	proposition	in	isolation.		When	an	agent	endorses	a	norm,	they	take	that	norm	to	be	consistent	with	an	overall	plan,	which	means	that	understanding	endorsement	of	norms	involves	understanding	total	systems	of	factual-normative	worlds,	where	factual-normative	worlds	are	complete	descriptions	of	the	facts	that	the	agent	knows	to	be	true	and	the	set	of	norms	that	the	agent	endorses.	Imagine	that	Smith	is	considering	whether	he	should	run	a	marathon.		Let	r	stand	for	the	proposition	“I	ought	to	run	the	marathon.”		We’ll	say	that	W	stands	for	the	factual-normative	world	that	is	an	expression	of	Smith’s	total	system	of	norms	and	factual	judgments.	There	are	three	relations	that	r	can	stand	in	with	respect	to	W:	r	can	be	W	forbidden,	W	permitted,	or	W	required.		The	question	of	which	of	these	relations	r	
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bears	to	W	is	a	factual	question.			Because	it	is	a	factual	question,	people	can	agree	about	whether	r	is	W	forbidden,	permitted,	or	required	without	thinking	that	the	total	system	of	norms	has	anything,	whatsoever,	to	speak	for	it.	Consider	Dani,	who	is	so	athletic	that	it	is	safe	to	call	her	a	fitness	addict.		Dani	participates	in	every	athletic	activity	that	she	can.		In	the	past,	she	has	participated	in	athletic	events	that	are	so	strenuous	that	they	cause	her	toenails	to	fall	off.		Dani	is	considering	whether	to	participate	in	an	athletic	event	that	involves	running	through	rough,	mountainous	terrain	barefoot.		Let’s	call	this	norm	that	she	ought	to	do	so,	b	(for	running	barefoot).		Dani’s	friend,	Jon,	may	agree	that,	given	the	total	system	of	norms	that	Dani	accepts,	b	is	W	permitted,	and	is	perhaps	even	W	required.		Jon	can	agree	with	Dani	on	this	point,	even	while	rejecting	the	idea	that	W	ought	to	be	endorsed.		Jon	may	think	it	crazy	to	subject	oneself	to	that	kind	of	pain.		So	the	normative	aspect	of	W	has	to	do	with	whether	one	ought	to	accept	it.		The	factual	aspect	has	to	do	with	which	norms	are	forbidden,	permitted,	or	required	relative	to	the	overall	system	W.	The	various	systems	of	norms	that	most	people	accept	will	be	incomplete.		In	the	real	world,	no	one	is	fully	informed	when	it	comes	to	facts,	or	fully	opinionated	when	it	comes	to	norms.		Logically,	however,	there	will	be	a	set	of	completions	for	each	factual-normative	world.	A	system	of	norms	is	complete	when	every	possible	factual-normative	option	that	an	agent	might	consider	in	a	situation	is	categorized	as	either	permissible,	impermissible,	or	required.		As	Gibbard	puts	it,	“The	content	of	a	normative	statement	is	the	set	of	factual-normative	worlds	in	which	it	holds.”89																																																									89	Ibid.,	97.	
	96	
	
Concerns	for	The	Imaginative	Rehearsal	and	Consistency	Thesis	Many	of	the	concerns	that	I	will	raise	for	Gibbard’s	view	below	are	related	to	one	simple	point.		That	point	is	that	according	to	his	position,	there	are	multiple	motivational	systems,	but	only	the	outputs	of	the	NCS	count	as	true	normative	judgments.		I	hope	to	show	that	this	way	of	looking	at	human	motivational	systems	gives	too	much	authority	to	norms	that	have	been	reflected	upon	and	are,	as	a	result,	capable	of	being	easily	articulated.				 As	we	have	seen,	Gibbard	makes	a	distinction	between	internalizing	a	norm	and	endorsing	a	norm.		Internalizing	a	norm	is	important	for	the	purposes	of	coordination,	but	all	that	is	required	for	internalization	to	occur	is	for	creatures	to	be	socially	conditioned	to	engage	in	certain	patterns	of	behavior.		Endorsement	requires	more.		Creatures	become	capable	of	endorsement	when	they	acquire	language.		Language	gives	us	the	ability	to	formulate	our	endorsements	and	allows	us	to	test	them	against	one	another	for	consistency.	The	first	concern	I	have	for	Gibbard’s	view	has	to	do	with	the	relationship	he	establishes	between	imaginative	rehearsal	and	acceptance	of	a	norm.		It	is	often	a	good	thing	when	a	person	has	worked	out	in	advance	the	position	that	they	are	prepared	to	avow	in	normative	discussion.	The	discussion,	if	and	when	it	happens,	may	run	more	smoothly	if	a	person	has	worked	out	what	they	plan	to	say	ahead	of	time.		My	concern	is	that	this	process	rules	out	far	too	many	cases	that	should,	intuitively,	count	as	normative	judgments.	In	what	follows,	I	will	provide	some	cases	
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in	which	an	agent	has	not	engaged	in	imaginative	rehearsal	but	still,	intuitively	has	made	a	normative	judgment.	Consider	a	case	of	what	I’ll	call	spontaneous	normative	avowal.		Suppose	that	I	survey	my	Introduction	to	Ethics	Class	regarding	their	positions	on	a	variety	of	controversial	ethical	issues.		At	the	point	at	which	I	poll	them,	I	have	not	given	any	lectures	on	the	topics	of	the	poll.		I	ask	them	about	the	moral	status	of	practices	like	euthanasia,	capital	punishment,	abortion,	and	so	on.		The	students	provide	responses.		Some	of	the	students	may	have	considered	the	issues	before,	but	many	of	them	may	not	have.		This	is	even	more	likely	to	be	the	case	if	we	make	the	issues	under	consideration	issues	that	the	students	are	less	likely	to	have	encountered	or	thought	about	in	the	past	such	as	problems	in	ethics	of	technology,	medical	ethics,	or	environmental	ethics.		They	have	had	no	time	to	check	their	endorsements	for	consistency.		Nonetheless,	students	are	able	to	report	their	initial	attitudes	on	these	topics.	Intuitively,	the	judgments	that	they	offer	are,	indeed,	normative	judgments.		Of	course,	throughout	the	duration	of	the	class	the	same	students	will	consider	a	wide	range	of	perspectives	on	the	various	topics.		The	students	may	find	that	their	positions	change	as	they	are	exposed	to	different	facts	and	arguments.	In	part,	their	positions	will	change	because	they	are	forced	to	see	that	inconsistencies	exist	between	their	various	judgments.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	right	thing	to	say	here	is	that	the	normative	judgments	of	the	students	have	now	changed,	not	that	their	initial	judgments	were	not	genuine	normative	judgments	to	begin	with	because	they	had	never	gone	through	a	reflective	process	involving	imaginative	rehearsal.			
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A	change	in	normative	judgment	may	not	always	come	about	as	a	result	of	reflection.		Some	changes	might	involve	spontaneous	radical	shifts	in	attitude.	Consider	the	case	of	a	woman	who	has	been	a	strong,	life-long,	supporter	of	the	death	penalty.		She	has	close	friends	who	have	been	the	victims	of	terrible	crimes.		She	believes	in	retributive	justice	and	also	believes	that	the	death	penalty	is	an	effective	deterrent.		She	advocates	publically	for	the	death	penalty,	seeking	to	increase	the	extent	to	which	it	is	pursued	in	cases	involving	the	most	horrendous	crimes.		On	one	occasion,	her	activism	puts	her	in	the	position	to	actually	attend	an	execution.		When	she	does	so,	however,	she	has	a	reaction	that	she	is	quite	surprised	by—she	is	appalled	by	what	she	witnesses.		In	that	moment,	her	view	on	the	issue	changes	dramatically.		She	comes	to	view	the	death	penalty	as	inhumane.		She	is	driven	to	this	conclusion,	not	as	a	result	of	reflection	on	the	consistency	of	her	judgments,	but,	instead,	as	a	result	of	a	strong	empathetic	response	to	the	person	being	put	to	death.	The	judgment	that	was	born	in	the	moment	did	not	come	about	as	a	result	of	imaginative	rehearsal.		She	did	not	prepare	herself	to	deal	with	demands	for	consistency.		In	fact,	we	can	stipulate	that	the	attitudes	that	she	holds	are	not,	in	fact,	actually	consistent.		She	has	not	had	an	opportunity	to	consider	the	consistency	of	the	things	that	she	endorses.		If	she	had,	she	would	have	some	hard	choices	to	make.		She	would	have	to	consider	whether	her	beliefs	about	the	deterrent	nature	of	capital	punishment	serve	to	justify	the	practice,	even	if	it	is	inhumane.		She	would	have	to	consider	whether	she	thinks	the	act	of	inhumanity	against	the	victim	or	the	pain	felt	by	the	victim’s	families	is	sufficient	to	justify	the	inhumane	act.	When	she	gets	around	to	reflecting	(if	she	ever	does),	she	will	
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inevitably	find	that	she	will	have	to	dispense	with	one	or	more	of	the	norms	that	she	endorses.		Intuitively,	however,	in	the	moment	where	her	attitude	abruptly	changes,	she	has	made	a	genuinely	normative	judgment.		But	this	intuition	is	not	consistent	with	Gibbard’s	view.		 One	response	that	Gibbard	might	offer	is	that	it	is	unsurprising	that	in	each	of	the	cases	that	I	have	described	above,	we	are	responding	to	what	is	clearly	a	motivational	impulse	of	some	type.		But	the	motivational	impulse	at	play	in	each	case	is	a	motivation	generated	by	a	motivational	system	other	than	the	NCS.		In	both	cases,	he	might	diagnose	the	judgment	involved	as	response	generated	by	internalized	norms,	but	not	necessarily	by	endorsed	norms.		If	we	haven’t	subjected	our	judgments	to	demands	for	consistency,	they	are	not	really	normative	judgments.		 At	the	outset,	Gibbard	asked	us	to	start	with	the	assumption	that	normative	judgments	express	endorsements.		He	asked	us	to	see	how	much	explanatory	power	that	proposal	had	and	to	consider	the	extent	to	which	the	concept	of	normative	judgment	is	strained	by	the	proposal.		When	an	analysis	would	have	us	rule	out	cases	of	mental	states	that	seem,	intuitively,	to	be	genuine	normative	judgments	simply	because	the	mental	states	in	question	have	not	been	reflected	upon,	the	analysis	strains	the	concept.	If	spontaneous	avowals	and	spontaneous	radical	changes	in	avowals	intuitively	strike	us	as	genuine	normative	judgments,	those	types	of	judgments	shouldn’t	be	considered	differently	simply	because	of	the	way	Gibbard	has	carved	up	our	motivational	psychologies.				The	consistency	aspect	of	Gibbard’s	account	is	also	problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	there	are	consistent	judgments	that	will	withstand	societal	
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demands	for	consistency,	but	are	not	judgments	that	are	intuitively	“genuinely”	endorsed	(if	there	really	is	such	a	state	of	endorsement	at	all).	These	examples	also	illustrate	that	normative	judgments	are	more	complicated	than	Gibbard	suggests.		There	may	be	cases	in	which	we	are	self-blind	when	it	comes	to	what	we	“really”	think	it	makes	the	most	sense	to	do.		These	are	cases,	which	are	not	instances	of	weakness	of	will,	in	which	norms	that	have	not	been	explicitly	endorsed	are	more	compelling	to	the	agent	than	the	norms	that	have	been	endorsed.	I	contend	that	in	these	cases,	intuitively,	the	agent	in	question	is	not	“in	the	grip	of	a	norm.”	If	these	examples	are	compelling,	they	show	that	the	response	to	a	demand	for	consistency	is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	a	mental	state	to	express	a	normative	judgment.		 Consider	the	case	of	Peter,	a	college	student	who	wants	to	enter	a	fraternity.		He	strongly	desires	to	feel	that	he	belongs	in	this	particular	group	of	peers.		He	knows	that	the	fraternity	has	certain	attitudes	toward	women,	certain	attitudes	about	what	manliness	consists	in,	and	so	on.		He	develops	an	internally	consistent	position	to	take	in	discourse	with	the	members	of	his	fraternity.	He	creates	an	imaginative	persona	that	is	consistent	with	the	position	held	by	the	other	members.		In	normative	discussion,	he	gets	on	with	them	well.		On	this	basis,	he	is	admitted	into	the	fraternity	and	is	in	good	standing	with	its	members.	In	the	course	of	time,	however,	he	witnesses	the	other	members	of	the	fraternity	engaging	in	behaviors	to	which	he	has	a	strong	emotional	response—behaviors	like	hazing,	harassing	women,	and	making	sexist	and	racist	remarks.		He	feels	a	strong	sense	of	disgust.		As	a	result,	he	never	actually	engages	in	any	of	these	behaviors.		He	doesn’t	recognize	this	about	himself,	however,	and	in	normative	discussion;	he	continues	to	avow	the	
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attitudes	that	are	similar	to	the	other	members	of	his	group.		There	are	at	least	two	directions	that	we	could	take	here.		One	might	maintain,	with	Gibbard,	that	the	linguistically	infused	norms	that	Peter	endorses	are	his	normative	judgments	because	they	come	about	as	a	result	of	the	right	kind	of	process.		The	disgust	that	Peter	feels	comes	about	as	a	result	of	being	in	the	grip	of	norms	of	politeness	and	social	responsibility.				The	other	response	is	to	say	that,	though	Peter	avows	one	set	of	norms,	his	disapprobation	and	his	subsequent	behavior	most	accurately	reflect	his	“true”	normative	judgment.					 It	is	noteworthy	that	in	Gibbard’s	discussion	of	imaginative	rehearsal,	he	talks	about	developing	an	“imaginative	persona.”		It	is	noteworthy	because,	when	a	person	reflects	on	the	things	the	set	of	norms	they	endorse,	the	persona	they	construct	may	truly	be	nothing	more	than	a	construction	of	their	imagination,	with	no	real	connection	to	how	they	behave	in	real	world	circumstances.		If	this	is	so,	then	that	is	a	problem	for	the	NGT.		Though	we	have	worked	out	what	we	take	to	be	best	to	think	or	do	in	a	cool	hour,	that	reflection	has	very	little	or	nothing	at	all	to	do	with	what	we	think	or	do	when	the	hour	is	not	so	cool.	Consider	the	character	John	Falstaff	in	Shakespeare’s	Henry	IV	Part	I	and	
Henry	IV	Part	II.	Famously,	Falstaff	is	a	good	for	nothing,	cowardly,	opportunistic,	drunk.		In	addition	to	providing	the	plays	with	most	of	their	comic	relief,	the	character	of	Falstaff	advances	the	plot	by	tempting	prodigal	Prince	Hal	away	from	his	father	and	his	responsibilities	to	the	kingdom	with	the	lure	of	a	lifestyle	of	debauchery.			
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Falstaff’s	many	character	flaws	are	obvious,	but	that	doesn’t	keep	him	from	talking	a	big	game.		When	he	avows	norms,	they	are	always	virtuous.	He	swears	“a	plague	on	all	cowards,”	though	he,	himself,	runs	from	every	battle.		He	claims	that	liars	are	“villains	and	the	sons	of	darkness,”	though	he	only	tells	the	truth	himself	when	other,	more	reliable	witnesses	are	present	to	call	him	out	on	his	falsehoods.		Nonetheless,	the	set	of	endorsements	that	Falstaff	is	willing	to	avow	is	consistent.		Not	only	are	his	avowals	consistent,	but	they	also	seem	sincere.		Viewers	can’t	help	but	to	like	Falstaff,	not	just	because	he	is	funny,	but	also	because	there	really	seems	to	be	some	goodness	there,	which	is	why	it	tugs	at	our	heartstrings	when	Prince	Hal	renounces	him.	One	of	the	reasons	that	Falstaff’s	character	is	so	comical	is	that	his	imaginative	persona,	consistent	as	it	may	be,	is	so	inconsistent	with	his	actual	behavior.		So,	contrary	to	the	wisdom	offered	by	the	NGT,	Falstaff’s	reflections	on	norms	don’t	tend	to	guide	his	behavior	at	all.			This	is,	then	either	a	problem	with	IRCT	or	a	problem	with	the	NGT.		That	is,	it	is	either	a	problem	with	the	view	that	normative	judgments	require	attention	to	demands	for	consistency,	or	it	is	a	problem	for	the	view	that	when	we	form	normative	judgments,	we	are	motivated,	at	least	to	some	degree	to	act	on	them.		We	can	imagine	a	scenario	in	which	Peter	the	frat	boy	is	not	motivated	in	any	way	to	engage	in	hazing	or	like	behavior.		Falstaff	is	certainly	in	no	way	motivated	to	be	brave.		 If	the	problem	is	the	consistency	requirement,	the	concern	is	similar	to	a	one	that	is	frequently	raised	against	coherentism	as	a	theory	of	justification	in	epistemology.		It	is	possible	for	a	person	to	have	a	set	of	beliefs	that	all	cohere	with	
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one	another,	but	are	all,	in	fact,	false.		The	coherence	theory	of	justification	is	problematic,	in	part,	because	mere	coherence	of	beliefs	doesn’t	necessarily	provide	good	reason	for	thinking	the	beliefs	under	consideration	are	true.		Similarly,	the	fact	that	there	is	a	consistent	set	of	endorsements	present	does	nothing	to	establish	that	the	set	is	a	set	of	the	agent’s	normative	judgments	or	that	the	agent	will	be	in	any	way	motivated	to	act	on	that	consistent	set.		There	may	well	be	many	other	factors	that	figure	into	the	set	of	endorsements	one	is	willing	to	avow,	and	self-blindness	limits	the	norms	an	agent	may	be	capable	of	avowing.		The	fact	that	a	set	of	endorsements	is	consistent	doesn’t	provide	us	with	any	reason	to	think	that,	among	all	the	mental	states	we	could	select	as	the	mental	states	that	normative	judgments	express,	the	state	must	be	a	state	of	endorsement.		 Gibbard	acknowledges	that	our	total	plan,	our	total	system	of	norms,	is	almost	always	incomplete.		There	is	some	information	that	we	don’t	have.		There	are	some	instances	in	which	we	will	be	ignorant	of	information	that	could	help	us	settle	certain	normative	questions.		Some	incomplete	or	inconsistent	systems	aren’t	inconsistent	or	incomplete	because	facts	are	missing.	We	frequently,	perhaps	even	always,	conduct	our	lives	while	maintaining	endorsements	that	are	inconsistent	with	one	another.	It	would	be	some	sort	of	miracle	if	we	could	pick	out	all	the	inconsistencies	given	the	number	of	norms	we	would	have	to	endorse	just	to	get	through	our	daily	lives.		We	don’t	have	that	kind	of	time	to	engage	in	imaginative	rehearsal.		Consider	the	case	of	Jane.		Jane	endorses	norms	that	call	for	being	kind	to	others.		She	thinks	that	friendliness	can	make	a	huge	difference,	even	in	the	most	insignificant	circumstances.		She	therefore	endorses	the	following:	
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Greet:		If	I	see	someone	that	I	know	on	the	street,	I	ought	to	greet	them.		Now,	consider	two	different	cases	in	which	she	might	follow	Greet.		In	the	first	case,	she	sees	someone	at	the	supermarket	with	whom	she	is	acquainted.		She	does	not	know	this	person	well	but,	in	keeping	with	her	general	commitment	to	Greet,	she	says	hello.		This	is	an	easy	case	for	Gibbard’s	view	to	analyze.	Jane	acts	in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	her	endorsements,	and	as	a	result,	she	acts	on	her	normative	judgments.		There	is	no	weakness	of	will	present.		 The	second	case	is	not	as	obvious.		Suppose	that	Jane	accepts	Greet,	but	she	also	accepts	the	following:	
Toxic:		I	ought	not	to	interact	with	people	who	tend	to	be	a	drain	on	my	emotional	well-being.		Often,	acting	on	both	Toxic	and	Greet	will	be	possible	at	the	same	time.		After	all,	the	vast	majority	of	people	that	she	knows	do	not	have	a	substantial	effect	on	her	overall	happiness.		Suppose,	though,	that	Jane	sees	one	such	toxic	person	in	the	supermarket.		She	passes	her	in	the	aisle	and,	despite	Jane’s	distaste	for	the	woman	and	her	desire	to	refrain	from	interacting	with	toxic	people,	she	nevertheless,	says	hello.	 What	do	we	want	to	say	about	this	case?		Do	we	want	to	say	that,	as	in	the	Milgrim	case,	Jane	has	succumbed	to	weakness	of	will?		Do	we	want	to	say	that	Jane	was	in	the	grip	of	a	norm?		This	all	depends	on	the	norm	that	is	“really”	endorsed.		If	the	norm	I	endorse	is	Greet,	then	we	aren’t	dealing	with	a	case	of	weakness	of	will.		If	the	norm	I	actually	endorse	is	Toxic,	then	it	is	a	case	of	weakness	of	will.		I	am	in	the	grip	of	a	norm	rather	than	acting	in	accordance	with	norms	that	I	endorse.			There	is	really	no	non-arbitrary	way	of	determining	which	of	the	two	states	Jane	is	
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in,	if	the	two	distinct	states	really	even	exist	at	all.		In	fact,	it	isn’t	clear	that	the	distinction	is	non-arbitrary	in	the	Milgram	case	either.		A	person	may	take	himself	or	herself	to	endorse	norms	that	call	for	non-violence,	but	what	reason	is	there	to	believe	that	the	avowals	that	they	are	willing	to	make	in	a	cool	hour	are	better	indicators	of	their	genuine	moral	judgments	than	their	behavior	in	an	actual	situation?		Pointing	to	norms	of	non-violence	endorsed	in	a	cool	hour	when	it	comes	to	Milgram-type	experiments	as	true	normative	judgments	may	be	more	palatable,	but	it	isn’t	necessarily	more	accurate.	Perhaps	our	endorsements	really	aren’t	that	stable	or	consistent	with	one	another.		Again,	the	judgments	that	actually	determine	what	we	will	do	in	a	particular	case	may	have	very	little	to	do	with	what	we	have	reflectively	endorsed.		We	often	use	non-reflective	processes	when	adjudicating	disputes	between	two	inconsistent	competing	endorsements.		Those	non-reflective	processes,	intuitively,	may	themselves	be	forms	of	normative	judgments,	and,	again,	it	seems	ad	hoc	to	rule	them	out.	One	response	might	be	that	the	norm	that	Jane	has	really	endorsed	is	a	norm	that	specifies	a	preference	order	of	endorsements.		For	example,	she	might	actually	endorse	a	norm	that	says,	“Greet	always	outweighs	Toxic.		Follow	Toxic	when	it	comes	to	avoiding	voluntary	interactions	with	toxic	people,	but,	if	forced	into	the	situation,	follow	Greet.”		It	is,	of	course,	possible	that	Jane	really	has	endorsed	some	norm	like	that,	but	it	is	equally,	if	not	more	likely,	that	she	has	never	spent	any	time	imaginatively	rehearsing	what	she	would	do	in	a	situation	like	the	one	she	finds	herself	in	in	the	supermarket.		It	is	implausible	that	we	have,	not	only	first	order	
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endorsements,	but	also	second	order	endorsements	about	the	rank	ordering	of	our	endorsements.		
Conclusion	Gibbard	speculates	that	the	mental	state	of	endorsement	exists	and	that	it	is	the	state	that	normative	judgments	express.		In	this	chapter,	I	have	argued	that	endorsement	is	not	a	plausible	candidate	for	the	state	that	normative	judgments	express.		It	fails	to	capture	the	range	of	our	normative	experiences.				 	
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CHAPTER	VI	
IS	REFLECTIVE	ENDORSEMENT	GOOD	FOR	ITS	OWN	SAKE?	
	We	have	now	seen	reflective	endorsement	used	to	solve	many	philosophical	problems.	Korsgaard	uses	it	to	ground	normativity.	Frankfurt	uses	it	as	part	of	his	accounts	of	freedom,	personhood,	care,	and	love.		Friedman	defines	autonomous	action	as	action	that	has	been	reflectively	endorsed,	and	Gibbard	uses	it	to	account	for	what	human	beings	are	doing	when	they	make	normative	judgments.			 Each	of	these	thinkers	suggests	that	reflective	endorsement	is	procedurally	valuable.		On	one	interpretation	of	what	this	means,	the	procedure	itself	is	valuable,	regardless	of	what	it	brings	about.	This	seems	to	suggest	that	reflective	endorsement	is	intrinsically	valuable.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	argue	that,	if	reflective	endorsement	is	valuable	at	all,	it	must	be	instrumentally,	rather	than	intrinsically	valuable,	In	the	chapters	that	follow,	I	will	argue	that	reflective	endorsement	is,	indeed,	instrumentally	valuable,	but	only	under	certain	conditions.			
Is	Reflective	Endorsement	Good	for	It’s	Own	Sake?	The	question	that	I	will	be	addressing	here	is	whether,	absent	any	other	good-making	features,	reflective	endorsement	is,	itself,	a	good.		I	will	argue	that	it	is	not	and	that,	in	fact,	in	many	cases	it	actually	contributes	to	a	negative	state	of	affairs.		 As	we’ve	surveyed	the	literature	on	the	various	uses	of	reflective	endorsement,	a	common	thread	has	been	that	it	provides	a	kind	of	normatively	superior	motivation.	For	example,	for	Friedman,	a	Muslim	woman	behaves	
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autonomously	when	she	affirms	the	principle	that	wearing	her	hijab	is	consistent	with	deeply	held	values	that	she	has	endorsed.		Emboldened	by	her	reflection,	she	puts	the	hijab	on	once	more	when	she	wakes	in	the	morning.		Her	running	sense	of	self,	established	by	her	continued	reflective	endorsement	of	the	values	that	matter	to	her,	motivates	her	to	behave	in	similar	ways	in	the	future.		For	Friedman,	this	kind	of	behavior	is	normatively	superior	to	behavior	that	is	not	motivated	by	reflective	endorsement	or	that	is	less	motivated	by	endorsement.		 Something	similar	is	going	on	in	the	case	of	Korsgaard.		When	we	reflect	on	what	really	matters	to	us,	we	endorse	certain	practical	identities,	and	those	practical	identities	provide	motivations	that	are	genuinely	normative	to	engage	in	behaviors	that	are	mandated	by	those	identities.				 We	have	also	seen,	especially	in	our	discussion	of	Gibbard,	that	reflective	endorsement	is	just	one	source	of	motivation.		Its	proponents	seem	to	suggest	that	endorsement	is	normatively	superior	to	other	forms	of	motivation.		For	Friedman,	it	is	because	we	are	on	the	far	end	of	the	autonomy	spectrum	when	we	engage	in	endorsement.		For	Korsgaard,	it	is	because	we	are	acting	on	reasons	that	are	genuinely	normative	for	us	when	we	do	so.		For	Frankfurt,	it	is	because	we	are	expressing	our	wills—exhibiting	our	personhood,	when	we	take	an	evaluative	stance	toward	our	own	inner	states.		 I’ll	attempt	to	demonstrate	that	motivation	that	comes	from	endorsement	is	not	properly	understood	as	superior	and	should	not,	in	many	cases,	be	granted	any	sort	of	normative	authority.	To	make	this	case,	I’ll	first	outline	just	a	few	sources	of	motivation	that	are	not	instances	of	endorsement.		I’ll	consider	cases	that	are	
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motivated	in	the	ways	I	have	described	and	compare	them	to	cases	in	which	behavior	is	motivated	by	endorsement.		I’ll	consider	behavior	of	each	of	the	following	types:				1. Instinctual	Behavior	2. Behavior	that	results	from	habituation	3. Behavior	that	results	from	shaming	First,	I’ll	provide	a	sense	of	what	I	have	in	mind	in	each	case.	First,	let’s	consider	instinctual	behavior.		This	is	the	kind	of	behavior	that	we	are,	essentially,	hardwired	to	engage	in.		For	example,	if	I	notice	that	my	child	has	tripped	and	is	beginning	to	fall,	I	will,	without	thinking,	reach	to	catch	him.		 The	second	type	is	behavior	that	has	been	habituated.		These	types	of	behaviors	are	often	those	in	which	we	have	been	socialized	to	engage.	Gibbard	calls	motivation	of	this	type	motivation	on	norms	that	have	been	internalized.	These	behaviors	might	include	things	like	maintaining	a	certain	social	distance	from	others,	holding	the	door	open	for	others	as	they	enter	public	places,	and	so	on.			 Habituated	behaviors	can	also	be	more	complex.	For	example,	imagine	a	mother,	Sarah,	who	has	internalized	appropriate	parenting	behaviors	based	on	the	way	that	she	was	raised.		When	she	was	a	child,	her	mother	had	a	swear	jar	that	everyone	contributed	to	when	they	uttered	a	profanity.		Sarah	has	one	as	well.		Sarah’s	mother	took	her	children	to	church	every	Sunday.		Sarah	does	the	same	thing	with	her	children.		She	has	not	reflected	on	the	behavior,	she	has	simply	assumed,	without	challenge,	that	the	way	that	her	mother	raised	her	was	the	way	that	she	should	raise	her	children.	
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	 The	third	kind	is	shame-based	behavior.		Again,	consider	a	woman	who	is	a	mother.		We’ll	call	her	Martha.		Martha	uses	only	cloth	diapers	for	her	baby.		She	buys	only	organic	food.		She	won’t	let	her	family	go	near	anything	that	is	genetically	modified.		Though	these	behaviors	seem	to	suggest	some	consistency	with	a	certain	kind	of	world-view,	in	Sarah’s	case,	that	is	entirely	a	coincidence.		Truthfully,	she	doesn’t	care	much	about	the	environment,	she	has	no	attitudes	about	the	health	benefits	or	lack	thereof	when	it	comes	to	eating	organic	food,	and,	frankly,	she	doesn’t	even	know	what	it	means	for	something	to	be	“genetically	modified.”		Her	motivation	for	these	kinds	of	practices	come	entirely	from	the	fact	that	her	friends	engage	in	the	same	behaviors	and	she	doesn’t	want	them	to	think	that	she	is	an	inferior	parent.		 On	the	face	of	it,	it	may	seem	as	if	these	sources	of	motivation	are	somehow	inferior	to	behaviors	that	are	motivated	by	reflective	endorsement.			In	what	follows,	I	will	make	a	case	against	that	intuition.		I	will	argue	that	the	good-making	and	bad-making	features	of	a	case	of	human	action	have	nothing	to	do	with	endorsements,	but,	rather,	are	determined	by	states	of	affairs.		To	establish	this,	I	provide	a	case	where,	initially,	the	other	types	of	motivation	that	I	listed	above	(instinctual,	habituated,	or	shame	based	behavior)	are	in	play.		I	will	then	introduce	endorsement	into	the	situation	and	check	to	see	if,	intuitively,	endorsement	has	added	anything	of	value	to	the	situation.		 Let’s	begin	with	a	case	of	instinctual	behavior.		Betty	and	John	are	on	a	subway	platform.		John	trips	and	begins	to	fall	into	the	gap.		Instinctually,	Betty	grabs	him	by	the	arm	and	pulls	him	up,	preventing	him	from	falling.		John’s	life	is	
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saved.		That’s	a	good	thing.		Betty’s	actions,	though	not	motivated	by	any	reflection	at	all,	let	alone	reflection	and	endorsement,	have	produced	a	good	state	of	affairs.		 Let’s	modify	the	case	slightly.		Betty	and	John	are,	again,	on	the	platform.		Again,	John	begins	to	fall,	and,	again,	Betty	catches	him.		But,	before	she	catches	him,	she	reflects	briefly,	finds	that	she	endorses	norms	that	dictate	that	she	should	help	people	when	she	can,	and	then	she	proceeds	to	catch	him.	What	do	we	want	to	say	in	this	case?		One	might	be	inclined	to	say	that	there	is	no	normative	difference	between	the	case	that	involved	endorsement	and	the	case	that	merely	involved	instinct.		After	all,	the	action	was	the	same	in	both	cases—Betty	saved	John.		On	the	other	hand,	one	might	be	inclined	to	say	that	the	case	in	which	reflective	endorsement	is	involved	is	superior	because	Betty’s	decision	in	that	case	is	somehow	reflected	in	her	very	character.		That	intuition	may	be	justified	but,	if	it	is,	reflective	endorsement	might	not	be	doing	all	of	the	work	in	generating	that	intuition.		 Let’s	consider	yet	another	case	of	a	similar	type	in	which	John	and	Betty,	yet	again,	find	themselves	on	the	platform.		Again,	John	loses	his	balance,	and,	again,	begins	to	fall.		Betty	takes	a	split	second	to	reflect	on	her	values,	realizes	that	she	hates	John	and	that	she	endorses	norms	that	would	best	be	promoted	by	his	death.		She	lets	him	fall	to	his	doom.		This	seems	like	a	bad	state	of	affairs.		What	does	the	endorsement	contribute	to	this	state	of	affairs?		Had	Betty	not	reflected	on	allowing	John	to	fall,	her	actions	still	might	have	produced	a	bad	state	of	affairs.		But	it	is	not	clear	that	her	actions	would	have	been	the	same	had	she	not	stopped	to	reflect	on	her	values.		Her	instincts	may	well	have	kicked	in,	and	she	might	have	done	
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something	to	help	him.		In	this	case,	the	presence	of	reflective	endorsement	seems	to	have	made	matters	worse.	It’s	not	obvious	that	there	is	value	in	the	mere	fact	that	Betty	went	through	the	reflective	process.			 Sometimes,	habituated	behaviors	may	also	be	more	valuable	than	behaviors	motivated	by	norms	that	an	individual	endorses.		Let’s	return	to	the	case	of	Sarah,	who	has	been	habituated	to	engage	in	all	of	the	same	parenting	behaviors	as	her	mother.		She’s	never	really	reflected	on	her	parenting	decisions,	she’s	simply	assumed	that	all	of	the	decisions	that	her	mother	made	in	raising	her	were	the	right	decisions	to	make.	This	is	not	uncommon.	Let’s	imagine	that	one	of	the	things	that	Sarah	routinely	does	is	see	to	it	that	her	child	eats	green	vegetables	as	part	of	her	dinner	each	night.		She	has	never	reflected	on	the	advisability	of	this	course	of	action,	she	is	merely	habituated	to	engage	in	it.		She	does	it	without	fail,	and,	as	a	result,	her	child	routinely	gets	the	nutrition	that	she	needs.		 Now	imagine	that	Sarah,	realizing	that	she	has	never	really	given	much	thought	to	the	practice	of	feeding	her	child	vegetables,	thinks	it	through.		She	consults	a	number	of	different	websites.	She	concludes	that	she	has	been	doing	the	right	thing	all	along,	and	she	continues	to	feed	her	child	vegetables.	She	has	now	endorsed	norms	that	support	feeding	vegetables	to	her	child.		Again,	one	might	have	two	different	responses	to	this	state	of	affairs.		One	might	think	that	Sarah’s	investigation	into	the	nutritional	value	of	vegetables	has	added	nothing	of	value	to	the	situation.		She	was	feeding	her	child	healthy	food	before	and	there	was	no	reason	to	believe	that	behavior	was	going	to	stop	anytime	soon.		After	consulting	sources	on	the	issue,	she	simply	reaffirms	the	action	in	which	that	she	was	already	
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inclined	to	engage.		On	the	other	hand,	one	might	think	that	Sarah	is	better	off	in	the	case	in	which	she	has	considered	carefully	her	reasons	for	feeding	vegetables	to	her	child	and	has	endorsed	norms	that	support	the	practice.		Again,	however,	we	can	question	whether	it	is	the	endorsement	itself	that	adds	value	to	the	state	of	affairs,	or,	instead,	it	is	the	substance	of	what	is	endorsed	that	lends	value	to	that	state	of	affairs.		 	Let’s	consider	another	case.		Again,	Sarah	realizes	that	she	has	never	really	reflected	on	her	reasons	for	feeding	her	child	vegetables.		Once	more,	she	takes	some	time	to	reflect	on	it.		She	consults	various	websites,	but,	sadly	critical	thinking	skills	are	not	her	strong	suit	and	she	checks	all	the	wrong	sites.			Perhaps	she	assigns	too	much	credence	to	websites	that	suggest	that	toxic	chemicals	have	leaked	into	all	the	earth’s	soil,	rendering	all	vegetables	unsafe	for	consumption.	She	concludes	that	her	mother	had	been	mistaken	about	the	advisability	of	feeding	children	vegetables	and	that	now,	she,	Sarah,	had	been	doing	the	wrong	thing	too.		She	stops	feeding	her	child	vegetables.		 	Feeding	one’s	children	vegetables	is,	of	course	a	good	thing	to	do	regularly.		The	reflective	endorsement	helped	when	it	led	to	a	good	state	of	affairs,	but	not	when	it	led	to	a	bad	state	of	affairs.		But,	it	seems	that	it	was	the	goodness	of	the	state	of	affairs	itself,	and	not	the	endorsement	that	made	the	action	good.		It	doesn’t	seem	like	the	habituation	motive	is	inferior	to	the	endorsed	motive,	and	again,	the	endorsed	motive	can	actually	be	worse.				 So	far,	we	have	been	considering	cases	in	which	reflective	endorsement	makes	a	state	of	affairs	worse.	However,	there	are	cases	when	reflective	
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endorsement	seems	to	be	ideally	suited	to	the	task	of	changing	bad	behavior.		Imagine	that	Sarah	spanks	her	children.		When	she	was	growing	up,	her	parents	spanked	her.		She	never	viewed	her	parents	as	abusive,	but	she	never	really	reflected	on	the	matter,	she	simply	assumed	that	it	was	the	right	thing	to	do.		A	friend	of	Sarah’s	mentions	to	her	a	study	pertaining	to	spanking	that	concluded	that	spanking	was	actually	harmful	to	the	proper	development	of	children.		This	new	information	brings	about	a	change	in	Sarah’s	behavior.		Instead	of	simply	continuing	to	believe	that	what	her	mother	did	was	best,	she	looks	into	the	issue	and	learns	that	repeated	studies	confirm	that	spanking	children	is	harmful	and	that	other	forms	of	punishment	are	actually	more	effective.		She	now	endorses	norms	that	speak	in	favor	of	refraining	from	spanking	one’s	child.		She	no	longer	spanks	her	children.		This	seems	like	a	good	thing.		Again,	we	must	ask	ourselves,	is	it	the	endorsement	involved	in	this	situation	that	makes	the	state	of	affairs	good,	or	is	it	the	brute	fact	that	Sarah’s	children	are	no	longer	being	spanked?		Again,	one	might	think	that	the	act	of	endorsement	is	a	good	thing.		One	might	assert,	as	mentioned	earlier,	that	engaging	in	these	kinds	of	practices	routinely	as	part	of	one’s	practical	reasoning	helps	one	to	endorse	the	right	norms	often.		One	might	also	argue	that	reflective	endorsement	of	this	type	helps	to	develop	Sarah’s	moral	character.		This	is	a	consideration	that	we	will	explore	in	greater	detail	in	the	final	chapter	of	this	book.		 On	the	other	hand,	in	many	cases,	our	intuitions	might	be	that	it	is	best	to	ignore	one’s	endorsements.	Consider	the	case	of	a	deeply	religious	Christian	man.		The	man	is	a	fundamentalist,	and	he	believes	that	homosexuality	is	a	sin.	When	he	
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reflects,	he	endorses	the	norms	that	a	fundamentalist	Christian	would	endorse.	His	daughter	comes	out	to	him	as	a	lesbian,	and	informs	him	that	she	has	a	partner	whom	she	loves	and	is	planning	to	marry.		Despite	the	set	of	Christian	norms	that,	upon	reflection,	the	man	endorses,	he	treats	his	daughter	with	love	and	support.		If	he	had	to	describe	his	own	behavior,	he	would	suggest	that	he	is	experiencing	weakness	of	will.		It	seems,	however	that	what	it	is	that	he	endorses,	if	it	is	playing	any	role	in	this	situation,	is	actually	making	the	situation	worse.		It	would	be	better	if	he	didn’t	experience	the	cognitive	dissonance	that	his	religious	beliefs	are	pretty	clearly	causing.		 What	all	of	this	seems	to	suggest	is	that	reflective	endorsement	itself	is	not	intrinsically	valuable.		These	cases	also	suggest	that	reflective	endorsement	is	not	entirely	without	value.		In	the	nest	two	chapters,	I	will	explore	possibilities	for	the	type	of	value	that	reflective	endorsement	might	have.		
Authenticity	and	Authority	Above,	I	provided	some	cases	that	were	meant	to	generate	the	intuition	that	reflective	endorsement	on	its	own	is	not	intrinsically	valuable.		To	show	this,	I	offered	cases	in	which	motivation	coming	from	“the	animal	control	system”	generates	results,	that	are,	intuitively,	equally	valuable	or	even	more	valuable	than	those	generated	by	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement.		There	are,	however,	a	different	set	of	arguments	for	the	claim	that	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement	has	intrinsic	value.		These	arguments	concern	the	values	of	authenticity	and	authority,	respectively.	
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	 Some	people	think	that	authenticity	has	intrinsic	value.		It	is	important	to	be	genuinely,	who	one	is.		Authenticity	is	a	trait	that	is	highly	valued	by	existentialist	thinkers,	among	others.		Some	people	who	value	authenticity	might	think	that	what	it	is	to	be	an	authentic	person	is	to	engage	in	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement.	One	might	think	that	the	reflective	endorsement	process	constantly	checks	some	values	that	you	endorse	against	other	values	that	you	endorse,	scanning	for	consistency	and	ensuring	that	you	remain	true	to	yourself.		 Similarly,	some	might	think	that	commands	issued	from	one’s	true	self	have	authority,	and	that	authority	makes	those	command	normative	for	us.		This	is	similar	to	the	view	that	Korsgaard	holds,	and	also	to	the	view	that	Kant	holds.		One	might	think	that	the	way	that	one	identifies	or	constructs	one’s	true	self	is	through	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement.		Therefore,	because	of	the	identity	relationship	that	obtains	between	normative	authority	and	reflective	endorsement,	if	the	authority	one	has	over	oneself	has	intrinsic	value,	so,	too,	does	reflective	endorsement.		 Both	of	these	arguments	rely	on	identification	of	states	that	are	accessible	through	endorsement	as	states	that	represent	a	person’s	“true	self.”		If	a	person’s	deepest	hopes,	wants,	desires,	fears,	and	reasons	for	actions	are	not	transparent	to	her,	if	they	are	not	accessible	to	her	through	the	process	of	endorsement,	then	it	is	not	clear	that	the	states	that	are	being	accessed	really	are	representative	of	the	individual’s	“true	self.”		At	this	point,	I’ve	provided	a	number	of	arguments	for	the	conclusion	that	we	don’t	get	authenticity	or	normative	authority	if	we	don’t	have	access	to	knowledge	about	who	we	really	are.		In	fact,	there	are	substantive	
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impediments	to	mere	attempts	to	determine	who	we	really	are.		I	will	turn	to	a	discussion	of	those	impediments,	and	a	discussion	what	I	take	to	be	the	real	value	of	reflective	endorsement,	in	the	next	two	chapters.		
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CHAPTER	VII	
HUERISTICS	AND	THE	PSYCHOLOGICAL	VALUE	OF	REFLECTIVE	
ENDORSEMENT	
		In	this	chapter,	I	will	present	one	of	the	ways	in	which	reflective	endorsement	can	be	valuable.		Ultimately,	I	will	contend	that	the	endorsement	process	is	valuable	in	more	than	one	way,	and	that	the	types	of	value	involved	are	substantially	different	from	one	another.		In	fact,	I	will	argue	that	the	value	that	reflective	endorsement	has	in	one	domain	may	diminish	the	type	of	value	that	it	has	in	another	domain.			 	The	clash	of	values	in	play	here	tracks	the	debate	concerning	what	the	central	role	of	philosophy	should	be.		The	history	of	philosophical	thought	is	rife	with	philosophers	who	have	argued	that	the	proper	goal	of	philosophical	inquiry	is	to	arrive	at	truths	about	the	world.		Plato	and	his	philosophical	descendants	attempted,	to	the	extent	possible,	to	find	the	way	out	of	Plato’s	cave—to	come	to	know	the	true	nature	of	things.		In	his	Meditations,90	Descartes	cast	all	of	his	beliefs	into	doubt,	retaining	only	those	that	he	could	know	with	certainty.		The	goal	of	his	philosophical	program	was,	in	part,	to	become	better	able	to	distinguish	truth	from	falsity,	and,	in	so	doing,	provide	a	firm	foundation	for	the	sciences—contributing	to	the	general	project	of	philosophy	conceived	as	an	endeavor	aimed	at	arriving	at	truths	about	the	world.		 Others	think	about	the	aims	of	philosophical	inquiry	differently.	Instead	of	engaging	in	a	search	for	truths,	these	philosophers	ask,	“How	ought	I	to	live?”		Of																																																									90	Descartes,	R.	and	Cress,	D.	(1993).	Meditations	on	first	philosophy.	Indianapolis:	Hackett	Pub.	Co.	
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course,	these	two	approaches	need	not	be	entirely	independent	from	one	another.		After	all,	the	“truth	seekers”	described	above	could	answer,	“I	should	live	my	life	in	pursuit	of	truth.”		The	views	are	distinct	from	one	another,	however,	in	the	sense	that	the	answer	to	the	question	“how	ought	I	to	live?”	needn’t	have	the	pursuit	of	truth	as	any	part	of	its	answer.		There	are	different	interpretations	of	the	question.	Some,	like	Aristotle,	think	that	it	can	only	be	understood	functionally,	as	a	question	about	what	it	is	for	human	beings	to	excel.91		Others	see	the	question	as	pertaining	to	how	to	live	ethically	or	virtuously,	independent	of	any	understanding	of	human	function.		Still	others	see	the	question	as	a	religious	one.		Finally,	and	most	crucially	for	our	purposes	in	the	next	section,	some	thinkers	understand	the	question	as	one	of	how	to	exist	in	this	world	as	a	human	being	without	succumbing	to	the	seemingly	inevitable	existential	pitfalls	that	accompany	a	condition	such	as	ours.		Is	it	possible	to	live	a	happy,	or	at	the	very	least,	a	tolerable	human	life?		Should	we	take	seriously	Camus’	claim	that	“there	is	only	one	truly	philosophical	problem,	and	that	is	suicide?”		If	a	life	with	limited	existential	anguish	is	possible,	how	can	it	be	achieved?		 My	analysis	of	the	value	of	reflective	endorsement	will	have	bearing	on	both	of	these	conceptions	of	living	a	philosophical	life.		As	I’ve	noted,	these	conceptions	can	sometimes	be	divergent.		I	will	argue	that	the	diagnosis	of	many	of	the	problems	that	I	have	identified	for	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement	as	a	method	for	solving	philosophical	problems	is	that,	at	times,	the	reflective	endorsement	process	has	value	in	one	domain	or	in	one	respect,	while	contributing	to	disvalue	in	another																																																									91	Aristotle,	W.	D.	Ross,	and	Lesley	Brown.	2009.	The	Nicomachean	ethics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
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domain	or	respect.		I	will	address	one	of	these	sources	of	value	in	this	chapter,	and	the	other	type	of	value	in	the	following	chapter.			
Reflective	Endorsement	and	Psychological	Health	
	When	we	reflect	on	our	own	internal	states	and	avow	or	disavow	things	that	we	find	upon	introspection,	it	is	often	psychologically	satisfying.		It	may	seem	as	if	the	satisfaction	comes	about	as	a	result	of	the	fact	that	our	introspection	has	led	us	to	become	more	authentic,	more	internally	consistent,	and	more	committed	to	the	things	that	we,	as	persons,	take	to	be	truly	valuable.			 The	feeling	that,	through	introspection,	we	have	become	a	more	unified	and	principled	human	being	is,	undoubtedly,	a	nice	one,	even	if	it	doesn’t	track	the	truth.	The	appearance	of	coherence,	consistency,	and,	ultimately,	authenticity,	in	many	cases	turns	out	to	be	just	as	satisfying,	if	not	more	satisfying,	than	actual	coherence,	consistency,	or	authenticity.		In	this	section,	I	will	employ	studies	from	social	psychology	to	establish	how	reflective	endorsement	might	be	valuable	toward	important	psychological	ends.		The	value	that	it	has	toward	these	ends,	as	we	will	see,	may	well	be	in	virtue	of	that	fact	that	taking	the	reflective	stance	puts	us	in	an	ideal	position	to	make	use	of	heuristics	that	are	really	good	at	producing	favorable	psychological	states.		What	I	have	in	mind	by	“favorable	psychological	states”	are	pleasant	sensations	or,	at	least,	the	lack	of	a	minimal	level	of	unpleasant	sensations,	such	as	fear,	pain,	or	anxiety.		 Studies	in	social	psychology	suggest	that	human	beings	are	guilty	of	various	kinds	of	attribution	errors.	We	misjudge	the	impact	of	situational,	contextual	factors	
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on	the	behavior	of	others,	particularly	in	situations	in	which	we	perceive	those	others	to	be	behaving	badly.		In	these	cases	(and	a	broader	range	of	others),	we	are	quick	to	blame	the	behavior	of	others	on	enduring	personality	characteristics,	rather	than	on	the	unique	features	of	the	situation.		In	their	book	The	Person	and	the	
Situation,	Nisbett	and	Ross	provide	several	examples	of	cases	of	this	type.92				 In	a	1967	study	of	college	students,	participants	were	asked	to	listen	to	or	read	speeches	that	they	were	told	were	prepared	by	other	students.93		They	were	informed	further	that	the	students	who	prepared	the	speeches	or	essays	were	under	substantial	constraints.		The	essays	took	positions	on	social	issues,	and	the	students	were	assigned	a	side	of	the	issue	to	argue	for.		So,	the	participants	in	the	study	knew,	before	being	asked	to	provide	an	evaluation	that	the	students	could	not	argue	for	any	other	side	of	the	social	issue	than	they	in	fact	did.		They	were	constrained	by	the	situation.		Even	so,	participants	in	the	study	overwhelmingly	assumed	that	the	students	who	constructed	the	speeches	or	essays	were	sympathetic	or	even	fully	committed	to	the	side	of	the	issue	for	which	they	were	arguing.			That	is,	students	were	more	likely	to	make	attributions	of	consistent	personality	characteristics	or	dispositions	to	the	speakers	than	they	were	to	explain	the	behavior	primarily	in	terms	of	the	situation	in	which	the	speakers	or	writers	found	themselves.	
																																																								92	Nisbett	and	Ross,	The	Person	and	the	Situation	Pinter	&	Martin	Ltd;	2	edition	2011	
93	Jones,	E.E.,	and	Harris,	V.A.,	The	attribution	of	attitudes.		Journal	of	Experimental	
Social	Psychology,	3,	1-2.	
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	 A	different	study	in	the	1970s94	led	researchers	to	a	similar	conclusion.		Females	were	asked	to	provide	entertainment	for	board	members	of	“The	Human	Development	Institute”	and	a	group	of	their	financial	backers.		Some	of	these	women	were	offered	$.50	per	hour	to	volunteer,	and	others	were	offered	$1.50	per	hour.		Observers	were	then	asked	to	predict	the	future	behavior	of	the	women	who	volunteered.		They	were	asked	“How	likely	is	it	that	the	subject	would	also	volunteer	to	canvas	for	the	United	Fund?”		The	assessment	of	the	observers	was	that	the	women	who	volunteered	to	provide	the	entertainment	would	be	more	likely	to	Canvas	for	the	United	Fund	than	non-volunteers,	regardless	of	who	much	they	were	being	compensated	for	providing	the	entertainment.		In	other	words,	observers	were	likely	to	attribute	the	behavior	of	the	volunteers	in	this	case	to	concrete	and	enduring	features	of	their	behaviors,	rather	than	to	the	particulars	of	the	circumstances	under	which	the	volunteers	were	asked	to	participate.		 Studies	also	show	that	we	are	far	more	likely	to	do	the	opposite	when	it	comes	to	our	own	behavior.95		We	are	more	likely,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	negative	behavior,	to	attribute	the	things	that	we	do	to	the	circumstances	that	we	are	in	rather	than	concrete,	stable,	personality	characteristics.		As	we	will	see,	however,	the	same	is	not	true	when	it	comes	to	what	we	might	deem	to	be	our	own	favorable	personality	characteristics.																																																										94	Nisbett,	R.E.	Caputo,	C.,	Legant,	P.,	and	Maracek,	J.	(1973)	Behavior	as	seen	by	the	actor	and	as	seen	by	the	observer.	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	27,	
154-164.		95	See	Moskowitz,	2005.	
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The	Need	for	Control	In	his	book,	Social	Cognition,	Gordon	Moskowitz	argues	that	human	beings	long	for	a	sense	of	control	over	what	happens	in	their	lives,	and	this	desire	helps	to	explain	some	of	the	attributions	that	they	are	apt	to	make.96		In	particular,	assigning	dispositional	attributions	to	others	helps	to	satisfy	this	desire.		The	world	strikes	us	as	a	safer,	more	predictable	place	when	we	think	that	we	can	rely	on	the	behaviors	of	others	to	stay	the	same,	as	it	might	if	enduring	personality	traits	or	characteristics	caused	the	behavior.					 Often,	we	make	character	attributions	in	the	case	of	our	own	behavior	as	well.		Moskowitz	argues	that	doing	so	contributes	to	a	sense	of	control	over	our	own	lives.		However,	that	the	sense	of	control	that	we	take	ourselves	to	have	as	a	result	of	such	attributions	is	often	illusory.		He	supports	his	point	with	a	1975	study	by	Langer.97		In	the	study,	participants	were	given	a	can	that	contained	two	marbles.		They	were	told	that,	if	they	picked	one	marble	in	particular,	they	would	be	given	a	desirable	prize.		Some	were	told	in	advance	which	marble	would	win	the	prize	and	others	were	not.		Some	participants	were	handed	a	marble	and	others	had	to	reach	into	the	can	and	select	one.		In	any	event,	the	process	by	which	the	participants	obtained	a	marble,	and	which	marble	they	obtained,	was	entirely	random.	Participants	who	randomly	selected	the	prize-winning	marble	from	the	can	were	more	likely	to	see	themselves	as	responsible	for	selecting	the	winning	marble	than	
																																																								96	Moskowitz,	Gordon	B.,	Social	Cognition,	The	Guilford	Press	New	York	2005.	97	Langer,	E.J.,	(1975).		The	illusion	of	control.		Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	
Psychology,	32,	311-328.		
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were	participants	from	any	other	group,	even	though	they	randomly	selected	that	marble.		 The	idea	that	we	have	control	over	the	positive	events	that	take	place	in	our	lives	is	psychologically	helpful.		Our	brains	tend	to	lead	us	to	favorable	conclusions	about	the	degree	to	which	we	are	responsible	for	the	good	things	that	happen	to	us.		We	take	the	good	things,	and	we	attribute	them	to	enduring	traits	of	our	own	characters.		Of	course,	evidence	suggests	that	we	are	making	a	mistake	when	we	do	this.		Nonetheless,	it	appears	to	be	psychologically	healthy.		 Here,	it	seems	that	reflective	endorsement	has	value	of	a	certain	sort.		If	we	are	inclined,	as	empirical	evidence	seems	to	suggest	that	we	are,	to	affirm	conceptions	of	ourselves	according	to	which	we	take	ourselves	to	have	control,	and	if	the	perception	of	control	is	valuable	(even	in	the	absence	of	the	existence	of	actual	
control),	then,	prima	facie,	reflective	endorsement	is	instrumentally	valuable	toward	that	psychological	end.		This	type	of	value	is	not	insignificant.		A	sense	of	control,	even	if	it	is	illusory,	can	easily	prevent	a	slip	into	existential	despair.		 It	clearly	isn’t	this	type	of	value	that	thinkers	we	have	considered	in	this	book	have	in	mind,	at	least,	not	primarily.		In	fact,	if	it	is	really	a	need	for	a	sense	of	control	that	motivates	our	self-attributions,	that	fact	might	undermine	some	of	the	conclusions	drawn	by	reflective	endorsement	theorists.	Consider,	for	example,	Korsgaard’s	view	of	the	normative	authority	of	practical	identities.		On	her	account,	reasons	with	real	normative	force	are	generated	by	the	conceptions	of	ourselves	that	we	value.		It	is	an	open	possibility,	of	course,	that	those	conceptions	of	ourselves	that	we	value,	that	we	would	rather	die	than	give	up,	are	not	actually	
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persistent	character	attributes	at	all.		Instead,	our	brains	develop	a	psychologically	healthy	heuristic	that	allows	us	to	perceive	the	world	in	such	a	way	that	it	makes	psychological	sense	for	us	to	understand	ourselves	as	having	control	over	what	happens	to	us.		If	the	practical	identity	is	illusory,	does	it	really	generate	reasons	that	have	normative	force?		 The	important	thing	to	note	here	is	that	a	person	might,	quite	involuntarily,	construct	a	picture	of	themselves,	that	doesn’t	exactly	match	the	facts,	but	affords	them	the	optimal	level	of	control.		Having	a	psychological	sense	of	control	may	require	that	the	person	in	question,	in	certain	cases,	increases	her	reflective	attention	on	positive	features	of	her	character,	while	decreasing	reflective	attention	on	the	more	negative	features	of	her	character.		 Consider	Stephanie.		Stephanie	conceives	of	herself	as	a	health	nut.		She	runs	several	miles	a	day	and	never	skips	weight	training.		She	eats	a	balanced	diet,	never	scrimping	on	fruits,	vegetables,	or	protein.		This	is	the	conception	of	herself	that	she	endorses	upon	reflection.		Consider	further,	however,	that	there	is	a	description	of	Stephanie	that	is	true,	but	that	she	will	not	accept.		She	has	pushed	the	truth	of	this	description	to	some	subconscious	place	where	she	never	has	to	look	at	it.		Stephanie	is	an	alcoholic.		After	engaging	in	healthy	behavior	all	day,	she	relieves	stress	at	night	with	excessive	amounts	of	alcohol	to	the	point	that	her	physical	health,	in	particular,	the	health	of	her	liver	and	her	kidneys,	are	in	serious	jeopardy.		The	psychological	mechanism	that	kicks	in	to	help	Stephanie	feel	in	control	of	her	life	and	her	health,	despite	her	clear	deficiency	is	aided	by	her	act	of	reflective	endorsement.		She	endorses	a	conception	of	herself	according	to	which	she	is	a	
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health	nut,	while	ignoring,	or	perhaps	even	rejecting	the	conception	of	herself	as	an	alcoholic—a	conception	of	herself	that	might	leave	her	feeling	powerless.			 The	value	of	reflective	endorsement	in	this	case	is	that,	absent	a	sense	of	control,	Stephanie	may	be	plunged	into	a	deep	despair,	or,	at	the	very	least,	she	might	feel	tremendously	anxious.		However,	this	example	also	highlights	a	way	in	which	reflective	endorsement	can	also	be	harmful.		When	the	heuristic	kicks	in	that	allows	Stephanie	to	feel	in	control	of	her	own	health	despite	her	alcoholism,	it	overrides	the	concern	that,	objectively,	she	should	be	feeling	in	order	to	change	her	habits	and	solve	her	drinking	problem.		
The	Self-Serving	Bias	Reflective	Endorsement	has	instrumental	value	in	a	different	psychological	way	as	well.		Empirical	science	supports	the	conclusion	that	we	are	motivated	to	both	attain	and	to	maintain	a	positive	sense	of	self.98		The	process	of	reflective	endorsement	can	help	us	to	develop	a	positive	conception	of	ourselves	that	is	psychologically	healthy.				 It	is	a	truism	that	most	people	are	average.		After	all,	that’s	what	it	is	to	be	average.		Despite	the	obvious	truth	of	this	description,	however,	most	people	believe	
of	themselves	that	they	are	above	average.		In	a	paper	on	the	topic,	Alicke	and	Govorun	highlight	the	results	of	a	well-documented	case	of	the	phenomenon:	Data	collected	in	conjunction	with	the	1976	College	Board	Exams	provide	on	of	the	earliest,	most	striking,	and	most	frequently	cited	demonstrations	of	the	better-than-average	effect.		Of	the	approximately	one	million	students	who	took	the	SAT	that	year,	70%	placed	themselves	above	the	median	in	
																																																								98	See	also	Cross,	P.	(1977),	Svenson	(1981),		
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leadership	ability,	60%	above	the	median	in	athletic	ability,	and	85%	rated	themselves	above	the	median	in	their	ability	to	get	along	well	with	others.99		Of	course,	it	is	obvious	that	many	of	the	participants	were	wrong	about	how	they	compared	to	the	average	with	respect	to	each	of	these	characteristics.		What	this	study,	and	many	others	like	it	highlight	is	that	we	have	a	psychological	need	to	think	highly	of	our	good	traits—in	many	cases,	more	highly	than	appraisal	of	our	traits	honestly	deserves.		It	seems	that	we	do	this,	in	part,	because	thinking	highly	of	ourselves	is	an	important	part	of	psychological	health.		 Importantly	for	our	purposes	here,	people	also	have	a	tendency	to	view	themselves	as	better	moral	agents	than	their	peers.		Codol	asked	study	participants	to	assess	how	often	they	conformed	to	socially	desirable	norms.100		Most	participants	indicated	that	they	conformed	to	such	norms	more	often	than	average.				 As	a	result	of	the	better-than-average	phenomenon,	or	our	self-serving	bias,	we	are	inclined	to	view	ourselves	in	more	favorable	ways	than	might	actually	be	warranted	by	the	best	available	evidence.			Viewing	ourselves	in	the	best	possible	light,	or,	at	least,	a	better-than	average	light,	contributes	to	psychological	health.	Reflective	Endorsement	can,	and	probably	often	does,	contribute	to	this	conception	of	ourselves.		We	introspect,	we	consider	ourselves	and	our	traits,	and	we	employ	a	heuristic	that	emphasizes	the	positive.																																																									99	Alicke,	Mark	D.,		Govorun,	Oleysa,	“The	Better	Than	Average	Effect.”	In	The	Self	in	
Social	Judgment.	Ed.	Alicke,	Mark	D.,	Dunning,	David	A.,	Krueger,	Joachim	I.		Pyschology	Press	New	York	2005.		100	Codol,	J.P.	(1975)	On	the	so-called	“superior	conformity	of	the	self”	behavior:	Twenty	Experimental	Investigations.		European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	5,	457-501.		
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	 Consider	the	following	case.		Mark	considers	himself	to	be	an	honest	person.		He	would	report	that	he	views	honesty	as	a	very	important	trait.		When	he	introspects,	he	endorses	a	picture	of	himself	as	an	honest	person,	excusing	those	cases	in	which	he	told	little	white	lies,	and	even	exempts	some	whoppers.		He	was,	after	all,	justified	in	lying	on	those	occasions,	or	so	he	tells	himself.		The	act	of	rationalizing	his	past	lies	is,	perhaps,	a	best-case	scenario.		Research	done	by	Alicke	suggests	that	when	making	character	attributions,	people	do	not	survey	their	past	behaviors.101		Instead,	Alicke	et	al.	concludes	that	people	employ	a	better-than-average	heuristic.		This	heuristic	has	an	“automatic	tendency	to	assimilate	positively-evaluated	social	objects	toward	ideal	trait	conceptions,	and	does	not	assume	that	people	routinely	review	their	behaviors	to	make	self-other	judgments.”	The	idea	that	past	behaviors	are	frequently	not	factored	into	self-assessment	is	strongly	suggested	by	an	Alicke	study.102		In	phase	one	of	the	study,	participants	were	asked	to	reflect	on	their	past	behaviors.		They	were	asked,	for	each	trait	dimension,	what	percentage	of	the	time	they	had	acted	in	a	way	that	was	consistent	with	that	trait.		For	example,	a	person	might	say	that	they	were	helpful	to	others,	80%	of	the	time.		At	a	later	stage	in	the	study,	the	same	participants	were	given	numbers	that	they	were	told	represented	the	average	percentages	of	how	often,	on	average,	their	peers	reported	engaging	in	behavior	along	those	same	trait	dimensions.		Unbeknownst	to	them,	the	students	were	provided	with	the	numbers																																																									101	Alicke,	Mark	D.,	Klotz,	M.L.,	Breitenbecher,	D.L,	Yurak,	T.J.,	and	Vrendenburg,	D.S.	(1995)	Personal	contact,	individuation,	and	the	better-than	average	effect.	Journal	of	
Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	68,	804-825.		102	Alicke,	Mark	D.,	Vrendenberg	D.S.,	Hiatt,	M.,	And	Govorun,	O.	(2001)	The	“better	than	myself”	effect.		Motivation	and	Emotion,	25,	7-22.	
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that	they,	themselves,	provided	at	the	earlier	stage	in	the	study.		At	this	second	stage,	they	were	asked	to	compare	their	traits	to	the	numbers	that	they	falsely	believed	were	provided	by	their	peers.		The	results	were	consistent—students	on	average	said	that	they	fared	better	for	those	traits	than	the	average	college	student	(even	though	these	were	the	numbers	that	they,	themselves	provided	as	an	accurate	summary	of	their	past	behaviors!)		Alicke	calls	this	the	“better-than-myself	paradigm.”			 Moreover,	we	can	imagine	that	Mark’s	perception	of	himself	as	an	honest	person	is	never	seriously	challenged,	for	when	he	compares	his	honesty	against	others	with	whom	he	is	either	acquainted	or	just	generally	familiar,	he,	perhaps	even	unknowingly,	compares	himself	with	the	least	honest	people	that	he	knows.103		 As	I	have	pointed	out,	however,	the	practice	involved	here	is	not	truth-conducive.		Many	philosophers	seem	to	want	to	maintain	that	the	value	that	reflective	endorsement	has	comes	from	the	connection	it	has	to	something	like	authenticity.		Friedman,	for	example,	wants	to	identify	autonomous	actions	with	actions	that	are	reflectively	endorsed,	because	such	endorsements	represent	choices	made	by	an	agent’s	true,	authentic	self.	The	true,	authentic	self	here	is	just	defined	in	terms	of	the	kinds	of	things	that	they	would,	consistently	avow	or	disavow.			The	conclusion	that	reflective	endorsement	ensures	authenticity	or	even	makes	authenticity	more	likely	than	not	appears	to	be	undermined	by	heuristics	like	the	self-serving	bias.		If	we	are	inclined	to	endorse	pictures	of	ourselves	that	are	flattering,	pictures	of	ourselves	according	to	which	we	are	better	than	average,	even																																																									103	This	type	of	explanation	of	self-serving	bias,	or	better-than	average	effect,	is	suggested	by	work	done	by	Perlfloff	and	Fetzer	(1986).	
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when	we	are	not,	then	it	looks	like	we	are	not	truly	motivated	by	a	desire	for	authenticity.					 Ambiguity	heightens	our	tendency	toward	this	kind	of	bias.			People	might	have	very	different	conceptions	of	what	it	means	to	be	“trustworthy,”	“kind,”	or	“respectful.”		When	we	reflect,	we	might	create	trait	abstractions,	and	the	self-serving	bias	is	ready	and	able	to	help	us	construct	those	abstractions	in	ways	that	are	favorable,	rather	than	unfavorable,	to	us.		It	may	be,	then,	that	we	are	more	quick	to	think	about	those	self-biased	abstractions	as	being	representative	of	our	selves	rather	than	our	actual,	concrete,	past	behaviors.			
Self-Verification		Reflective	Endorsement	can	also	be	psychologically	healthy	in	a	third	way—to	satisfy	a	need	we	have	to	verify	those	components	of	the	self	that	we	already	take	ourselves	to	have.		Some	social	scientists	have	suggested	that,	in	addition	to	satisfying	a	need	for	predictability	and	control,	our	impulse	to	self-verify	also	satisfies	a	psychological	need	that	we	have	to	have	“consistent	and	balanced	cognitions.104”		Too	much	change	is	unsettling	to	us.		Therefore,	in	addition	to	attempting	to	maintain	a	positive	view	of	ourselves,	we	also	try	to	maintain	a	stable	one.				 In	support	of	the	claim	that	human	beings	have	a	tendency	toward	self-verification	that	is	distinct	from	their	tendency	toward	self-serving	affirmations,																																																									104	Moskowitz,	Gordon	B.,	Social	Cognition:	Understanding	the	Self	and	Others.	The	Guilford	Press	New	York	2005.		
	131	
studies	have	been	conducted	that	indicate	that	human	beings	prefer	to	be	judged	negatively	with	respect	to	those	features	of	their	life	or	behavior	that	they	already	view	as	being	deficient.		In	one	such	study,105	participants	were	asked	to	describe	their	worst	feature	(e.g.,	their	weight).		Other	participants	were	then	brought	in	to	comment	on	that	feature.		Some	of	these	participants	said	something	positive	about	the	feature	and	others	said	something	negative	about	the	feature.		The	original	participants	were	then	asked	which	of	the	two	assessors	they	would	like	to	participate	with	in	a	later	stage	of	the	experiment,	and	people	chose	the	assessor	who	agreed	with	their	assessment	of	their	negative	feature	rather	than	the	one	who	disagreed	with	it.		It	may	be,	then,	that,	to	achieve	a	sense	of	consistency,	we	accept	evidence	from	others	that	supports	the	way	in	which	we	already	want	to	view	ourselves,	and	that	we	reject	disconfirming	evidence.				 Of	course,	the	process	of	reflection	on	one’s	own	attributes	and	then	disavowing	one	or	more	is	a	paradigm	case	of	engaging	in	a	reflective	endorsement	process	(or,	in	this	case,	an	instance	of	reflective	disavowal).	These	studies	suggest	that	we	like	confirmation	of	the	ways	in	which	we	are	already	inclined	to	view	ourselves.				
Three	Conclusions		There	are	three	conclusions	that	I	would	to	draw	here.		The	first	has	to	do	with	the	value	of	endorsement	and	the	second	has	to	do	with	why	I	think	value	of	this	type	is																																																									105	Swan,	W.B.,	Jr.		(1990)	To	be	adored	or	to	be	known?:	The	interplay	of	self-enhancement	and	self-verification.	In	E.T.	Higgens	and	R.	Sorrentino	(Eds.)	
Handbook	of	motivation	and	cognition:	Foundations	of	social	behavior	(Vol.	2	pp.	527-561).		New	York:	Guilford	Press.	
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neither	what	the	philosophers	we	have	discussed	in	this	book	have	in	mind,	nor	does	this	type	of	value	benefit	them	in	any	way.		The	third	specifically	addresses	Gibbard’s	use	of	reflective	endorsement.		 The	first	conclusion	is,	as	we	have	seen	in	this	chapter,	it	looks	like	the	process	of	reflective	endorsement	can	help	us	to	satisfy	at	least	three	important	psychological	goals.	First,	it	satisfies	a	need	that	we	have	for	psychological	stability	and	security.		It	would,	after	all,	be	quite	frightening	to	feel	as	if	you	don’t	know	what	to	expect,	even	from	your	own	behavior.		When	we	reflect	on	our	own	inner	states,	our	traits,	and	the	things	that	matter	to	us,	we	take	ourselves	to	arrive	at	a	reasonable	enduring,	stable	conclusions.		Sure,	this	sense	of	stability	might	be	arrived	at,	in	part,	by	a	set	of	heuristics	that	allow	us	to	confirm	what	we	already	believe.		We	might	be	more	inclined	to	accept	evidence	that	confirms	the	existence	of	the	set	of	attributes	that	we	already	take	ourselves	to	have.		It	is	likely	that	those	traits	developed	because	it	was	fitness	enhancing	for	them	to	do	so.		Human	minds	can	be	consumed	with	anxiety	and	general	existential	dread.		Mechanisms	that	confirm	a	certain	intrapersonal	stability	can	help	with	that.				 The	process	of	reflective	endorsement	also	psychologically	healthy	to	the	extent	that	it	helps	us	to	feel	good	about	ourselves.		We	have	seen	that	endorsement	of	positive	traits	is	a	common	practice,	guided	by	self-serving	heuristics.		So,	this	chapter	has	highlighted	the	ways	in	which	reflective	endorsement	can	be	psychologically	valuable.				 The	second	conclusion	that	I	want	to	draw	is	this:	the	type	of	psychological	value	of	reflective	endorsement	that	I	have	outlined	is	pretty	clearly	not	what	the	
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thinkers	we	have	discussed	have	in	mind	when	they	claim	that	endorsement	has	value	and	can	solve	all	sorts	of	philosophical	problems.		In	fact,	the	heuristics	that	lead	to	psychological	health	in	these	cases	appear	to	be	at	odds	with	the	kinds	of	philosophical	aims	these	positions	are	trying	to	achieve.		Most	of	the	views	that	we’ve	considered	are	after	the	kind	of	authority	or	normative	force	that	emanates	from	the	“true	self”	in	some	sense.		The	existence	of	these	heuristics	that	aim	toward	psychological	health	rather	than	truth	or	authenticity	raise	the	specter	of	self-deception	on	a	massive	scale.		This	can’t	be	the	kind	of	value	they’re	after.		 The	conclusion	that	I	have	drawn	so	far	may	not	appear	to	apply	directly	to	Gibbard’s	project.	The	third	conclusion	that	I	want	to	draw,	then,	applies	specifically	to	Gibbard’s	project.			Gibbard	is	doing	something	descriptive	rather	than	normative.		He	isn’t	trying	to	tell	us	that	we	should	or	shouldn’t	treat	the	outputs	of	reflective	endorsement	as	if	they	have	authority	over	judgments	of	different	types.		Instead,	he	is	simply	providing	a	descriptive	account	of	what	it	is	that	normative	judgments	express.		 I	think	that	operations	of	the	heuristics	I	have	described	in	this	chapter	are	problematic	for	Gibbard’s	descriptive	position	as	well.		In	my	discussion	of	Gibbard,	I	argued	that	his	moral	psychology—specifically	his	taxonomy	of	human	motivation,	is	too	narrow,	and	that	it	rules	out	other	types	of	motivation,	that	seem,	intuitively,	to	count	as	normative	judgments.		The	discussion	of	heuristics	in	this	chapter	highlights	the	idea	that	what	goes	on	when	we	endorse	something	is	not	as	simple	as	he	makes	it	out	to	be.		Some	of	the	heuristics	that	we	employ	when	we	endorse	things	are	really	not	much	different	from	motivational	impulses	that	take	place	at	
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the	level	of	what	he	called	“the	animal	control	system.”		If	these	mechanisms	are	really	not	much	different,	that	fact	lends	further	credibility	to	the	claim	that	there	is	no	real,	significant	line	to	be	drawn	between	an	“animal	control	system”	and	a	“normative	control	system.”		 In	this	chapter,	I	have	raised	some	empirical	studies	pertaining	to	self-evaluation.		I	have	argued	that,	reflective	endorsement	is	valuable	for	psychological	reasons,	but	that	this	isn’t	the	form	of	value	that	philosophers	who	employ	reflective	endorsement	in	philosophical	accounts	are	looking	for.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	will	provide	an	account	of	the	conditions	under	which	reflective	endorsement	might	be	valuable	in	a	philosophical	sense.	
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CHAPTER	VIII	
	
	THE	PHILOSOPHICAL	VALUE	OF	REFLECTIVE	ENDORSEMENT		
	
		In	the	previous	chapter,	I	argued	that	reflective	endorsement	is	instrumentally	good	in	at	least	one	respect—it	contributes	to	psychological	well	being	in	several	forms.	It	fosters	a	sense	of	control	and	predictability	and	it	contributes	to	a	positive	self-image.		I	will	now	argue	that,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	it	is	implausible	that	the	only	value	that	reflective	endorsement	has	is	psychological	value.		After	all,	people	who	dedicate	their	lives	to	the	study	of	philosophy	do	so	because	they	think	engaging	in	reflective	activity	is	of	fundamental	importance.		Many	of	us	agree	with	Socrates	that,	“The	unexamined	life	is	not	worth	living.”		We	tend	to	think	that	evaluation	of	the	self	is	a	crucial	part	of	what	it	is	to	live	an	examined	life.			 That	we	take	self-evaluation	to	be	important	is	well	illustrated	by	the	quotidian	ways	in	which	we	judge	ourselves	and	other	people.		We	tend	to	value	the	behavior	of	those	who	do	not	simply	take	life	as	it	comes,	but	who,	instead,	stop	to	challenge	or	reaffirm	the	beliefs	and	values	that	they	hold.	When	we	know	that	one	of	our	local	hiking	buddies,	who	finds	great	joy	in	the	beauty	of	nature,	supports	the	reduction	of	environmental	regulations	or	the	seizure	and	sale	of	state	park	lands	to	private	entities,	we	want	him	to	stop,	reflect,	and	get	his	values	in	order.	It	is	common	for	people	to	get	frustrated	when	members	of	their	communities	claim	to	embrace	one	set	of	values,	while	voting	for	candidates	who	support	an	entirely	different	set	of	values.		We	want	them	to	reflect,	not	just	on	the	justification	they	have	for	their	beliefs,	but	also	on	the	consistency	and	strength	of	their	values.	
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	 We	value	this	kind	of	reflection.		We	tend	to	think	it	is	bad	when	it	does	not	occur.		This	fact	simply	cannot	be	explained	by	the	kind	of	psychological	value	that	I	have	appealed	to	above.		We	may	want	our	hiking	buddy	to	be	in	good	psychological	health,	but	that	isn’t	the	reason	that	we	want	him	to	reflect	more	carefully	on	his	values.				 It	seems,	then,	that	there	is	some	value	in	the	reflective	endorsement	process,	above	and	beyond	the	mere	psychological	value	that	it	has	under	the	conditions	described	in	the	last	chapter.		When	an	abusive	friend	reflects	on	her	abusive	nature	and	resolves	to	change	it,	we	don’t	think	that	the	value	of	what	she	has	done	lies	simply	in	the	fact	that	she	has	introspected.		Though	the	process	of	introspection	might	be	psychological	valuable	for	her,	that	psychological	value	isn’t	what	we	are	appealing	to	when	we	praise	her	thoughtfulness.		After	all,	she	could	have	introspected	incorrectly.	She	could	have	employed	a	self-serving	heuristic	like	the	one	described	in	the	previous	chapter	that	motivated	her	to	pay	more	attention	to	her	positive	traits	than	her	negative	ones,	or	she	might	have	focused	only	on	evidence	that	supported	the	picture	that	she	already	had	of	herself	as	a	loving,	caring	friend.	We’ve	spent	much	time	in	this	book	discussing	what	it	might	look	like	for	a	person	to	introspect	incorrectly.			 One	of	the	main	difficulties	for	the	approach	taken	by	the	thinkers	addressed	in	this	book,	in	my	view,	is	that	they	maintain	that	an	agent’s	introspection	and	affirmation	of	a	value	or	set	of	values	is	enough	to	determine	what	is,	in	fact,	actually	valuable	to	that	agent.		What	I	have	intended	to	suggest,	throughout	this	book,	is	that	the	idea	that	values	are	constructed	by	reflective	endorsement	renders	
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individuals	infallible	on	the	issue	of	what	it	is	that	matters	to	them.		I	maintain	that	such	a	view	is	implausible	for	several	reasons.		First,	we	already	have	reason	to	believe	that	many	of	the	heuristics	that	are	employed	when	we	introspect	are	aimed,	not	at	achieving	a	more	coherent,	well	developed	picture	of	the	self,	but	are,	instead,	aimed	at	maintaining	control,	stability,	and	overall	psychological	health.		Second,	the	matter	of	what	types	of	things	a	person	truly	cares	about	might	be	better	addressed	by	looking	at	factors	other	than	what	a	person	would	affirm	upon	introspection.			This	is	so	because	the	question	of	what	an	agent	cares	about	is	only	internally	accessible	to	a	certain	degree.		Nevertheless,	as	we	have	seen,	many	thinkers	on	this	topic	tend	to	think	of	it	as	an	entirely	internal	matter.		At	best,	the	views	that	we	have	considered	provide	accounts	of	what	an	agent	thinks	matters	to	them.		The	question	of	what	actually	matters	to	them	might	be	one	that	needs	to	be	resolved	very	differently.				 Getting	this	right	is	important	for	many	reasons.		I’ll	briefly	highlight	one	reason	here,	and	will	discuss	it	in	more	detail	at	the	end	of	the	chapter.		Reflective	Endorsement,	if	done	right,	is	valuable	because	of	the	potential	it	provides	for	character	refinement	and	moral	improvement.		I’ve	argued	throughout	this	book	that	reflective	endorsement	is	not	always	valuable,	and	that,	in	certain	cases,	it	actually	has	negative	value.		Despite	the	fact	that	the	process	can	often	go	wrong,	it	can	also	go	right.		In	fact,	it	may	be	the	case	that	there	are	certain	valuable	states	of	affairs	that	can	only	be	achieved	through	introspective	avowal	or	disavowal.		For	example,	if	a	person	can’t	recognize	negative	character	traits	in	themselves	or	dispositions	to	behave	in	ways	that	are	harmful	to	either	themselves	or	others,	then	
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they	may	never	be	in	the	position	to	change	those	behaviors.		Without	critical	self-evaluation,	we	may	never	be	in	a	position	to	live	flourishing	human	lives.		
Reflective	Endorsement	and	Socratic	Virtue	I	have	suggested	that,	when	we	take	reflective	endorsement	to	have	value,	it	is	because	we	view	it	as	an	important	part	of	a	commitment	to	living	a	philosophical	life.		For	the	purposes	of	our	discussion	here,	I	will	identify	the	project	of	living	a	life	in	which	one’s	values	are	frequently	assessed	and	revaluated	in	an	attempt	to	live	a	more	integrated,	coherent,	well	reasoned,	life,	as	a	project	with	the	aim	of	attaining	
Socratic	Virtue.		Going	forward,	I	will	use	the	term	Socratic	Virtue	to	pick	out	a	phenomenon	that	has	real	philosophical	value.		Reflective	Endorsement	plays	some	role	in	the	achievement	of	that	goal,	but	only	under	highly	specified	conditions.	
	
An	Analog	in	Virtue	Epistemology	The	approach	to	the	attainment	of	Socratic	Virtue	that	I	will	argue	for	is	motivated,	in	part,	by	Ernest	Sosa’s	approach	in	his	work	A	Virtue	Epistemology.106		I	will	argue	that,	though	our	interest	here	is	in	a	different	philosophical	concept	(Sosa	is	providing	an	account	of	reflective	knowledge),	many	of	the	structural	elements	of	his	view	will	help	us	in	our	analysis	as	well.				 Sosa	thinks	of	belief	attainment	as	a	performance.		He	uses	an	example	of	an	archer	shooting	at	a	target	to	describe	how	this	is	supposed	to	work.		There	are																																																									106	Epistemic	questions,	though	relevant	to	much	of	what	I	am	discussing	here	(especially	insofar	as	knowledge	is,	itself,	normative),	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	project.		I	discuss	Sosa’s	view	here	to	highlight	some	of	its	structural	elements,	which	I	will	employ	in	my	own	account.	
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skilled	archers	and	there	are	unskilled	archers.		When	it	comes	to	hitting	targets,	there	are	good	shots	and	there	are	bad	shots.		Under	certain	conditions,	skilled	archers	can	take	bad	shots	and	unskilled	archers	can	hit	the	bull’s	eye.				 Sosa	identifies	three	ways	in	which	we	can	evaluate	an	archer’s	performance.		First,	we	can	determine	whether	it	hits	the	target.		The	standards	for	evaluation	here	are	straightforward.		The	arrow	either	hits	the	target	or	it	does	not.		Second,	we	can	determine	whether	the	shot	exhibits	some	skill	on	the	part	of	the	archer.		This	standard	of	evaluation	admits	of	degrees.		Some	archers	are	better	than	others.	Skilled	archery,	as	with	skill	in	many	other	performances,	requires	knowledge	of	various	types.		The	archer	must	know,	for	example,	how	to	shoot	in	less	than	favorable	conditions	(e.g.,	in	the	wind).		They	must	know	enough	about	their	machinery	to	be	able	to	operate	it	successfully	in	various	conditions.		Sosa	calls	evaluation	of	this	sort	evaluation	of	whether	a	shot	is	adroit.	
	 Finally,	Sosa	considers	whether	an	archer’s	shot	is	apt.		An	arrow	can	hit	a	target	for	any	of	a	number	of	reasons,	and	not	all	of	them	are	attributable	to	the	archer.		An	arrow	might	be	on	course	to	miss	the	target	entirely,	but	a	sudden	wind	might	pick	up,	blowing	the	arrow	right	where	it	needs	to	go.		The	arrow	might	be	headed	off	course,	but	someone	might	move	the	target	such	that	the	arrow	hits	right	where	it	should.		An	archer’s	shot	is	apt	when	it	hits	the	target,	not	because	of	some	external	condition	or	set	of	conditions,	but	because	of	the	skill	of	the	archer.			
	
Aptness,	Reflective	Endorsement,	and	Socratic	Virtue	
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The	use	of	Reflective	Endorsement	to	achieve	Socratic	Virtue	is	also	a	skill,	and	is	valuable	in	the	Socratic	sense	only	when	it	is	being	used	skillfully.		Some	people	are	more	skillful	than	others,	and	this	is	a	respect	in	which	I	think	accounts	like	those	I	have	addressed	in	this	book	get	things	wrong.		All	of	the	accounts	that	we	have	considered	(with,	perhaps,	the	exception	of	Gibbard)	seem	to	maintain	that	reflective	endorsement	is	a	process	that	we	all	engage	in	with	roughly	equal	degrees	of	skill.		So	long	as	we	have	reflectively	endorsed	something	we	have	reasons	for	action	that	are	truly	normative	(Korsgaard),	we	counts	as	free	persons	(Frankfurt),	and/or	we	are	autonomous	(Friedman).		This	is	so	because,	for	the	most	part,107	on	these	views,	the	question	of	whether	an	agent	has	reflectively	endorsed	something	or	not	is	an	on/off	question,	and	there	are	no	further	standards	to	employ.		 		Extending	the	analogy	with	what	Sosa	has	to	say	about	belief	production	as	a	skill,	I’ll	now	lay	out	some	of	the	conditions	that	need	to	be	met	in	order	for	a	person’s	assessment	of	what	they	value	to	be	adroit.		Recall	that	in	the	case	of	the	archer,	attainment	of	skill	involved	the	attainment	or	possession	of	a	certain	body	of	knowledge.		The	archer	needs	to	know	how	to	operate	his	or	her	instrument.		They	also	need	to	know	background	information	about	how	their	bodies	work	in	conjunction	with	the	bow.		We	will	now	consider	what	it	would	take	for	a	person	to	be	skillful	with	respect	to	the	use	of	reflective	endorsement.		
1.	Reflection	on	Past	Behaviors.	
																																																									107	Friedman’s	account	of	autonomy	does	admit	of	degrees,	but	she	seems	to	suggest	that,	though	people	might	be	more	autonomous	than	others	under	certain	conditions,	merely	engaging	in	the	process	of	endorsement	is	enough	to	make	a	person	minimally	autonomous.	
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We’ve	said	that	in	order	for	an	archer	to	be	a	good	archer,	he	or	she	must	have	a	certain	sort	of	knowledge	base.		This	knowledge	base	would	include	not	just	a	substantial	understanding	of	how	bows	and	arrows	work,	but	also	an	understanding	of	the	archer’s	own	strengths	and	weaknesses.		Perhaps	the	archer	is	stronger	on	one	side	of	his	or	her	body	than	the	other.		Perhaps	the	archer	is	healing	from	an	injury	and	needs	to	plan	in	advance	for	certain	kinds	of	scenarios	in	which	the	injury	might	prove	to	be	an	issue.				 Reflective	Endorsement	is	not	used	skillfully	when	we	simply	affirm	whatever	we	choose	to	affirm.	A	crucial	piece	of	the	puzzle	of	what	we	really	care	about	involves	looking	at	our	own	past	behaviors.		We	can	look	back	at	some	of	the	examples	presented	in	earlier	chapters	to	highlight	this	phenomenon.		Recall	Jane,	from	our	discussion	of	Frankfurt,	who	thought	she	wanted	to	be	a	lawyer,	but	who	really	wanted	to	be	an	artist.		In	the	past,	she	put	off	or	avoided	her	law	studies	at	all	costs	but	was	always	eager	to	sketch	or	engage	in	other	forms	of	art.		The	evidence	in	this	case	suggests	that	she	cares	about	art	but	does	not	care	about	the	law.			As	we	have	seen,	human	beings	do	not	frequently	take	their	own	past	behaviors	into	account	when	making	character	attributions	about	themselves.		 To	achieve	Socratic	Virtue,	past	behaviors	must	be	taken	into	account.		We	must	use	them	to	inform	us	about	who	we	are	as	people.	Imagine	that	a	person	conceives	of	himself	or	herself	as	having	a	commitment	to	truthfulness,	or	to	timeliness.		He	or	she	has	a	disposition	to	reaffirm	those	commitments	when	asked.		They	are	neglecting	very	important	information	if	they	ignore	their	own	past	
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behaviors.		If,	upon	reflection	of	those	behaviors,	they	find	that	they	lie	frequently	or	that	they	are	always	late,	they	must	take	these	observations	into	account.		 It	is	also	important	to	recognize	that	key	evidence	pertaining	to	these	issues	might	well	come	from	sources	other	than	our	own	self-assessments.		Others	with	whom	we	are	close	may	often	be	in	a	better	position	to	call	to	our	attention	our	more	reliably	performed,	persistent	behaviors.		These	may	be	behaviors	that,	for	whatever	reason,	we	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	see	in	ourselves.		 A	willingness	to	pay	attention	to	relevant	evidence	is	part	of	what	it	is	to	employ	reflective	endorsement	skillfully.		When	an	archer	behaves	skillfully,	he	or	she	moves	in	a	particular	way	because	of	their	possession	of	the	appropriate	kind	of	background	information.		For	a	person’s	self-evaluation	to	be	adroit,	it	must	be	similarly	responsive	to	the	right	kind	of	information.		Appreciating	the	importance	of	reliable	behavioral	dispositions	is	essential	to	skill	of	that	type.		
Knowledge	of	How	Behavior	is	Associated	with	Value		For	an	agent	to	determine	what	really	matters	to	them,	it	will	not	be	enough	to	simply	look	at	their	past	behaviors.		After	all,	past	behaviors,	especially	those	that	occur	when	people	are	very	young,	often	demonstrate	a	lack	of	understanding	about	how	a	behavior	is	connected	to	a	value	or	set	of	values.	Coming	to	have	an	understanding	of	the	connection	between	behaviors	and	values	is	also	important	to	engaging	in	reflective	endorsement	skillfully.				 This	is	a	concept	that	is	familiar	from	Aristotle’s	ethics.		On	Aristotle’s	view,	very	young	people	are	consumed	with	pleasure,	and	it	is	only	after	looking	to	the	
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virtuous	and	becoming	habituated	that	the	agent	recognizes	the	connection	between	virtue	and	action.		He	says:		Actions	are	called	just	or	temperate	when	they	are	the	sort	that	a	just	or	temperate	person	would	do.	But	the	just	and	temperate	person	is	not	the	one	who	merely	does	these	actions,	but	the	one	who	also	does	them	in	the	way	in	which	just	or	temperate	people	do	them.108		So,	for	Aristotle,	the	just	or	temperate	person	doesn’t	simply	engage	in	the	appropriate	behavior	given	the	situation.		The	person	has	been	habituated	to	recognize	the	connection	between	the	action	and	the	virtue.		 Similarly,	skillful	endorsement	must	be	more	than	simply	empty	avowal.		An	agent’s	reflective	endorsement	is	adroit	when	they	recognize	the	range	of	behaviors	that	certain	endorsements	entail.		A	tendency	toward	ignorance	or	misinformation	represents	diminished	skill	or,	in	the	more	extreme	cases,	a	lack	of	skill.		 Consider	the	case	of	a	Michelle,	who	professes	to	care	about	the	environment.		Perhaps	this	attitude	was	instilled	in	her	in	a	somewhat	clumsy	way	in	grade	school.		Despite	her	claim	to	care	about	the	environment,	she	engages	in	many	practices	that	have	serious	negative	environmental	impacts.		She	eats	meat,	doesn’t	recycle,	drives	her	car	to	work	rather	than	taking	accessible	public	transportation,	and	allows	her	car	to	idle	while	she	waits	for	her	kids	to	come	out	of	school	so	that	she	can	keep	the	air	conditioning	running	in	the	summer.		Her	behaviors	don’t	actually	bear	out	her	claim	to	care	about	the	environment.				 I’m	not	denying,	here,	that	Michelle	experiences	strong	reactive	attitudes	when	she	introspects	about	the	environment.		She	meets	an	internal	component	for																																																									108	Aristotle,	W.	D.	Ross,	and	Lesley	Brown.	2009.	The	Nicomachean	ethics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		
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caring.		What	I	am	suggesting	here	is	that	skillful	endorsement	has	external	components	as	well	as	internal	components.		It	is	not	enough	for	the	archer	to	simply	understand	how	to	move	his	body	in	order	to	get	the	arrow	to	fly	in	one	direction	or	another.		If	he	really	wants	to	be	skilled	at	archery,	there	are	other	things	that	he	must	know.		Similarly,	if	a	person	really	cares	about	something,	whether	that	thing	is	a	thing,	a	person,	or	a	practical	identity,	there	is	an	external	obligation	to	become	knowledgeable	about	the	thing	in	question	if	a	person	wants	to	care	well.		 What	I’ve	said	about	people	who	lack	information	also	applies	to	people	who	possess	inaccurate	information.		Let’s	go	back	to	our	example	of	the	woman	in	the	Friedman	chapter	who	desires	to	feed	her	family	and	children	only	healthy	food.		She	mistakenly	comes	to	believe	that	all	and	only	food	that	is	organic	is	healthy	food.		Here,	I	am	reminded	of	a	scene	from	Harold	and	Maude	in	which	Maude	offers	young	Harold	some	champagne.		When	he	informs	her	that	he	doesn’t	drink,	she	replies,	“It’s	alright,	it’s	organic.”		Let’s	imagine	that	our	health	food	minded	mother	reasons	according	to	similar	principles.		Of	course,	not	all	things	that	are	healthy	are	organic,	and	not	all	things	that	are	organic	are	healthy.		If	the	woman	in	this	case	were	to	follow	the	advice	offered	in	the	previous	section	and	reviewed	her	own	past	behaviors,	she	could	do	so	in	more	than	one	way.		The	first	way	is	to	look	at	whether	she	was	always	motivated	by	a	desire	to	feed	her	children	healthy	food.		She	could	also	evaluate	whether	she	has,	in	the	past,	been	the	best	judge	of	what	constituted	healthy	food.		So,	one	point	of	analysis	may	be	not	simply	what	an	agent’s	past	behavior	happened	to	be,	but	also	the	extent	to	which	that	past	behavior	was	
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actually	an	expression	the	values	that	the	agent	claims	to	care	about.		This	is	an	external	condition.				 Should	we,	then,	look	at	our	past	behaviors	themselves,	or	at	the	intentions	behind	our	past	behaviors?	I	think	that	the	answer	is	both.	Sometimes	the	external	world	conspires	against	us	in	the	sense	that	an	action	we	desired	to	be	of	one	type	actually,	in	fact,	turned	out	to	be	a	behavior	of	an	entirely	different	type.		The	woman	intending	to	feed	her	children	healthy	food,	but	being	mistaken	about	what	counts	as	healthy	food	is	a	good	example.		By	contrast,	sometimes	our	actions	are	quite	telling	when	it	comes	to	what	we	actually	care	about,	but	we	our	own	intention	is	not	transparent	to	us.		I	may	act	in	such	and	such	a	way	because	I’m	afraid	of	stepping	outside	my	comfort	zone,	all	the	while	I	am	totally	unaware	that	I	even	have	a	comfort	zone	and	don’t	know	what	it	would	look	like	to	be	outside	of	it.			Reflective	Endorsement	and	Protecting	Against	Hueristics	We	saw	in	the	previous	chapter	that	behavior	that	we	take	ourselves	to	be	endorsing	for	one	reason,	we	might,	in	fact,	be	endorsing	for	different	reasons	altogether.		For	example,	Melinda	might	introspect	and	confirm	to	herself	that	she	is	a	good	student.		She	might	do	this,	even	in	light	of	the	fact	that	it	is	roughly	midway	through	the	semester	and	she	has	entirely	given	up	on	attending	class	regularly.		Instead	of	paying	much	attention	to	her	attendance,	she	focuses	on	her	ability	to	score	decently	well	on	exams	by	simply	searching	the	Internet	for	information	listed	as	weekly	topics	on	the	syllabus.		Why	is	she	capable	of	engaging	in	such	impressive	mental	gymnastics?		It	may	well	be	that	it	is	because	self-serving	heuristics	have	
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come	to	save	the	day,	if	not	with	respect	to	her	grade	at	least	with	respect	to	her	self	esteem.		 Michelle,	a	previously	overweight	person	who	has	been	on	an	exercise	kick	for	years	might	conceive	of	herself	as	overweight.		She	might	discount	the	opinions	of	those	who	tell	her	otherwise	and	may	choose	to	spend	time	with	those	who	confirm	the	negative	image	that	she	has	of	herself.		A	validation	heuristic	might	be	to	blame.		 When	reflective	endorsement	is	adroit,	those	engaging	in	it	are	aware	of	the	possibility	that	the	mind’s	use	of	heuristics	might	masquerade	as	authentic	self-evaluations.		That	such	a	heuristic	is	operative	is	always	a	possibility—serving	as	persistent	local	skeptical	hypothesis.		We	may	never	be	able	to	rule	it	out	entirely,	but,	if	we	want	to	be	skillful,	we	must	keep	the	possibility	in	mind	and	do	what	we	can	to	protect	against	it.		Like	an	archer	making	apt	shots,	the	apt	reflective	endorser	is	familiar	with	their	equipment	and	knows	how	to	protect	against	its	potential	deficiencies.		
Apt	Reflective	Endorsement	Finally,	we	can	paint	a	picture	of	what	it	would	look	like	for	reflective	endorsement	to	be	apt.		Recall	that	an	archer’s	shot	is	apt,	not	simply	under	the	conditions	that	he	or	she	makes	the	shot,	or	simply	under	the	condition	that	the	shot	is	skillful.		In	order	for	the	shot	to	count	as	apt,	the	archer	must	make	the	shot	because	he	or	she	is	skillful.		
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	 Apt	reflective	endorsement	may	look	very	similar.		When	a	person	introspects	aptly,	they	introspect	by	making	use	or	the	best,	most	reliable	information	available	to	them.		If	they	arrive	at	a	position	of	value,	they	must	do	so,	not	as	a	lucky	result	of	useful	heuristics,	but	because	they	are	reflecting	correctly.		
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